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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Institutions and the Performance of Liberal Democracy: Judicial Procedures and the
Efficacy of Constitutional Review
by
Jay N. Krehbiel
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Professor Matthew Gabel, Chair
Modern liberal democracies typically depend on courts with the power of constitutional
review to ensure that elected officials do not breach their constitutional obligations. With
neither the power of the purse nor the sword, the potency of this review is not guaranteed. Courts must rely on government officials for the implementation of judicial rulings.
The ability of a court to ensure that elected officials faithfully implement decisions can
depend critically on the public’s ability to observe elected officials’ responses to judicial
decisions. In this dissertation, I argue that courts strategically use key judicial procedures
to increase the likelihood of public awareness of rulings. Drawing from the comparative
judicial politics literature on separation of powers, public awareness, and noncompliance,
I develop a formal model of one such procedure available to many of the world’s constitutional courts, public oral hearings. The model provides empirical implications for when a
court will hold public hearings and how hearings affect case disposition. I then test these
implications using data on cases and the use of hearings at the German Federal Constitutional Court. The results of this analysis support my argument that courts use hearings
as an institutional tool to address potential noncompliance. An empirical extension of the
theory to the timing of judicial decisions at the German court provides further support
for my argument.

VII

Chapter 1
Introduction
The institution of constitutional review has increasingly become a hallmark of modern liberal democracy. Since the end of World War Two, constitutional review has been
adopted by most of the democratized and democratizing world (Schwartz 2000). From
Western European nations like Germany and Italy to more recently established democracies like Montenegro and South Korea, constitutional review has become a standard
part of democratic political systems. By the year 2011, 83% of the world’s constitutions
included a provision for giving the judicial branch the authority to review the compatibility of state actions, including legislation, with elected officials’ constitutional obligations
(Ginsburg and Versteeg 2014).
These constitutional courts play a pivotal role in democratic politics. Modern liberal
democracies typically depend on courts with the power of constitutional review to consider
alleged breaches of constitutional obligations by government officials. By granting a court
the ability to invalidate legislation, constitution writers hoped to create an institutional
structure that would credibly commit elected governments to things like the rule of law and
the protection of citizens’ rights from the state (North and Weingast 1989). Perhaps most
importantly, courts can serve to constrain governing majorities. For example, the Kosovo
Constitutional Court, created in 2009, was granted the “authority to review legislation
and individual complaints of rights violations” in order to make the court “the ultimate
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check on legislative and executive power in Kosovo and the final arbiter of the meaning of
constitutional provisions enshrining human rights and freedoms” (Constitutional Court
of Kosovo 2016). Similarly, the German Federal Constitutional Court’s core duties are to
“ensure that the constitution...is obeyed” and to secure individuals’ “fundamental rights”
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 2016). The quality of democratic governance has come to
depend on the ability of judiciaries to effectively carry out these duties.

The Fundamental Challenge of Noncompliance
Although constitutional review has become a prominent feature of modern liberal
democratic politics, the potency of review is fundamentally limited. Courts are inherently weak institutions. With neither the power of the sword nor the purse, courts cannot
directly enforce their own decisions. Unlike the executives with their “swords” or legislatures with their “purses”, courts have few formal powers to ensure court orders are
carried out. Constitutional review provisions typically grant courts the authority to issue
rulings on the constitutionality of government actions and legislation, but rarely provide
judges with the institutional tools needed to implement and enforce those decisions. As a
consequence, compliance with the rulings of constitutional courts relies on the willingness
of elected officials to faithfully implement a court’s decision.
This institutional arrangement leaves courts in a potentially precarious situation. Judiciaries are tasked with constraining governing majorities, and yet at the same time they
are reliant on these very same elected officials for the implementation of their decisions.
Of course, obtaining such cooperation from elected officials poses no challenge to judicial
authority when a court’s decision conforms with their interests. Even in striking down
legislation, courts can anticipate compliance when the governing majority prefers the discontinuation of the policy under review (Whittington 2005). Similarly, courts may enjoy
substantial latitude in their decision making when governing majorities view courts as a
form of political insurance protecting their interests in the event of future electoral defeat (Ginsburg 2003). Governments might also view courts as beneficial actors providing
2

elected officials information on the efficacy of current policies (Rogers 2001). In circumstances such as these, the court’s reliance on the other branches of government poses may
pose little threat to the efficacy of constitutional review.
A court’s institutional weakness becomes problematic for the efficacy of review, however, when the preferences of those other branches diverge from those of the court. In
such cases, courts must rely on the government for implementation, even when doing so
is counter to the interests of the actor directed to implement the decision. Faced with a
decision constraining their own power and striking down their preferred policies, elected
officials have an incentive to not comply with the court’s ruling by ignoring or even outright defying the court. Scholars have noted the occasional use of noncompliance in a
number of contexts (Rosenberg 2008; Spriggs 1996; Vanberg 2001, 2005; Staton 2006,
2010; Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 2008; Carrubba and Zorn 2010; Carrubba and Gabel
2015).
Courts are not blind to this threat of government noncompliance. With few or no
formal powers to prevent officials from engaging in noncompliance or to punish them when
they do, courts face a choice when confronted with potential noncompliance. On the one
hand, a court can resolve the conflict by refraining from ruling against the government’s
preferences. By deferring in this way to the government, the court essentially avoids
the issue of noncompliance entirely by aligning its ruling with the preferences of the
government. On the other hand, a court can face the threat of noncompliance head on by
ruling against the government and striking down the challenged legislation. But in doing
so, the court runs the risk of having its decision ignored or defied.
A recent case from the German Federal Constitutional Court helps illustrate the nature
of this potentially difficult situation. In 2010, the court received a case challenging the
constitutionality of the state law governing university professors’ salaries in the state of
Hesse. The plaintiff in the case was asking the court to strike down the statute on the
grounds that it set salaries unconstitutionally low. To declare the law unconstitutional,
however, would require the court to rule against the preferences and explicit wishes of both
3

the state government of Hesse and the federal government, the two government entities
who would be called upon to implement the court’s decision. The court faced something of
a dilemma - if it struck down the challenged statute, obtaining compliance would depend
on the choices of elected officials with a vested interest in the continued implementation
of the overturned policy. How, then, could the court ensure the implementation of its
decision if it chose to strike down the challenged statute?1
Cases such as this highlight the potential for tension between courts and governments
and bring into focus the fundamental puzzle this project seeks to help answer. How can
a constitutional court effectively constrain a government and obtain compliance with its
decisions? In particular, how can a constitutional court do so when the governing majority
has an incentive to engage in noncompliance? In what follows, I briefly review the existing
literature on this question and then present my argument. I then proceed to discuss the
theoretical and empirical approach I employ in the project. I conclude with an outline of
the remaining chapters.

Theoretical Solutions to the Noncompliance Problem
That courts regularly are able to successfully constrain governments indicates the
existence of some mechanism compelling elected officials to comply with judicial decisions
striking down legislation. Several theories seek to identify this mechanism. Institutions
feature prominently in many of these theories. For one, governing majorities may feel it is
in their best interest to have an effective judiciary capable of constraining the government.
As discussed earlier, uncertainty over future electoral or policy outcomes can incentivize
officials to create, empower, and maintain a constitutional court as a form of insurance
(Ginsburg 2003; Ramseyer 1994). By complying with the court today, officials aim to
create a reciprocal arrangement with their competitors that will ensure they similarly
1

In the conclusion, I return to this case in a more in-depth discussion of its circum-

stances and the court’s actions through the adjudication process. In particular, I consider
how my argument helps understand this case.
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comply with the court if the current governing majority falls out of power.
For another, the efficacy of courts may be determined by the arrangement of preferences held by the other branches of government. In such an account, the ability of courts
to obtain compliance is reliant on one or more political institutions bringing pressure
on the complying actors. Judicial authority results from either having the aid of another institution capable of compelling compliance or sufficient discord amongst the other
branches of government that they cannot coordinate on a response to judicial decisions.
If, however, one of these conditions is not met, courts are constrained by the threat of
noncompliance and thus have an incentive to avoid the conflict with governments that can
arise from striking down legislation, even if the constitutionality of the statute is highly
suspect (Epstein and Knight 1998; Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova 2001; Ramseyer and
Rasmusen 2001; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Helmke 2005).
While these accounts provide powerful insights into the politics of constitutional review, they cannot fully answer the question of why the same court might be able to obtain
compliance in one case but then be unable to do so in another case despite no changes
in the arrangement of the other political institutions’ preferences. These accounts are
well suited for explaining the creation of constitutional courts and providing a sense of
the limits of judicial power, but they do not provide an explanation for the cases when
a court strikes down a statute and obtains compliance against the wishes of a governing
majority. If reciprocity were the motivation for compliance, then it is unclear why some
decisions are met with compliance and others are met with noncompliance. And if courts
are wholly limited by the preferences of other institutions, then it is similarly unclear why
governments sometimes comply despite simultaneously protesting the court’s decision.
If institutions alone cannot fully explain how courts obtain compliance and when they
are able to do so, then some additional mechanism must be involved. Public support
for a court can serve as this force compelling government compliance. If a court enjoys
considerable public support, elected officials may opt to comply with the court’s rulings
in order to avoid upsetting voters. The public support needed to engender this response
5

from governments can take one of two forms: diffuse support or specific support (Gibson,
Caldeira and Baird 1998). Outlined by Easton (1975), citizens might support an institution due to the particular content of its actions (specific support) or they might do so
because they view an institution as legitimate (diffuse support). In the context of courts,
specific support corresponds to the public’s support for the policy choices made by judges
and diffuse support is the public’s support for the judiciary as a legitimate institution
and important feature of democratic governance even when the court makes unpopular
decisions. In other words, diffuse support is public support enjoyed by a court when it
makes a decision the public does not like. While specific support and diffuse support are
largely viewed as linked (Mondak 1991, 1992; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson, Caldeira
and Baird 1998; Gibson et al. 2003), there is a key distinction between the two. A court
tasked with effectively constraining a governing majority is likely to be called upon to
strike down statutes popular with the public. In order for public support to compel government compliance, citizens must back the legitimacy of the court and its decision even
when they dislike the specific content of the ruling.
Although diffuse public support can account for how courts can obtain compliance
even in the face of government resistance, it does not explain why the same court can
obtain compliance in some cases and not in others. If a high level of public support
were sufficient for compliance, then a court with such support would never be ignored
or defied by elected officials. Yet this is not the empirical reality facing even the most
highly esteemed courts (e.g. Carrubba and Zorn 2010; Vanberg 2005). Examining the
German Federal Constitutional Court, Vanberg (2001, 2005) argues that the impact of
public support on the efficacy of constitutional review is conditioned by the likelihood
the public will become aware of government noncompliance. When the public is aware of
a case and the court enjoys a high level of support, the court is free to rule against the
government with the knowledge that voters will hold their elected officials accountable
for noncompliance. If, however, the public is unaware of a case and the government’s
noncompliance, then voters cannot punish officials, even if they staunchly support the
6

court’s legitimacy.
A key feature of Vanberg’s argument is that courts cannot assume their rulings will
always attract the necessary public attention to assure compliance. As Staton (2006,
2010) shows, however, courts are not entirely helpless. Studying the Mexican Supreme
Court, Staton demonstrates that public attention is endogenous to judicial behavior.
While Staton focuses on the use of public relations efforts, his theory draws attention to
the ability of courts to use their resources strategically to enhance the chances of gaining
compliance. If Staton’s argument holds in general, we would expect to see courts using
other institutional tools at their disposal to raise public awareness about their rulings
when faced with potential noncompliance.
The central argument of this project is that judicial procedures can serve as such
institutional tools for courts to increase public awareness when faced with potential noncompliance. The judicial process typically offers courts mechanisms for raising the profile
of a case. Some procedures can expand the media exposure of a case and create opportunities for media access to the court. Other facets of the process can influence the salience
of a case and the likelihood of the public becoming aware of a decision. This project
focuses on one of the most prominent judicial procedures, the public oral hearing.
Building on the theoretical and empirical work of Vanberg (2001, 2005) and Staton
(2006, 2010), I argue that courts call public oral hearings to promote compliance. Perhaps more than any other judicial procedure, public oral hearings tend to increase public
awareness of cases. Unlike most aspects of judicial deliberation, hearings are typically
both open to the public and, importantly, the media. Focusing on this aspect of hearings, I contend that courts’ use of hearings is strategically linked to the potential for
noncompliance in a case.
To illustrate my argument, I develop a formal model of the interaction between a
government and a court empowered to hold a public oral hearing. I demonstrate that
courts can use hearings to improve the likelihood of compliance, but that there are also
limits to what the procedure can accomplish. There are some cases that hearings cannot
7

bring into the public consciousness. There are others that governments will fight regardless
of a court’s strategic use of procedures. But for some, the increase in public awareness
brought on by a public oral hearing can empower a court and bring a government to
comply. The theoretical argument and empirical analysis presented in the coming chapters
clarify how and when hearings can successfully fulfill this role of enhancing the efficacy of
constitutional review.

Theoretical and Empirical Approach
The theoretical approach I employ in this project centers on a formal model. There are
several advantages to using a formal model when analyzing complex research questions
such as the one posed here. First, models promote parsimony. Constitutional review
is a complex process. A model allows me to narrow my focus onto the specific actions
of interest, like the use of a public oral hearing. To do this, I must make a number of
assumptions about how courts and governments operate. For example, I am interested
here in how courts relate to external institutional pressures, and so I do not model the
internal politics of bargaining within a court (Maltzman, Spriggs II and Wahlbeck 2000).
Similarly, I am focused on how a governing majority responds to a judicial ruling rather
than the negotiating that takes place in coalition governments (Martin and Vanberg 2004,
2011). It is not that these aspects of politics are unimportant, but rather that they are
not central to the problem of interest.
Second, models force scholars to be explicit about the assumptions and choices made
in modeling this simplified world. The players, what they care about, and the actions
they can take are all defined and transparently presented. Models require us to assume
away aspects of the real world, but the manner in which we must make such assumptions
eliminates any ambiguity over what is included and what is excluded from the model. And
while the plausibility of the assumptions made in a model can be debated, the transparent
nature of models specifies the precise assumption or claim under scrutiny.
Third, models can motivate rich empirical analysis by yielding empirically-testable
8

implications. The findings of a game theoretic model, just like those of any deductive
theory, follow logically from the assumptions made. By developing an argument in this
manner, we can identify implications for how the players in the game should behave. Some
of these implications may be straightforward and fairly obvious. Others, however, may be
counterintuitive or nuanced relationships that would be difficult to discern without the
aid of a model. Such results can often inform empirical analyses, which, importantly, can
empirically distinguish the argument promoted in the model from alternative accounts
and explanations.
The empirical approach I employ complements this theoretical approach. I use the
German Federal Constitutional Court as my case study. Centering the analysis on a single
country allows me to appropriately match the model’s propositions and assumptions to
an empirical setting. Aspects of judicial politics and institutional design, for example, can
be best accounted for by eliminating cross-national variation. Put another way, a singlecountry analysis is best suited for the task of mapping the assumptions made in the
model to the real world. Furthermore, focusing on one court allows me to more effectively
collect the detailed information needed to test the model’s empirical implications. Of
course, this approach does not come without costs. Designing empirical research around
one country necessarily limits the scope and generalizability of the findings. However, the
abstract nature of the model ensures that the empirical hypotheses are not dependent
on the specific context of Germany. As I discuss later in the project, the German court
provides a useful case for testing my theory, but it is not the only potential case.

Plan of the Project
The remainder of the project is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical argument. I begin the chapter by providing an extensive discussion of public oral
hearings that shows the procedure’s prominence and widespread use in the world’s judiciaries. The chapter then goes on to consider how hearings might address noncompliance
and present potential alternative explanations for the use of hearings. In order to specify
9

empirical hypotheses distinguishing my argument from these alternatives, I construct a
game theoretic model of an interaction between a court and government. The model identifies conditions under which courts can use hearings to address potential noncompliance
and when hearings are most likely to have a substantive impact on case disposition. These
results suggest that courts use hearings improve the likelihood of government compliance
and enhance the ability of constitutional courts to effectively exercise constitutional review. In doing so, the model provides a series of testable empirical implications.
Chapter 3 transitions the analysis from the abstract nature of the theoretical argument
to the case study that forms the basis for testing the theory’s empirical implications, the
German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). The chapter begins with a brief history
of the FCC focused on the court’s creation and early attempts to establish itself in the
German political system. I then describe the institutional structure of the FCC, including
the court’s appointment process, jurisdiction, organization, and process. I then turn to
assessing the compatibility of the FCC with the key assumptions and features of the
theoretical model. In particular, the chapter focuses on the connection between hearings
and media coverage, the risk of noncompliance facing the FCC, and the degree of public
support for the FCC.
In Chapter 4, I test the model’s implications for the court’s use of public oral hearings
and the relationship between hearings and case disposition. To carry out this analysis I
use an original dataset on constitutional review cases at the German court. This dataset,
covering all instances of constitutional review from 1995 to 2013 for which the court had
discretion over hearings, includes a series of variables on case characteristics as well as
variables capturing aspects of the political circumstances surrounding each case. I then
extend the data back to 1983 by merging this dataset with Vanberg’s (2005) dataset on
FCC decisions. I find that the FCC is more likely to hold a public oral hearing when
noncompliance is potentially at issue in a case. This relationship, however, is conditioned
by the expected effectiveness of the proceeding at increasing public awareness of the case.
I further find that the court is more likely to rule against the government by striking down
10

a statute as unconstitutional in cases granted a hearing. These findings provide nuanced
insights into the strategic behavior of courts and, critically, remain robust to controlling
for a series of alternative explanations for the use of hearings and their impact on case
disposition.
In Chapter 5, I extend the theoretical and empirical analysis to a second potential
institutional tool available to courts, the timing of decisions. Building off the model in
Chapter 2, I develop a theoretical account of constitutional review that explores how
a court can address the noncompliance problem by strategically timing its decisions. I
argue that the likelihood of public awareness is affected by the electoral calendar in such
a manner that cases decided in the period immediately preceding an election are, all else
equal, more likely to garner the public’s attention. The ability of courts to effectively take
advantage of this feature of electoral campaigns, however, is limited by uncertainty in the
length of each electoral term. Using data on media coverage of German politics generally
and FCC decisions specifically, I find evidence suggestive of a media coverage “bump”
for cases decided in the months immediately prior to a national election. An empirical
analysis of the timing of FCC decisions provides further evidence that the court is more
likely to strike down legislation as unconstitutional in this pre-election period, but only
when faced with potential noncompliance and when the upcoming election is at the end
of a standard electoral term.
I conclude in Chapter 6. The chapter begins by offering a summary of the theoretical
and empirical results. Next, I consider the implications of my project for understanding
cases by returning to the illustrative example briefly introduced earlier in this chapter.
I then discuss the implications of my research for a range of topics in German politics,
judicial politics, and, more broadly, comparative politics and the study of democratic
systems. The chapter then raises a number of questions for future research and analysis. I
conclude with a discussion on what the project tells us about the role of judicial procedures
in modern liberal democracies and their impact on the quality of democratic governance.
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Chapter 2
A Strategic Theory of Public Oral
Hearings
How can constitutional courts use public oral hearings to address potential noncompliance? When might we expect to observe a court holding hearings to such an end? And
what are the consequences of such a strategy for case disposition and ultimately the efficacy of constitutional review? In this chapter, I address these questions by developing a
strategic theory of public oral hearings in which I describe how a court might use hearings
as an institutional tool for overcoming noncompliance. The model formalizes the interaction between a government and a court with discretion over which cases receive a public
oral hearing. In doing so, the model yields several insights into the influence potential
noncompliance has on a court’s procedural choices and the downstream consequences of
those choices for the ability of a court to obtain compliance from government officials.
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I begin by describing public
oral hearings from a comparative perspective. I will show the widespread discretionary
use of hearings in constitutional courts and further provide an intuition for why public oral
hearings might serve as an especially useful institutional tool for increasing the likelihood
of compliance by raising public awareness of judicial decisions. In the second section,
I develop a game theoretic model of judicial-government relations in which the court
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has discretion over holding a hearing. I then provide a discussion of the model’s results
and implications. The chapter concludes by considering the extent to which public oral
hearings can help courts overcome the noncompliance problem.

Public Oral Hearings as an Institutional Tool
Public oral hearings are one of the most prominent judicial procedures in many of
the world’s constitutional courts. Hearings provide litigants the opportunity to state
their arguments directly to the court and to answer justices’ questions. Moreover, the
public nature of hearings means that members of the media can observe the proceedings
and the public can consequently become increasingly aware of the court, cases, and legal
issues. Together, these features of hearings create a unique environment that intersects
the interests of judges, litigants, the media, and the broader public.
The typical public oral hearing at the Austrian Constitutional Court illustrates this
well. Hearings begin with a presentation by the Permanent Reporter assigned to the case.1
This presentation includes an overview of the case facts, the legal issues at question and
the litigants’ positions on those questions. Once this background information has been
presented, the justices’ questioning of the litigants begins. This predominantly involves
the judges asking the parties present to clarify certain aspects of their arguments, although
the justices can additionally delve into issues such as the legal or policy implications of
the case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the President of the court closes the session by
informing the parties of whether the court’s decision will be issued orally or in writing.
The proceedings are open to the public and, to a limited extent, the media.
The public nature of hearings is particularly noteworthy in the context of judicial
decision making. While much of the judicial process, such as deliberations, takes place
behind closed doors, public oral hearings provide an opportunity for litigants, citizens, and
the media to watch the court conduct its business. As Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs II
1

The Permanent Reporters are elected by the plenum of the Constitutional Court from

among its members for a three year term of office.
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(2006) described it in the context of oral arguments at the Supreme Court, hearings
serve as “the most visible element” of the decision making process. This visibility, and
the insight it provides citizens on both what their courts do and how they go about
doing it, has led the public oral hearing to occupy an influential role in many judiciaries’
relationships with their respective publics.
Recognizing the ability of hearings to engage the public, the rules governing public
oral hearings at many of the world’s constitutional courts include specific provisions regarding media coverage of proceedings. These provisions typically outline the degree of
media access to hearings and specify what can and cannot be broadcasted or recorded.
For example, paragraph 1 of Article 28 in the Slovenian Constitutional Court Rules of
Procedure states that “filming and photographing during public hearings is not allowed,
however, it is allowed prior to a public hearing and at the oral pronouncement of Constitutional Court decisions,” while the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of
the Republic of Croatia similarly affirms the ability of journalists and media reporters to
“be present at the...public hearing.”2 The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom takes
media access a step further by providing live online streaming of all proceedings before
the court. And even in courts that do not have formal rules specifying media access,
norms of transparency have led many courts to allow recordings of portions of hearings.3
However these courts define media access, the key takeaway from these examples is that
courts structure the relationship between hearings and the media.
The second distinguishing feature of public oral hearings is their infrequent use by
many constitutional courts. In contemporary liberal democracies, constitutional courts
typically have discretion over which cases are granted a public oral hearing. While courts
are often required to hold hearings for certain types of cases, such as impeachments and
2

Article 47, Para 3 of the Act. The full text reads “Journalists and the media reporters

may be present at the Session and the public hearing as well as the other gatherings in
the Constitutional Court.”
3
As we will see in the next chapter, this is the case at the German Constitutional
Court.
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political party prohibitions, the decision to hold a hearing is often left to the court for
more common proceedings like concrete judicial review cases. In such cases, a court’s
internal rules govern the decsionmaking process on the use of hearings. Although the
specifics of these rules vary across country, they commonly grant the power to determine
the use of a hearing to the court’s president (e.g. South Africa, Austria).
This ability of courts to rule with or without public oral hearings and, in so doing,
control the media’s access to the courtroom without limiting the judges’ capacity to
adjudicate cases, is found in a diverse set of courts. Table 2.1 provides a breakdown of this
discretion across a sample of 40 high courts from around the world. The geographically
varied sample includes many of the most prominent and power constitutional courts, such
as the German Constitutional Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as several less
established or newer constitutional courts such as those recently created in Kosovo and
Albania. Of the 40 courts in the sample, 27 have wide discretion over the use of hearings in
constitutional review cases. These 27 include courts at varying stages of development and
from disparate political contexts. Notably, discretion over hearings is not clearly related
to the influence or power of a constitutional court. Courts that have struggled to assert
their authority over other political institutions, such as the Russian Constitutional Court
(Trochev 2008), have such discretion, as do the highly influential German and Austrian
constitutional courts. Similarly, discretion is limited in both powerful courts (e.g. U.S.
Supreme Court) and courts struggling to assert themselves in their domestic political
arenas (e.g. Hungary, Romania). One trend worth noting is the increasing prevalence
of discretionary hearings in newer constitutional courts, which may be suggestive of a
growing acceptance of such an arrangement in the design of courts.
Despite the prominence of public oral hearings in modern constitutional courts and
the ability of many courts to harness the use of this key procedure, scholarly attention
to hearings has been limited and predominantly focused on the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g.
Johnson 2001, 2004; Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs II 2006). One result of this focus
on the U.S. Supreme Court, which holds hearings for most constitutional review cases, is
15

Table 2.1: High Court Discretion over Public Oral Hearings
Wide Judicial
Discretion

Little or No
Discretion

Albania
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Germany
Israel
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Kosovo
Macedonia
Moldova
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine

Australia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Denmark
Greece
Hungary1
Iceland
Italy
Norway
Poland
Portugal1
Romania
UK Supreme Court
US Supreme Court2

1

Only written proceedings used.
While not required, the court typically holds oral arguments
in cases involving the constitutional review of statutes.
Sources: Official court websites, European Commission for
Democracy through Law’s 2010 “Study on Individual
Access to Constitutional Justice”.
2
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that scholars have not given attention to why a court holds a hearing. As a consequence,
the extant literature has sought to answer the impact of hearings independently of the
rationale for the hearing in the first place. The theory presented here addresses these two
questions as inextricably linked in the context of the many courts that have discretion over
hearings. Before developing the formal model, however, it is useful to consider how extant
accounts of the role hearings play in decision making, particularly at the U.S Supreme
Court, could be applicable in a comparative context or, at a minimum, informative with
respect to potential alternative accounts to the theoretical argument presented here.
One potential use of hearings is to address a court’s normative or functional goals, such
as increasing the transparency of salient cases and promoting the legitimacy of decisions.
By allowing litigants to have their day in court, hearings can enhance the perceived fairness
and legitimacy of the court’s ultimate decision. This “procedural fairness” can ensure that
litigants accept the court’s decision and, ultimately, the institution’s legitimacy (Tyler
1994, 2003). Moreover, the public nature of hearings provides a degree of transparency
in the judicial process that is otherwise conducted out of the public eye. Transparency
can similarly enhance the legitimacy of the court’s ultimate decision by promoting the
appearance of a fair process. In both instances, hearings serve a functional purpose as a
means to achieving a normative goal.
A second account of hearings addresses the informational aspect of the procedure.
Examining the U.S. Supreme Court, Johnson (2001, 2004) argues that the court uses
hearings as a means for obtaining information that in turn enhances the court’s ability
to ensure its decisions result in the justices’ preferred policy outcome. Hearings reduce
uncertainty over policy conditions, which allows the court to make more precise decisions
than it otherwise would. The function of hearings by this account, then, is to help judges
craft their opinions to ensure the implementation of the decision results in the desired
policy outcome.
The potential influence of hearings on case disposition has similarly been studied in
the context of the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, empirical research on the U.S.
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Supreme Court shows that oral arguments advantage the government’s position because
the government typically has superior representation in the form of the Solicitor General
(Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs II 2006). The government’s resources, coupled with
the reputation and experience gained from repeated arguments at the court, give the
Solicitor General an edge in oral arguments at potentially persuading justices to adopt
the government’s viewpoint. As a result, oral arguments more often than not ultimately
serve to improve the federal government’s probability of success at the court.
Below, I develop a formal argument of how a court can use public oral hearings to
promote compliance. In short, I argue that hearings provide courts an opportunity to
influence public awareness of judicial decisions, which in turn enhances the capacity of a
constitutional court to ensure that government officials comply with that decision. The
formalization of this argument is valuable because it distinguishes my argument from these
extant theoretical and empirical claims about the relationships between oral hearings,
the likelihood of government noncompliance, and case disposition. For one, if courts
use hearings to pursue the normative goals like transparency and legitimacy, then they
should be more likely to use hearings in publicly salient cases. Salient cases are more
likely to involve government actions where compliance is at issue. For another, if it is the
case that hearings benefit the government, then the court’s likelihood of ruling against
the government should be lower in cases granted a hearing. The formal model will help
to clarify the strategic argument advanced here and identify empirical implications that
distinguish my argument from extant ones like those described above.

A Formal Model of Public Oral Hearings
Following the example of Vanberg (2001, 2005) and Staton (2006, 2010), I use a single
period game of incomplete information. The game has two players: a government4 , G,
4

I treat the government as a unitary actor since many of the courts with discretion

over hearings are in countries with a fused executive. Indeed, most of the courts in my
sample that have discretion operate in such a system.
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and a court, C. I assume the government prefers its policy upheld and the court prefers
to strike down the challenged law as unconstitutional. I further assume that the court
enjoys a high level of public support such that the government is always punished when
the public observes noncompliance. Upon receiving a case, the court chooses whether to
hold a public oral hearing (H = 1) or forego doing so (H = 0). The court then issues its
decision and either upholds (V = 0) or vetoes (V = 1) the challenged government action.
If the court upholds, the game ends as the government automatically complies. If the
court vetoes, the government responds by either evading (E = 1) or complying (E = 0)
with the ruling. The game then ends and payoffs are realized. The timing of the game is
summarized as follows:
1. Court receives a case
2. Court chooses to hold a hearing (H = 1) or not hold a hearing (H = 0).
3. Court chooses to uphold (V = 0) or veto (V = 1) the challenged law. If the court
chooses V = 0, the game ends.
4. If the court vetoes, the government chooses to evade (E = 1) or comply (E = 0).
5. Game ends, payoffs are realized.
I now turn to the utility functions of the players. I specify three components of the
court’s utility function. First, a policy component captures the importance of the policy
at issue in a case to the court. This component accounts for the long-standing finding in
the judicial politics literature that judges have preferences regarding the outcome of cases
(e.g George and Epstein 1992; Baum 2009). It is important to note, however, that I am
agnostic here as to the source of the court’s preferences. That is, the model makes no
claims about, for example, whether the court is motivated by ideology (i.e. the attitudinal
model (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002) or legal principles (i.e. the
legal model). Rather, this component of the court’s utility distills these distinct accounts
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into a single parameter in the model. I label this parameter A, where A > 0.5 Since I
assume the court has preferences divergent from the government, the court only receives
A when it vetoes and the government complies.
The second component represents the institutional costs of noncompliance. Successful
noncompliance can undermine public confidence in the court’s ability to effectively constrain other institutions and ultimately harm the court’s institutional legitimacy. Moreover, successful noncompliance can harm how the court is perceived by other political
institutions, which can encourage further noncompliance. That courts concern themselves with these negative institutional consequences of noncompliance has been well established in the literature (Clark 2009; Staton 2010; Vanberg 2005; Stephenson 2004;
Carrubba 2009; Caldeira 1987; Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 1995; Rogers 2001). In the
model, I capture the potential institutional cost attached to a case with the parameter
I, where I > 0. The court incurs this cost when the government successfully evades;
otherwise I equals 0.
The third component of the court’s utility function is the cost of holding a hearing.
Judges have limited time, especially in courts with mandatory dockets. Frequently faced
with overwhelming caseloads, dedicating at least a full day to a hearing for a single case
comes at considerable cost. In addition to the opportunity cost of holding a hearing, the
proceedings require courts to use their limited budgetary resources. The model captures
these costs with the parameter κ, where κ > 0. To summarize, the utility function of the
court is:

EUC (H = 0) = A(V )(π) − I(V )(1 − π)
EUC (H = 1) = A(V )(φ) − I(V )(1 − φ) − κ
5

This conditions simply represents the assumption that the court always has some

policy interest in a case. This condition is particularly justifiable since constitutional law
cases typically have particularly serious policy implications.
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The government’s utility has two components. The first component is the importance
of the challenged policy to the government. I assume that the government always attaches some value to the policy under review. This is, of course, not to say that courts
and elected officials never agree on policy. Rather, I make this assumption for a clear
theoretical reason. The model is intended to provide intuition into a court’s response to
the implementation problem. If, however, the government places no value on the challenged policy, then there is no implementation problem and, as a result, the model is
no longer useful. By assuming that at least some policy divergence exists between the
court and the government, I am ensuring that the model captures the political environment of theoretical interest here. The value the government places on the challenged
policy is represented by α, where α > 0. The government gains α if either the court
upholds or the government successfully evades a judicial veto. The second component
of the government’s utility function is the potential electoral backlash from the public
for noncompliance. This component captures the theoretical claim that voters punish
elected officials when the voters observe those officials failing or refusing to comply with
the decision of a legitimate court. In the model, this electoral punishment is captured by
the parameter β, where β > 0. To summarize, the utility function of the government is:

EUG (H = 0) = α(E)(1 − π) − β(E)(π)
EUG (H = 1) = α(E)(1 − φ) − β(E)(φ)

Both players have a common prior belief, π, about the probability of the public becoming aware of evasion by the government when the court does not hold a hearing. The
model’s innovation is the addition of a second belief, φ, the public becoming aware when
a hearing is held. I assume the likelihood of public awareness is strictly greater for cases
granted a hearing (φ > π). As with the probability π, both the government and court
share the same belief about φ. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the model’s parameters.
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Table 2.2: Model Parameters
Probabilities

Explanation

Restriction

π
φ

Baseline Probability of Public Awareness
Probability of Public Awareness After a Hearing

0<π<1
0<π<φ<1

Court’s policy payoff
Court’s institutional cost
Court’s cost of holding a hearing
Government’s policy payoff
Government’s electoral cost

A>0
I>0
κ>0
α>0
β>0

Utility Components
A
I
κ
α
β

Results
The solution concept for the game is subgame perfection. I limit the analysis to
pure strategies. To aid the analysis, I state the definitions that structure the equilibria
conditions. Each definition identifies a threshold governs each actor’s choice. This allows
me to structure the equilibria in a straightforward manner and provide a clearer exposition
of the results. The relevant actor’s strategy is determined by whether π, or φ when the
court holds a hearing, is greater or less than the threshold.
Definition 1.1: Define the “Government Compliance Threshold” as:
TGComp ≡

α
α+β

The first definition delineates the threshold by which the government determines
whether or not to evade a judicial veto. I refer to this threshold as the “Government
Compliance Threshold.” If π, or φ when the court holds a hearing, is less than this value,
then the government chooses to evade the ruling. This threshold is determined by the
two components of the government’s utility function. As the importance of the challenged
policy to the government increases, or the political backlash for noncompliance decreases,
the government is more willing to engage in noncompliance. In other words, the threshold
indicates that the value of π, or φ, must be higher to incentivize the government to comply when the government either values the policy highly or the potential electoral cost of
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noncompliance is low.
Definition 1.2: Define the “Judicial Veto Threshold” as:
TCV eto ≡

I
A+I

The second definition concerns the court’s decision of whether or not to veto the challenged government action. I label this inequality the “Judicial Veto Threshold.” The
court vetoes only if π, or φ when the court holds a hearing, is greater than the threshold
value. As the court becomes increasingly confident in the likelihood of public awareness
of its decision, the court’s willingness to strike down legislation as unconstitutional correspondingly rises. This relationship, however, is conditioned by the policy and institutional
implications of the case. When the institutional costs associated with noncompliance are
high, the court becomes increasingly cautious about striking down laws by only striking
down laws when the probability of public awareness is similarly high. In contrast, the
court’s willingness to challenge the government increases when the court places significant
importance on the policy under review. In such instances, the court will strike down a
law even under less transparent conditions.
Definition 1.3: Define the “Judicial Public Hearing Threshold” as:
TCHearing ≡

K
A+I

The third threshold, which I refer to as the “Judicial Public Hearing Threshold.”
defines the court’s decision to hold a public hearing. The court will only hold a public
oral hearing if this condition is met. The parameter values necessary for this condition
to obtain, however, vary with the values taken by π and φ. Specifically, whether or
not the court holds a hearing is a function of the court’s willingness to strike down the
legislation as unconstitutional and the likelihood of the government complying with the
court’s decision. Of course, these conditions are endogenous to the game and themselves
functions of the players’ utility functions. Below I address these equilibria condition, along
with discussions of their substantive significance.
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In total, there are eight subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in the game.6 In discussing
these equilibria, I group them into categories. The following propositions summarize the
equilibria. The proofs of the equilibria are left to the appendix.
Confrontational Hearing Equilibrium: For π < φ < TGComp , φ > π > TCV eto , and
φ − π > TCHearing the following strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
SG ={Evade, ..., Evade}
SC ={Hearing, V eto}

This equilibrium, as its name implies, captures a combative interaction between the
court and government. Under these conditions, the government opts to engage in noncompliance irrespective of the court’s use of a public oral hearings. Interestingly, though, the
court similarly will strike down the challenged statute as unconstitutional with or without
a hearing. The key determination for the court, then, is whether the marginal increase in
the probability of the public observing the court’s decision after a hearing, formally φ − π,
outweighs the cost (κ) of holding the hearing. If either the case or the broader political
environment is not conducive for a hearing to be effective enough to offset the cost of the
hearing, then the court will simply strike down the law without holding a hearing. If,
however, a case lends itself to having a hearing, then the court will still strike down the
law but do so after bearing the cost of holding a hearing. In short, in this setting both
the court and government aggressively pursue their most preferred course of action (strike
and evade, respectively), with the court determining its willingness to hold a hearing on
the effectiveness of the procedure at increasing public awareness.
6

The government’s strategy profile is listed in the following order: 1.) nature selects an

environment in which evasion will be observed and the court holds a hearing; 2.) nature
chooses such an environment but the court does not hold a hearing; 3.) nature selects
an environment in which evasion will not be observed and the court holds a hearing; 4.)
nature selects such an environment and the court does not hold a hearing.
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Mobilizing Hearing Equilibrium:

For φ > TGComp > π, φ > TCV eto , and 1 − π >

TCHearing , the following strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
SG ={Comply, Evade, Comply, Evade}
SC ={Hearing, V eto}

This equilibrium characterizes an environment in which the court’s use of a hearing
switches the government’s behavior from evasion to compliance. This equilibrium obtains
if the court’s veto and hearing thresholds are met and the government’s threshold for
compliance is met only when the court holds a hearing. In this setting, the government
will only comply when a hearing is held; otherwise, it will evade the decision. The court
will hold a hearing when the cost of doing so justifies the increase in the likelihood of
public awareness. As with the Confrontational Hearing Equilibrium, the court’s veto
threshold is met without a hearing, and thus the court will veto regardless of whether
or not it holds a hearing. The decision to hold a hearing, then, similarly turns on the
procedure’s effectiveness. When a hearing is either a low cost endeavor or expected by
the court to considerably increase the likelihood of public awareness, the court will strikes
down the law after a hearing and the government will comply. Otherwise, the court still
strikes down the law without a hearing but faces a noncompliant government.
This equilibrium additionally highlights the potential impact of hearings on the regular
interactions between legislations and the judiciary. The ability of a hearing to increase
the likelihood of public awareness for judicial decisions creates the classic “separation
of powers” relationship between courts and legislatures. That is, the court holding a
hearing leads to a political environment in which each branch carries out its constitutional
duty: the court to strike down unconstitutional legislation and the legislature to faithfully
implement that decision. But the government’s equilibrium behavior in the absence of a
hearing is telling. Without a hearing, the government evades the court’s decision and the
quality of democratic governance is brought into question. One important implication
of this result is that a successful separation of powers system, one in which courts strike
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down legislation that does not conform to the constitution and legislatures comply, can
be the result of choices made by courts during the adjudication process.

Judicial Emboldening Hearing: For φ > TGComp > π, π < TCV eto < φ, and

A
A+I

>

κφ
K+I

>

TCHearing , the following strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
SG ={Comply, Evade, Comply, Evade}
SC ={Hearing, V eto}

Limited Judicial Emboldening Hearing:

For φ < TGComp , π < TCV eto , and

TCHearing , the following strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
SG ={Evade, ..., Evade}
SC ={Hearing, V eto}

These two equilibria characterize environments in which a hearing alters the court’s
behavior. These equilibria obtain when the court’s veto threshold lies between the probability of awareness without a hearing and the probability of awareness after the court
holds a hearing. In these equilibria, the increased level of public awareness emboldens
the court to veto the challenged government action when it otherwise would uphold. In
the judicial emboldening equilibrium, hearings have the additional effect of making the
government switch its strategy from evasion to compliance. Once again, these equilibria
are bounded by the costs associated with holding a hearing; if the costs to doing so become too high, the court will forgo the procedure. In addition to the direct cost of the
hearing (κ), these thresholds are a function of the policy component of the court’s utility
function. The more the court values the specific policy at stake, the greater the cost it is
willing to bear to hold a hearing.
These equilibria speak further to the role hearings can have in ensuring the proper functioning of democratic governance and separation of powers arrangements. First consider
the limited judicial emboldening hearing equilibrium. In this environment, the ability of
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the court to hold a hearing provides an opportunity to create the political environment
necessary for the court to challenge the government by striking down legislation. This
point is critical - without the hearing, the court would lack the necessary public attention
to strike down an unconstitutional law and, as a result, uphold such a statute rather than
strike it down but be met with successful noncompliance from government officials. This
dynamic is even clearer in the judicial emboldening equilibrium. In this equilibrium the
ability of the court to hold a hearing has its most striking impact on the efficacy of constitutional review. Without a hearing, the court would uphold the challenged law because
it expects the legislature to successfully evade the decision. As a result, the lack of a
hearing leaves the court unable to fulfill its role as a constraint on legislative behavior.
The ability to hold a hearing, however, creates an environment that both allows the court
to strike down the challenged statute and incentivizes the government to comply with the
decision. That is, the court’s use of a hearings leads both players to change their actions
from damaging the quality of democratic governance to behavior that falls directly in line
with the expectations of a separation of powers system.

Fully Deferential Government:

If π > TGComp and π > TCV eto , the following strategy

profile constitutes a SPE:
SG ={Comply, ..., Comply}
SC ={No Hearing, Veto}

The fully deferential government equilibrium captures cases involving a government
that will comply with the court’s decision regardless of whether or not the court holds
a hearing. Such cases may follow from one of two situations. In the first scenario, the
government may view the challenged statute as insignificant or not worth risking the
potential backlash for engaging in noncompliance. For example, a government might
find itself defending a law in court that was passed by a previous government. In such
a case, the cost incurred by the current government when the court strikes down the
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previous government’s law is minimal. As a result, the government in such a case has
little incentive to engage in noncompliance. In the second situation, the government
might value the law under review, but recognize that the likelihood of public awareness
for the case is too high to make noncompliance an electorally viable strategy, even in the
absence of a hearing. In cases where the public is likely to observe the court’s decision and
the government’s subsequent response, the government is bound by the court’s decision
despite its preference to ignore or defy the court. Put another way, this equilibrium
represents the ideal separation of powers environment; the court effectively constrains
the government without the need for procedural or other tools. The court ensures that
officials do not breach their constitutional obligations thanks to the credible threat of an
electoral backlash from an informed and aware public.

Fully Deferential Court:

For φ < TCV eto , the following strategy profile constitutes a

SPE:
SG ={Evade, ..., Evade}
SC ={No Hearing, Uphold}

The defining feature of the fully deferential court equilibrium is, as the name implies,
the court’s weakness vis-a-vis the government. In this equilibrium, the likelihood of public
awareness for a case is so low that the court upholds the challenged statute even after
holding a public hearing. That is, the ability of the court to obtain compliance from
government officials is limited regardless of the court’s use of procedural or institutional
tools like oral hearings and, as a result, the court is effectively eliminated as a check against
the government. Just as the fully deferential government equilibrium characterized a
separation of powers arrangement functioning as intended, this equilibrium characterizes
a failed separation of powers arrangement in which one branch, the court, is unable to
constrain another branch of government.
The relationship described in the fully deferential court equilibrium further highlights
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the limited efficacy of public oral hearings at ensuring the effective exercise of constitutional review. In some previous equilibria the court can sufficiently increase the likelihood
of public awareness to strike down unconstitutional legislation and, under certain circumstances, ensure compliance from government officials without the need of the public. Here,
however, public oral hearings cannot aid the court in this endeavor. The intuition behind
this result is that some cases are simply unlikely to garner public awareness regardless
of a court’s procedural choices. Some issue areas fail to engender significant media or
public interest and, as a result, are unlikely to receive attention even if the court tries to
highlight the case. When this is the case, the court cannot expect voters to credibly hold
their elected officials accountable for breaching constitutional obligations. Consequently,
in such instances the court must defer to the government even when a case involves unconstitutional state actions.

Excessively Costly Hearings:

For anytime TCHearing is not met, the following strat-

egy profiles constitute SPE:

SG =

SC =




Evade, ..., Evade

if π < TGComp



Comply, ..., Comply

if π > TGComp




No Hearing, V eto

if π > TCV eto



No Hearing, U phold if π < TCV eto
The final equilibrium, the excessively costly hearings equilibrium, captures the players’
strategies when the costs associated with holding a public oral hearing outweigh the policy
and institutional concerns of the court. In this equilibrium, the court explicitly compares
the expected benefit of holding a hearing to costs of doing so. Importantly, this decision
is made independently from the government’s strategic calculation. That is, the cost of
holding a hearing can simply be too both in cases where the government will comply
with court’s decision and in cases where the government will engage in noncompliance.
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Rather, the court in this equilibrium determines that the low level of importance of the
policy under review makes holding a hearing an unattractive option. Similarly, the court
is increasingly unwilling to incur the cost of holding a hearing as the expected institutional
costs of noncompliance decrease.
Substantively, in this equilibrium, the court and government behave as though the
court does not have the ability to hold a hearing. That is, the court’s choice regarding
case disposition and the government’s choice regarding compliance are determined by
the likelihood of public awareness only insofar that a case is inherently likely to garner
attention without the aid of judicial procedures. The result is an environment in which the
court is considerably less capable of effectively constraining the government, particularly
in cases unlikely to garner the public’s attention. What sets this equilibrium apart from
others in which the court’s authority is limited, however, is the nature of the condition
hindering the court. While the policy and institutional costs associated with a case are
determined by the topic of the case and the policy preferences of the court, the cost
of holding a hearing is in many ways a function of factors beyond the court’s control.
Legislative acts, for example, often place requirements on the court when hearings are
held and specify how hearings are to be conducted. Moreover, the budgetary costs for
holding hearings come from court budgets that are often set by legislatures. As a result,
the likelihood of a court finding itself in the excessively costly hearings equilibrium and
thus unable to use the procedure to engender compliance can be the result of actions
taken by the very actors the court is attempting to constrain. This raises a question
about the political incentive for legislatures to grant courts the discretion and resources
to hold hearings that can be used against them. Legislatures could, after all, place severe
restrictions on the use of hearings in order to render them ineffective. Such actions would
increase κ and thereby expand the range of cases falling into this equilibrium. Although
beyond the scope of the model, I return to this question of the ability of legislatures to
manipulate the cost of hearings later in the conclusion.
Taken together, the equilibria demonstrate the range of influence public oral hearings
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can have on judicial-legislative relations. On one end of the spectrum, hearings play no
role in affecting the strategic behavior of the court or government. Characterized by the
fully deferential court and government equilibria, the court does not use hearings in these
cases to address to potential noncompliance.7 On the other end of the spectrum, hearings
have a profound affect on the behavior of both courts and governments. This is most
clearly demonstrated by the impact of hearings on behavior in the judicial emboldening
equilibrium. In this equilibrium the court’s use of a hearing simultaneously allows the
court to rule against the government when it otherwise would have upheld the challenged
statute and the government complies with the court’s decision when it would have evaded
such a decision in the absence of a hearing. In such cases, the consequence of hearings for
the quality of democratic governance is most prominent. But even in less extreme cases,
such as those characterized by the mobilizing hearing and limited judicial emboldening
equilibria, hearings continue to provide a court with an expected level of public awareness
sufficient to engender compliance from an otherwise recalcitrant government.

Interpretation and Empirical Implications
One of the particularly useful values of a theoretical model such as the one constructed
above is that we can interpret the model’s results in ways that provide insights into the
relationship between two actors that otherwise may not be immediately obvious. Figures
2.1 and 2.2 help to facilitate such an interpretation of my model. The shaded regions
in the figures indicate the sections of the parameter space in which the court holds a
hearing, while the unshaded regions represent regions in which the court does not do
7

It is important to note, however, that this does not imply that courts in reality would

never hold hearings. Courts may use hearings for other purposes, such as gathering
information or to legitimize the judicial process by giving litigants their “day in court.”
The model does not preclude such uses of hearings, but rather simply does not speak to
when we should expect to observe hearings used for such purposes.

31

so.8 The x-axes represent the government’s willingness to engage in noncompliance (the
government’s compliance threshold TGComp ). That is, higher values along the x-axis in
both figures indicates that the government is more likely to evade or ignore a judicial
decision to strike down the challenged statute.9 The court’s “Judicial Public Hearing
Threshold” is captured by the y-axis, with increasing values along that axis indicating
that the likelihood of public awareness must increase in order for the court to hold a
hearing. Along both axes I specify the values of the model’s parameters that form the
boundaries between the equilibria. In order to ease the interpretation of the figures, I
focus my discussion on the relationship between two cut points on the x-axis, π and φ,
and the court’s veto threshold (TCV eto ).
Consider Figure 2.1 first. This figures shows the model’s predictions when the likelihood of public awareness for the court’s decision is sufficient for the court to strike down
the challenged legislation even without holding a hearing (π > TCV eto ). In this scenario, the
court holds a hearing when a case falls in one of two equilibria: the “Mobilizing Hearing”
and “Confrontational Hearing” equilibria. These equilibria obtain when TGComp surpasses
π and φ, respectively, and the court’s cost of holding a hearing does not become too high.
When the conditions regarding the government’s compliance threshold are met, as is the
case in the far left region of the figure, the court is in its strongest position, the “Fully
Deferential Government” equilibrium. The final equilibrium represented in Figure 2.1 is
the “Excessively Costly Hearing” equilibrium located in the upper region of the figure.
With the costs of holding a hearing exceeding their expected value, the court here is in a
weak position vis-a-vis the government. Note that the government’s compliance thresh8

The relative size of the regions in the figures are purely illustrative. While the general

shape of the figures remains consistent across different values of the model’s parameters,
the values chosen here and the subsequent depiction of the equilibria regions were selected
in order to aid in the exposition of the results.
9
Recall from the model results described above that this can be either due to the
government placing considerable importance on the challenged statute or a low electoral
cost for engaging in noncompliance.
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old influences this equilibrium only insofar that the government cares sufficiently about
the policy to consider noncompliance (i.e. the fully deferential government equilibrium
does not obtain). If this condition is met, we see from the figure that the court may be
constrained by the cost of a hearing regardless of the intensity of both the court’s and
government’s policy preference.
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Predictions when π > TCV eto
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The second figure displays the model’s predictions for intermediate values of the court’s
veto threshold (π < TCV eto < φ). The results presented in this figure are analogous to
those in Figure 2.1, with the primary difference being that the court’s veto threshold
has increased to surpass π but remain less than φ.10 Under this condition, the court’s
strongest position is once again in the far left portion of the figure. Just as in Figure
10

If the court’s veto threshold is beyond φ, then the “Fully Deferential Court” equilib-

rium obtains for all combinations of parameter values. The logic for this result follows
from the relationship between the court’s veto threshold and φ. If the threshold is beyond φ, then the court will not feel it has sufficient public awareness to strike down the
challenged legislation, even if it holds a hearing. As a result, the court always upholds
without holding a hearing.
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2.1, the Fully Deferential Government equilibrium that obtains here is the result of π
surpassing the government’s compliance threshold, which indicates that the government
will comply without the court holding a hearing due to the latent likelihood of public
awareness. As the government’s compliance threshold value shifts rightward along the
x-axis, the relative strength of the court vis-a-vis the government becomes increasingly
dependent on the court’s use of a hearing. When the government’s compliance threshold
takes an intermediate value (π < TGComp < φ), the court’s use of a hearing empowers the
court to challenge the government when it otherwise would not have (“Limited Judicial
Emboldening Hearing”). Similarly, hearings allow the court to challenge the government
even when the government places a high level of importance on the policy under review
(TGComp > φ). This strengthened position for the court is constrained, however, by the
relative cost of holding the hearing. This constraining effect, logically, increases with
the likelihood that the government will engage in noncompliance (TGComp increases). To
summarize both figures with regard to the court’s strength relative to the government, the
court is strongest in the left regions of the figure and decreases in strength as we move to
the right and upward in the figure. The court is able to retain this strength in the lower
portions of the center and right regions of the figure by holding a public oral hearing, but
in turn pays a cost to do so.
A series of observations based on these figures help to structure the empirical implications that follow from the model’s results. First, consider environments in which the
government places little to no importance on the policy under review. In such cases, the
government has little incentive to risk an electoral backlash by engaging in noncompliance and so accordingly faithfully carries out the court’s decision. The court, recognizing
that the government will not challenge the court’s authority to strike down legislation
as unconstitutional, does not need to pay the cost of holding a hearing in order to effectively exercise its judicial review power. Put another way, the court has no incentive to
hold a hearing when the environment is such that the government will comply with the
court’s decision due to a lack of interest in defending the continued implementation of the
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Predictions when π < TCV eto < φ
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challenged policy.
The converse of this dynamic is further instructive for understanding the model’s
implications for when a court will hold a hearing. The court’s ability to rely on the public
to compel compliance from government officials is decreasing as the importance of the
policy to the government increases.11 As the figures show, when our attention shifts from
the left section of the figure towards the shaded lower center and right sections, the court’s
response in such cases is to use public oral hearings to increase the likelihood of public
awareness. The possibility of noncompliance, a strategy driven by the government’s policy
interest in a case, leads the court to effectively strengthen its position by incurring the
cost of a hearing to increase the likelihood of public awareness. Only when confronted
with this threat does the court hold a hearing. The figure illustrates this aspect of the
game, as the court holds a hearing only when the challenged policy is at least moderately
salient to the government. This leads to the first observation.
Observation 1: If a court uses hearings to increase the likelihood of public
11

Formally, TGComp increases.
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awareness in response to potential noncompliance, then a court should only
use hearings when the government cares about the constitutionality of the
policy under review. If the government views the policy under review as being
of little or no importance, then a court should never hold a hearing.
A similar dynamic exists between the court and government with regard to the magnitude of the potential electoral backlash against elected officials for failing to comply with
the court’s decision. Recall that the government’s compliance threshold is determined
not only by the government’s policy concerns, but also the electoral cost (β) associated
with the public observing the government engage in noncompliance. The relationship
between this cost and the court’s need to use hearings, however, is the inverse of that
described above regarding the government’s policy considerations. When the electoral
cost is high, the government is less likely to take the risk of being “caught” defying the
court by the public. As a result, the government will comply independent of the court’s
strategy with regard to hearings. In such instances, the court’s effectiveness at constraining the government is sufficiently supported by the threat of the public’s backlash against
the government that the court does not need a hearing. When this is not the case,
however, and the magnitude of the public backlash is insufficient to compel compliance
alone, then the court can use a hearing to make the most of that threat by increasing the
likelihood of public awareness. This counterintuitive result suggests courts use hearings
simply when the potential magnitude of the public backlash is greatest, but rather when
the threat of backlash is coupled with a strong likelihood of the public becoming aware
of the government’s noncompliance.
Observation 2: If a court uses hearings to increase the likelihood of public
awareness in response to potential noncompliance, then a court should be less
likely to hold a hearing as the magnitude of the electoral backlash suffered by
the government for observed noncompliance increases.
Taken together, these first two observations identify a critical insight of the model.
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Both the policy salience and magnitude of an electoral backlash are central to the credibility of a government’s threat of noncompliance. When the government cares significantly
about the challenged policy (Observation 1) or the electoral punishment for noncompliance is not exceptionally high, then a strategy of noncompliance is credible. That is,
in such situations the court must take seriously the possibility that the government will
respond to a decision to strike down a statute by ignoring the court or otherwise refusing
to implement the court’s decision. The credibility of noncompliance threats is enhanced
even further when both conditions obtain. When neither do, however, the court recognizes the government’s weakened position and, consequently, can exert its authority over
the government without a need to hold a public oral hearing. To summarize, the first two
observations highlight the centrality of the degree of risk for noncompliance in determining the court’s strategy. When the degree is low, the court is empowered and does not
a hearing. When the opposite is true, however, the court must evaluate how a hearing
might influence its political environment. The remaining observations from the model
speak to such evaluations.
The third observation addresses the court’s use of hearings when confronted with a
government sufficiently invested in the challenged policy to make noncompliance a credible
threat to the court’s authority, or, to put it in the context of the figures, a case falls outside
of the “Fully Deferential Government” equilibrium. In such situations, the court can use
its ability to hold a hearing to increase the likelihood of public attention and thereby
incentivize government officials to comply. To do so, however, is not costless. The cost
of holding a hearing forces a court to be selective about which cases receive a hearing.
The model suggests a criterion upon which a court can balance the expected benefit of
holding a hearing with the costs of doing so. The expected effectiveness of a hearing at
increasing the likelihood of public awareness can inform a court as to whether or not a
hearing is worthwhile. Put simply, hearings that are more likely to significantly increase
the likelihood of awareness are more likely to provide a benefit to the court that outweighs
the cost of holding the hearing. All else being equal, courts should use hearings when a
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hearing is likely to have its greatest impact. Formally, this concept of effectiveness is the
difference in the likelihood of public awareness for a case including a hearing and that same
case without a hearing. This is captured in the model by the quantity φ−π. In the model,
as φ − π increases, the range of values that satisfy TCHearing increases and the more likely
the court will hold a hearing. This dynamic is best illustrated in Figure 2.1. In Figure
2.1, the court will hold a hearing even when doing so does not change the government’s
strategy. However, the court will only do so if the increase in the likelihood of public
awareness is sufficiently large. The share of the parameter space in which the court will
hold a hearing increases with the distance between π and φ; as the distance between these
values grows, so does the range of possible values the model’s other parameters can take
and still have a hearing be an equilibrium strategy for the court. The third observation
follows from this discussion.
Observation 3: Given a sufficient risk of noncompliance and that courts
use hearings to address that noncompliance, the court is more likely to hold
hearings when they will be most effective at increasing public awareness.
The fourth observation considers how the court’s use of hearings is influenced by the
interaction between the cost of holding a hearing and the government’s incentive to engage in noncompliance. Naturally, the cost of holding a hearing constrains the court’s
use of the procedure. The unique insight of the model, however, is that this constraint is
conditioned by the value of the government’s compliance threshold (TGComp ). When this
threshold is high, such as in cases involving policies the government views as important,
the maximum cost the court is willing to incur to hold a hearing decreases. The logic
here is that the court is averse to paying the cost of a hearing only for the government
to successfully ignore its ruling. Accordingly, the cost the court is willing to incur for a
hearing decreases when the court faces a government with a strong incentive to engage in
noncompliance. It is in such cases that the court is least likely, if it holds a hearing, to
reap the benefits of doing so. To see this relationship graphically, consider again Figures
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1 and 2. Recall that the government’s compliance threshold (TGComp ) is captured by the
x-axis, while the cost of holding a hearing is represented along the y-axis by the court’s
public hearing threshold (TCHearing ). As the government’s compliance threshold increases,
due, for example, to the importance of the policy to government officials, the range of
parameter values that satisfies the court’s public hearing threshold decreases. That is,
as we move from the “Mobilizing Hearing” equilibrium to the “Confrontational Hearing”
equilibrium in Figure 2.1, the court’s threshold exerts a greater constraining effect on the
court’s use of hearings. Similarly in Figure 2.2, the transition from the “Limited Judicial
Emboldening Hearing” equilibrium to the “Judicial Emboldening Equilibrium” that occurs when TGComp increases is accompanied by the enhanced constraining effect of TCHearing
and κ on the court’s willingness to hold a hearing. It is important to note, however, that
the relationship between the cost of hearings and the government’s willingness to engage
in noncompliance is itself conditional. When the challenged policy is of minimal importance to the government and the “Fully Deferential Government” equilibrium obtains,
this dynamic does not exist. This insight informs the fourth observation.
Observation 4: Given a sufficient risk of noncompliance and that courts use
hearings to address that noncompliance, the constraint imposed on the court
by the cost of holding a hearing increases with the importance of the policy
to the government.
In addition to identifying the conditions under which a court holds hearings to address
noncompliance, the model provides insights into the relationship between such a use of
hearings and a court’s ability and willingness to effectively constrain government officials
by striking down unconstitutional statutes. Specifically, an implication of the model is
that hearings should correspond to case disposition in constitutional review cases. If
courts are using hearings to address potential noncompliance, then they should use the
procedure in precisely the cases involving statutes the court wants to strike down. The
result is that a court should be more likely to strike down legislation in cases granted a
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hearing. This result follows from the theory’s central argument that hearings improve the
level of public awareness and ultimately increase the likelihood of compliance. Put simply,
a court will only incur the cost of holding a hearing if it then expects to reap the benefits of
striking down the challenged statute and obtaining compliance from government officials.
To see this graphically, consider again Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.1, there are two equilibria in
which the court holds a hearing: the “Mobilizing Hearing” and “Confrontational Hearing”
equilibria. In both of these equilibria, the court rules against the government by striking
down the challenged legislation. In other words, the model produces no equilibrium in
which the court holds a hearing but does not strike down the challenged statute. Moreover,
if we examine Figure 2.2, we see that the court holds a hearing in the “Limited Judicial
Emboldening” and “Judicial Emboldening” equilibria, indicating that holding a hearing
switches the court’s strategy from uphold (V=0) to veto (V=1). The equilibrium strategy
predicted by the model in every case granted a hearing, then, is for the court to strike
down the statute. This prediction motivates the fifth and final observation.
Observation 5: Given a sufficient risk of noncompliance and that courts
use hearings to address that noncompliance, the court is more likely to rule
against the government in cases granted a hearing.

Conclusion
Constitutional courts face a fundamental challenge when exercising their authority to
subject legislation to constitutional review. Without the ability to directly enforce their
decisions, courts must rely on government officials to implement judicial rulings. And
while this reliance on the other branches of government poses no problem for judicial
authority when the court’s decision conforms with the interests of those other branches,
courts encounter a real difficulty when the interests of government officials incentivize
them to ignore rather than implement the court’s decision. Explaining how courts can
ensure compliance with decisions in these difficult situations, then, is central to understanding the limits of judicial authority and ultimately the role of constitutional courts
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in modern liberal democracies.
In this chapter I examined how one of the most prominent judicial procedures, public
oral hearings, can influence the ability of a court to effectively exercise constitutional
review. Public oral hearings in modern liberal democracies are characterized by two key
features. First, hearings typically generate media coverage of cases brought before constitutional tribunals by providing media access otherwise lacking in the judicial process.
Second, typically the decision to hold hearings is largely left to the discretion of the presiding court. Combined, I argue these two features make public oral hearings a institutional
tool courts can use to address potential noncompliance. Using a formal model to develop
my argument, the argument presented in this chapter provides insights into how hearings
might serve to empower constitutional courts, when a court might use a hearing to this
end, and the consequences of such a use of hearings for judicial decision making and the
efficacy of constitutional review.
Specifically, the model allowed me to derive a series of relatively nuanced implications
about the relationship between hearings and the efficacy of constitutional review. The
theory implied that a court’s use of hearings is tied to the need for public awareness of
judicial decisions. Unlike extant accounts of hearings that attribute the use of hearings to
information gathering or the pursuit of normative goals such as legitimacy or transparency,
the account presented here links hearings to the credibility of the noncompliance threat
posed by the government. Moreover, the theory identified two constraining conditions,
the likely effectiveness of a hearing at increasing public awareness and the cost of the
procedure, on the use of hearings for combating potential noncompliance. In contrast to
existing accounts of public oral hearings, the theory highlights how the effect of hearings
on case disposition can be a function of the decision to hold the hearing in the first place.
Taken together, these implications present a novel account of the role hearings can play
in the interbranch relationship of constitutional review.
What do these implications mean for the quality of democratic governance in modern
liberal democracies? Perhaps most clearly, the theoretical model points to how discretion
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over public oral hearings can empower constitutional courts. If public awareness of judicial
decisions is indeed a solution to the issue of potential noncompliance, then courts can
use hearings to increase the likelihood of such public attention. That is, the discretion
available to courts with regard to hearings provides an opportunity for courts to affect
their political environment and, ultimately, affect the response from government officials
to a court’s decision. In showing these relationships, the model suggests that granting
courts discretion over the use of hearings can promote compliance with judicial decisions
and serves to enhance the quality of democratic governance.
It is important to note, however, that discretion over hearings does not necessarily aid
constitutional courts in ensuring the faithful implementation of all decisions. Hearings
are only useful for promoting compliance insofar as they are effective at garnering public
attention for a case and the court’s decision. When a hearing is unlikely to improve the
likelihood of public awareness, the procedure has minimal impact on judicial authority.
This limitation is most pronounced in cases that are either too technical or banal to
inspire the public’s attention. Such cases, however, are those for which the court is most
constrained. That is, hearings do not help courts when they are at their weakest.
Ultimately, the theoretical model shows that public oral hearings can serve as a useful,
albeit limited, institutional tool for courts. The ability of hearings to increase the likelihood of public awareness allows judges to have a measure of control over their political
environment. In the subsequent chapters, I test a set of the model’s empirical implications
in order to find evidence of court’s using hearings as tools for addressing noncompliance.
Although the model is intentionally devoid of much institutional details in order to maximize its generalizability, I conduct this analysis in the context of the German Federal
Constitutional Court. The subsequent chapters provide a justification for this choice of
setting and then a rigorous empirical examination of the court’s use of hearings and the
consequences of the procedure’s use for the court’s decision making.
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Chapter 3
An Empirical Application: The
German Federal Constitutional
Court
In Chapter 2, I presented a theoretical model that explains how a court can use a
procedure such as public oral hearings to facilitate government compliance with judicial
decisions. The model demonstrates how the ability of hearings to raise public awareness
can incentivize a court to strategically hold hearings and ultimately constrain governments through the effective exercise of judicial review. In so doing, the model generates
a series of empirical implications regarding when a court will hold a hearing and how
the use of hearings corresponds to the likelihood of a court striking down legislation as
unconstitutional. I now turn to the empirical tests of these hypotheses. In this chapter,
I present the case I use for the empirical analysis, the German Federal Constitutional
Court (German: Bundesverfassungsgericht).
The Federal Constitutional Court, which I will from here on refer to as the FCC,
serves as the arbiter of constitutional disputes raised in the German judiciary. As the
“supreme guardian of the constitution”, the FCC is widely viewed as the most influential
court in the German judiciary (Kommers 19994; Kommers and Miller 2012). Indeed, the
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court’s position as a constitutional organ makes the president of the FCC the fifth highest
ranking position in the German political system. More practically, the FCC’s ability to
effectively exercise judicial review over state and federal legislation has made it one of “the
most active and powerful constitutional court in Europe” (Kommers 1994: 470). This
success has made the FCC a model for new constitutional courts in recently democratized
nations in Eastern Europe (Schwartz 2000) and East Asia (Ginsburg 2003). In sum, the
FCC operates as one of the most significant legal institutions in the world.
The FCC provides an excellent setting for the empirical implications of my theoretical
model. This is because of the court’s position in German politics, its institutional structure, and the its decision making process. This chapter describes these aspects of the
FCC and focuses particularly on how adjudication at the FCC satisfies the assumptions
of the model. To this end, the chapter is organized as follows. The first section gives a
brief history of the FCC. In the second section, I provide a description of the court’s institutional structure, jurisdiction, and process. The third section consider the compatibility
of the FCC with the key assumptions and features of the theoretical model.

A Brief History of the FCC
The origins of the FCC lie in the political environment of post-World War Two Germany. As the Allied powers worked to shape a new West German political system based
on the tenets of liberal democracy, they promoted the inclusion of judicial review in the
form of an independent judiciary capable of ruling on the constitutionality of laws and
other official acts. Although there existed some limited precedent for judicial review in
Germany’s legal system, neither the Nazi regime nor its predecessor, the Weimar Republic, had provided an environment conducive to the development and maintenance of a
judiciary willing and capable of effectively constraining the state through the abrogation
of legislation. With the experience with Nazism still fresh in their minds, the constitutional scholars, lawyers, and politicians that set to work on crafting the a new German
constitution considered it critical to rectify this shortcoming of the previous regimes. To
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this end, the delegates to the constitutional assembly, officially known as the Parliamentary Council, agreed to create an independent tribunal vested with the ability to engage
in constitutional review.1 This tribunal became known as the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
the Federal Constitutional Court.
Promulagted on May 23, 1949, the new German constitution, officially called the
Grundgesetz or Basic Law, laid out the basic authority and primary responsibilities of
the FCC. But while the Basic Law specified the court’s compulsory jurisdiction and the
selection process for judges, it otherwise left to the newly elected legislature the task of
enacting an enabling law to define the court’s procedure and organization. What followed
was two years of extensive debate between the Christian Democratic-led government, the
Social Democratic-led opposition, and the state governments. Ultimately, the lower house
of parliament, the Bundestag, and the upper house, the Bundesrat, passed the Federal
Constitutional Court Act (FCCA). Consisting of over 100 operative sections, the FCCA
structured the court’s organization, composition, procedure, and jurisdiction. With the
passage of the FCCA, the court had both a constitutional and statutory basis. All that
was left for the legislature to do was to appoint judges to serve on the court.
Although the Bundestag and Bundesrat had passed the FCCA with the support of
the major parties and state governments, the process of appointing judges to the court
proved difficult. The Basic Law stipulated that half of the court’s judges be appointed
by the Bundestag, while responsibility for appointing the other half was given to the
Bundesrat, the upper house of the German parliament consisting of representatives of the
state governments. Moreover, the rules for appointing judges, which had just been passed
as part of the FCCA, required a three-fourths majority vote of the Bundestag for its half
1

The proposal for such a court came from Professor Hans Nawiasky, a colleague of

the famous Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen. Nawiasky played a prominent role in writing
the Bavarian state constitution, which included provisions for a constitutional court. His
background in the design of the Bavarian court and work with Kelsen, who had founded
the Austrian Constitutional Court after the First World War, proved influential for the
FCC’s inclusion in the constitution.
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of the court appointments and a two-thirds majority for the half of the court appointed
by the Bundesrat. As a result, any appointment to the FCC would require a compromise
between the governing party, the CDU led by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and the
main opposition party, the SPD. While the two parties had agreed on the importance of
creating the FCC, they now starkly disagreed over who would serve as the justices on the
newly formed court. Six months after the passage of the FCCA, the deadlock continued
unresolved and the FCC remained unable to perform its duty.
It was only after that constitutional crisis over the territorial organization of the
states in southwestern Germany did the government and the opposition parties reach
a compromise over judicial candidates and appoint judges to the FCC. In what became
the FCC’s Marbury vs. Madison (Kommers and Miller 2012), the court was needed to
adjudicate a dispute over what statehood would look like for the three southwestern states
of Baden, Württemburg-Hohenzollern, and Württemburg-Baden. While the leader of the
Baden government argued for the restoration of the pre-war state boundaries of Baden, the
leaders of the other two states favored a large, single state. Since the Basic Law requires
a referendum be held for any territorial reorganization, both sides promoted plans for the
referendum that advantaged their preferred outcome. And with neither side willing to
compromise, the Bundestag stepped in and passed legislation organizing the referendum
in a way that favored the creation of a unified Southwest state. Specifically, the statute
set the date and process for the referendum and extended the state legislative sessions to
avoid holding both the scheduled election immediately preceding the referendum and a
new election afterwards.
Recognizing the implications of the Bundestag’s actions for the likely outcome of the
referendum, the minister-president of Baden, Leo Wohlleb, initiated a challenge of the
statute’s constitutionality at the FCC. By doing so, Wohlleb put the federal government
in a doubly difficult position. First, there were legitimate doubts about the law’s constitutional basis, particularly regarding whether or not the federal government has the
authority to extend the terms of state legislatures. The second problem was of a more
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pressing political nature. No ruling could be made on the case because neither the Bundestag nor the Bundesrat had made any appointments to the court. The prospect of
an unresolved constitutional challenge of the referendum posed a serious problem for the
government, especially after Wohlleb declared that Baden would boycott the referendum
unless the FCC ruled on the case. Faced with the choice of either finally establishing the
court or risking the possibility of a state government defying the national government,
the Adenauer government brokered a compromise with the SPD-led opposition that appointed a slate of moderate judges to the court with broad partisan support.2 With these
appointments, the FCC was finally operational and ready to address the constitutional
questions facing the young West German republic.
The FCC’s decision in Southwest has become a cornerstone of German constitutional
jurisprudence. The court struck down the Bundestag’s extension of the state legislative
terms as unconstitutional, stating that “a state cannot dispose of its legislative authority”. As for the referendum itself, the court upheld the part of the statute governing the
procedures of the vote. As Kommers and Miller (2012) and Vanberg (2005) both note,
however, the more important aspect of the decision was the scope of its effect. The court
asserted its authority to strike down unconstitutional legislation. Even though this power
is explicitly granted to the court in the Basic Law, the case provided a critical opportunity
for the FCC to define the scope of that authority. In its decision, the FCC stated that
“legislative bodies may not again deliberate upon and enact a federal law with the same
content” as a law struck down as unconstitutional. That is, the court asserted that its
judgement both prevented the execution of the current law under review and proscribed
2

See Vanberg 2005 for an excellent discussion of the political environment surrounding

the case. The court’s decision, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951) also provides a valuable depiction of
the events leading up to the case.
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the government from passing laws in the future with the same content.3
The first major tests for the FCC’s authority came shortly after the Southwest case. In
late 1952, the Adenauer government was shepherding two treaties through the Bundestag
and Bundesrat. One, the General Treaty, ended the Allied occupation of West Germany
and restored the nation’s sovereignty. The second, the European Defense Community
Treaty, committed Germany and German forces to a pan-European defense system. The
passage of both treaties was a high priority for the government, as Adenauer saw them
as vehicles for promoting West Germany’s ties with the Western powers. The SPDopposition to the treaties, however, saw them as too demanding on West Germany and as
running counter to the goal of reunification with East Germany (Vanberg 2005). Lacking
the necessary votes in the Bundestag to stop ratification, the SPD decided to pursue the
alternative strategy of challenging the constitutionality of the treaties at the FCC. With
the support of 144 members of the Bundestag, the SPD sent the case to the FCC and put
the court on a direct collision course with the Adenauer government.
The ratification of the treaties was a central part of the Adenauer government’s foreign policy, and as such the government took a keen interest in the proceedings at the
court. The government’s interest turned to concern, however, when word began to reach
the chancellory that the First Senate of the FCC, which had been assigned the case,
was likely to rule against the treaties.4 Faced with the possibility of a damaging FCC
ruling, the government sought to initiate a proceeding that incorporated the more pro3

The FCC also established two fundamental tenets for interpreting the Basic Law.

First, the court declared that the Basic Law must be considered as a whole rather than
as a collection of individual clauses. Second, the FCC stated that the Basic Law contains the “fundamental principles” of democracy and federalism that supersede any other
constitutional provision or amendment. See Kommers and Miller (2012: 80-87) for an
in-depth discussion on the jurisprudential consequences of the case.
4
The FCC is divided into two senates of equal size. Each senate has unique and
exclusive jurisdiction over certain issue areas. I give more detail on this structure later in
the chapter.
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government leaning Second Senate. If the government could move the question of the
treaties’ constitutionality to a friendlier venue, such as the entire court rather than only
the half of the judges that made up the First Senate, then the government could obtain
a positive FCC decision that would preempt the First Senate’s ruling on the original
SPD-initated proceeding. The government found the proceeding it needed by convincing
the Federal President, Theodor Heuss, to request an advisory opinion from the court regarding the constitutionality of the treaties. Since such proceedings required the entire
Court instead of only one senate, the government was assured that the case would go to
its preferred venue.
At this point, however, the case took an unexpected turn. The court recognized that
the government was attempting to manipulate the outcome by engaging in forum shopping. Accordingly, the court sought to avoid the damage to its authority that would result
from falling victim to the government’s maneuvering. The First Senate recommended that
the decision on the president’s request for an advisory opinion be made binding, which
would supersede all other proceedings, including the SPD’s original case. The Adenauer
government signed off on this move, viewing this as a positive development since the
binding decision would come from the full court where they had an advantage. With the
decision now in the hands of the full court, the First Senate dismissed the SPD’s case.
Once the case reached the full court, the government’s expectation of a positive disposition of the case came into serious doubt. When word reached the government that the
court was likely to rule against the treaties in the advisory opinion, government officials
quickly changed tactics. First, they sought to bring a case to the Second Senate, which
they anticipated would uphold the treaties as constitutional. The government did so by
claiming that the opposition had obstructed the majority’s ability to legislate, a claim
that only the Second Senate had the jurisdiction to resolve. This move, however, was
met with derision from both the court and the media, all of whom viewed the move as an
unabashed attempt to undermine the court by shifting venues. The court reiterated the
binding nature of the pending advisory opinion for all other proceedings regarding the
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topic, including the government’s newly proposed proceeding.
With that path seemingly blocked, at least temporarily, the government turned to
withdrawing the advisory opinion request from the court’s docket. By doing so, the
government could focus its efforts on the recently initiated proceeding at the Second
Senate, which would then be the only proceeding remaining on the issue before the court.
As Vanberg (2005) notes, however, the government did not leave it at that. Seeking to
further influence the court’s decision, government officials began openly criticizing the
court and suggesting that possible changes to the court’s institutional structure may be
needed. While the Adenauer government had hoped that such talk would bring the FCC
closer to the government’s desired policy views, it had the opposite effect. The media
immediately criticized the government for suggesting attacks on the court. The resulting
turn of public support against the government and in favor of the court led the government
to walk back its statement and reiterate its support for the court’s independence and the
importance of the rule of law. The court ultimately dismissed the government’s suit as
inadmissible and the withdraw of France from the treaty made further litigation moot
before the court could rule on the treaty’s constitutionality. While the jurisprudential
fallout of the cases was relatively limited, the political ramifications were considerable.
The court and government now knew that conflict between the institutions was a distinct
possibility and that the court had considerable support from the media and the general
public.5
These events early in the court’s development highlight the institutional tension facing courts engaged in constitutional review. Recall that a fundamental assumption of the
model in chapter 2 is that the government can ignore or otherwise defy the court’s ruling.
As we saw with the Adenauer government’s plan to manipulate the FCC, this potential
exists in the German context. A second key assumption is that public attention to such
attempts by the government to engage in noncompliance brings pressure upon elected
5

See Vanberg (2000) for an excellent in-depth discussion of these cases and, more

generally, the challenges faced by the FCC in its early years.
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officials to accept the court’s decision. The media attention and subsequent public backlash against the government in the European Defense Community Treaty highlights this
point well. In the remainder of the chapter, I turn to the FCC’s institutional structure
and position in German politics to demonstrate the aptness of the German court as a test
case for my theory.

The Institutional Structure of the FCC
The institutional structure of the FCC is defined by a combination of the Basic Law,
the FCCA, and the court’s own internal rules. The Basic Law includes unambiguous
provisions for the court’s jurisdiction and the election of judges by the Bundestag and
Bundesrat. As is the case for many high courts, however, most aspects of the FCC’s internal structure and process are unspecified in the constitution and instead left to legislation
passed by the Bundestag and Bundesrat or the court’s own procedures.6 The Bundestag,
through the FCCA, has given the court much of its structure, while the court has then
organized itself and developed its own method for conducting business.

Appointment Process.

Article 94 of the Basic Law delegates the appointment pro-

cess for FCC judges to the two houses of the federal parliament, the Bundestag and
Bundesrat.7 This has come to mean that the Bundestag and Bundesrat each select half
of each senate. The FCCA requires a two-thirds majority vote to approve a judicial selection. The process by which that vote comes to pass, however, is left to the internal
processes of the institutions themselves. In the Bundesrat, the entire chamber debates
and then votes on candidates. In contrast, the Bundestag employs a more complicated
method. The Bundestag delegates the election of judges to a committee called the Ju6

Article 94 stipulates that “the organisation and procedure of the Federal Constitu-

tional Court shall be regulated by a federal law.”
7
The exact text is: “Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court shall be
elected by the Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat.”
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dicial Selection Committee (Wahmännerausschuss).8 This twelve-person committee then
selects the justices by a two-thirds majority vote. Since partisan representation on the
committee is proportional to each party’s size in the Bundestag, the two-thirds threshold
effectively gives both the CDU and SPD, the two major parties, the ability to veto any
appointment. As we saw with the Southwest case, the parties place considerable importance on the selection of FCC judges and therefore are willing to exercise this veto if
necessary. To avoid such deadlocks, the parties have compromised by granting “property
rights” to seats on the court, with half of the seats going to the SPD and half to the
CDU. In addition, when the smaller liberal party (FDP) or the Greens are in a governing
coalition, they may gain a seat on the court. The key to this compromise is the balance it
creates on the FCC. Whenever a seat becomes open on the court, the party with “rights”
to that seat selects the replacement even when that party is not the majority party in the
Bundestag. This practice of “property rights” on seats has similarly been adopted by the
Bundesrat, thus ensuring that neither party has an advantage in the number of judges
appointed to the court.
The FCCA places additional structure on the selection of judges by specifying the
qualification requirements and tenure conditions for judges. Judges must be 40 years old,
eligible for election to the Bundestag, and be qualified to hold a judicial office in the
German judiciary.9 The law additionally prohibits judges from simultaneously holding
any office in the legislative or executive branch of the federal or any state government.
8

In 2012, a private litigant brought a case to the FCC challenging the constitutionality

of the Bundestag’s use of the Judicial Selection Committee (2 BvC 2/10). Since the
litigant was arguing that the sitting judges had been appointed unconstitutionally, the
court not surprisingly rejected the case.
9
This means that candidates must have passed certain bar exams and be certified in
the legal profession (Kommers and Miller 2012). It is worth noting that this requirement
stands in contrast to those imposed on candidates for seats on many other prominent
high courts. For example, there are no qualification requirements for U.S. Supreme Court
nominees.
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Once on the court, judges serve twelve-year nonrenewable terms.10 Judges are required to
retire at the age of sixty-eight, even if they have yet to complete their twelve year term.11

Jurisdiction.

Like many European constitutional courts, the power to review the

constitutionality of government actions in Germany is vested solely in a constitutional
court. Based on the work of Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen, this centralized model of review
grants the authority to interpret the constitution to a single constitutional tribunal. These
“Kelsenian” courts, such as the FCC, stand in stark contrast to the decentralized model
of review best exemplified by the American judicial system. In the American model,
the authority to review the constitutionality of legislation is granted, in principle, to
every court in the judiciary. For example, if any court in the American judiciary, such
as a federal district court, is presented a case that raises a constitutional question, that
court is empowered to rule on that question. Litigants can then appeal that decision
up the judicial hierarchy, at the apex of which sits a high court like the U.S. Supreme
Court. In contrast, the European model of judicial review gives a monopoly on the power
of constitutional interpretation to a single tribunal. Under this system, whenever an
ordinary court in the judiciary receives a case requiring an answer to a constitutional
question, that court is obligated to refer the question to this tribunal. The tribunal,
typically called a constitutional court, then can answer the constitutional question and
refer the dispute back to the originating court. The result is a specialized court that only
addresses constitutional questions and has exclusive jurisdiction over such questions.
The Basic Law enumerates the paths by which cases can reach the FCC. Table 3.1
10

The FCCA originally provided for a two-tiered tenure system in which judges selected

from the federal judiciary were granted life tenure while other judges had eight year
renewable terms (Kommers and Miller 2012). The Bundestag revised the FCCA in 1970
to its current state.
11
There are no prohibitions on judges’ post-FCC careers, although most either retire
from professional life or work for a university either as a law professor or in administration
(Vanberg 2005). A notable exception was FCC president Roman Herzog, who become
Federal President after completing his term on the court.
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provides a list of the types of actions that fall under the court’s constitutionally authorized
jurisdiction.12 As is evident from this extensive list, the Basic Law allows cases to reach
the FCC via a variety of means. That said, as Table 3.2 shows, the vast majority of
cases brought to the FCC fall within just a few key proceeding categories. Concrete and
abstract judicial review cases, along with constitutional complaints, dominate the court’s
docket and, of particular importance for the questions of interest here, represent the bulk
of cases asking the FCC to issue an opinion on the constitutionality of federal and state
laws.
Table 3.1: Proceeding Types at the FCC
Proceeding

Authorizing Constitutional Article

Forfeiture of Basic Rights
Constitutionality of Political Parties
Review of Election Results
Impeachment of the federal president
Disputes between high state organs
Abstract judicial review
Federal-state conflict
Individual constitutional complaints
Municipal constitutional complaint
Other disputes specified by law
Removal of judges
Intrastate constitutional disputes
Concrete judicial review
Public international law actions
State constitutional court references
Applicability of federal law

Article 18
Article 21 (2)
Article 41 (2)
Article 61
Article 93 (1) [1]
Article 93 (1) [2]
Articles 93 (1) [3], 84 (4)
Article 93 (1) [4a]
Article 93 (1) [4b]
Article 93 (2)
Article 98
Article 99
Article 100 (1)
Article 100 (2)
Article 100 (3)
Article 126

Source: Kommers and Miller (2012: 10)

The most common proceeding brought to the FCC is the individual constitutional
complaint. Unlike the other proceedings brought to the court, constitutional complaints
can be brought directly by ordinary citizens. When an individual believes that some
government action has infringed on his or her constitutional rights, that person can lodge
the complaint at the FCC at next to no cost. No filing fees or formal papers are required,
12

In addition, the FCCA grants the court the authority to issue temporary injunctions

in certain circumstances.
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Table 3.2: Number of FCC Decisions by
Proceeding
Constitutional Complaints
Concrete Judicial Review
Abstract Judicial Review
Disputes between Federal Organs
Federal-State Conflicts
Unconstitutional Parties

Proceeding Type, 1951-2015
Number of Decisions
4,076
1,074
116
124
27
5

Source: Bundesverfassungsgericht

nor is the assistance of a lawyer. In addition, the FCC has taken an expansive view on
standing requirements such that corporate entities, including foreign corporations, are entitled to file constitutional complaints (Kommers and Miller 2012). The only requirement
applicants must meet is that they have exhausted all other remedies before bringing their
case to the FCC. Given the low cost and wide access for filing, it is perhaps not surprising
that the FCC receives thousands of constitutional complaints every year challenging a
wide range of government actions.13 As Table 3.3 shows, the FCC receives constitutional
complaints against the decisions of both the judicial and legislative branches of government. While the bulk of constitutional complaints deal with claims against ordinary
courts,14 the court does receive a steady stream of cases addressing laws and regulations.
Moreover, many of the highest profile constitutional complaints are challenges of state or
federal legislation.
The second key proceeding at the FCC is concrete judicial review. These proceedings
are brought to the FCC by ordinary courts in the German judiciary. The administrative,
civil, and criminal courts regularly docket cases that include constitutional questions. As
ordinary courts lack the authority to decide constitutional disputes, these courts must
refer constitution questions to the FCC when resolving a case depends on constitutional
13

The court’s caseload has grown over the course of its existence in large part as a result

of the popularity of the constitutional complaint. To deter litigants from irresponsibly
filing complaints, the court now has the authority to levy a fine for filing frivolous cases.
14
Most such cases claim that a court improperly applied a citizen’s constitutional rights
in a case, such as due process.
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interpretation. These conditions for concrete review cases most closely resemble the cases
and controversies requirement of the U.S. Supreme Court insofar that they require a court
in the judiciary to be adjudicating an ongoing case in order to refer the constitutional
question to the FCC. A key difference between these proceedings and cases in the U.S.
system is that the decision to refer a constitutional question is vested solely in the court
hearing the case. While litigants can raise a constitutional question in the course of a
case, the presiding court has the discretion over whether or not to refer the question.
Moreover, the ordinary courts must provide a justification for referring a case, which the
FCC can reject if it determines the referral is unfounded.
The third primary route for bringing constitutional challenges of legislation to the
FCC is abstract judicial review. While constitutional complaints and concrete judicial
review cases involve challenges against legislation already in effect, abstract review cases
deal with questions regarding the constitutionality of legislation before it has taken effect.
That is, abstract review allows specific litigants the right to challenge an action without
the existence of a concrete dispute. Standing to bring abstract review cases is, however,
limited to the federal government, state governments, and the Bundestag if 1/3 of that
body’s members agree to the request. These cases often are particularly politicized, as
they effectively extend the legislating stage of lawmaking by involving challenges of recently debated and passed legislation (Vanberg 1998; Stone Sweet 1992). Abstract review
cases, however, occur relatively infrequently compared to concrete review or constitutional complaints, as the political actors empowered to use abstract review can leverage
the threat of initiating proceedings during the legislative bargaining stage of lawmaking
(Vanberg 1998).
While constitutional complaints, concrete review and abstract review cases dominate
the FCC’s docket in terms of both the quantity and public profile of cases, the court
does decide occasionally on other eligible proceedings. Disputes between federal organs,
known as “Organstreit” proceedings, resolve conflicts between branches of the federal
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government.15 The FCC also resolves conflicts between the Federal government and state
governments, which ordinarily involve disputes over the administration of federal law
by state governments (Kommers and Miller 2012). Finally, the court resolves election
disputes and cases regarding the prohibition of political parties.16

Table 3.3: Constitutional Complaints Filed at the FCC, 2011-2015
Filed Against

2011

2012

2013

Laws and Regulations
Ordinary Civil Courts
Ordinary Criminal Courts
Administrative Courts
Social Courts
Finance Courts
Labor Courts

93
2425
1471
791
517
179
102

180
2193
1561
691
525
127
128

203
2352
1711
755
593
172
122

Source: Bundesverfassungsgericht

Organization.

The court’s internal organization is determined by the Bundestag

through the FCCA. The FCC currently has sixteen judges, although in the past the court
has had as many as twenty-four judges.17 The most distinctive feature of the FCC’s
organization is its two senate structure. This structure splits the court into two distinct,
independent bodies with eight judges. Each senate is given exclusive jurisdiction over
specific proceedings and issue areas. The result of this structure is a court that effectively
15

The federal president, Bundestag, Bundesrat, and the federal government are qualified

to bring Organstreit cases to the FCC.
16
The court has not banned a political party since the first decade of the West German Republic, when it banned the Communist and the right-wing Socialist Reich parties. A 2003 attempt by the federal government to ban the extreme right wing National
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) failed due to procedural concerns regarding the
government’s evidence gathering tactics. See Kommers and Miller (2012: 293-300) for
more.
17
The FCCA originally set the number of judges at twenty-four. This number was then
reduced to twenty in 1956, and further reduced to its current number of sixteen in 1962.
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consists of two courts, as the two senates rarely come together to decide cases as a single
court.18 The First Senate decides cases involving issues of substantive law, including
concrete review cases and constitutional complaints dealing with the constitutionality of
legislation. The Second Senate deals with “political” cases, such as abstract review cases,
election disputes, and disputes between branches or levels of government. Since such
cases are relatively uncommon, the Second Senate has added to its docket constitutional
complaints and concrete review cases involving civil and criminal procedure.
In response to a seemingly ever-growing caseload, the FCC further organized its senates
into three judge panels called chambers (Kammern). Revisions to the FCCA in 1956
allowed the court to create these committees in order to quickly dismiss constitutional
complaints that are either unfounded or lack any chance of success. The Bundestag
increased the power of these chambers in 1986 by giving the panels the authority to rule
on the merits of a constitutional complaint if all three judges agree on the decision and
the decision clearly lies within established constitutional jurisprudence (Kommers and
Miller 2012). If, however, one judge votes to accept the complaint, it is referred to the
full senate. Additionally, the chambers are prohibited from striking down legislation as
unconstitutional. This arrangement allows the chambers to effectively dispose of cases
quickly without undermining the authority of the senates or the court’s ability to rule
consistently.

Process. Once a case reaches the First or Second Senate, the FCCA and the court’s
Rules of Procedure govern the court’s decision making process. While the adjudication
process at the FCC varies in some degree on the specific proceeding type, the process is
generally as follows. The first stage is the assignment of the case to a judge rapporteur.
At the beginning of every business year, the court assigns each judge specific issue areas
18

The FCC refers to such decisions as being made en Plenum. The plenum does issue

rules on the court’s procedures and judicial administration. In addition, the plenum
decides cases in the event that one senate decides a matter contradicting the jurisprudence
of the other senate.
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for which they are responsible. This specialization takes advantage of individual judges’
expertise and background in legal issues such as international and European law, environmental law, and tax law. Once a case is assigned to the appropriate judge, that judge
is effectively in charge of the case. The rapporteur writes a report for the senate that
provides to the other judges the facts, background, legal arguments, and a recommended
holding for the case. This role gives the judge rapporteur considerable influence over the
final opinion, which in fact is often written by the judge rapporteur or at least draws
heavily from the rapporteur’s initial report.
After the case has been assigned to the appropriate judge rapporteur and the rapporteur’s report has been distributed to the senate, the court has the option to hold a
public oral hearing. Article 25 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act stipulates that
“the Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the basis of oral proceedings.” The FCC
developed its own interpretation of the law’s provisions for oral arguments, determining
that only a small subset of proceeding types, such as abstract review and political party
prohibitions, are entitled to guaranteed oral hearings, while constitutional complaints and
concrete review cases, which comprise the bulk of the court’s caseload, can be adjudicated
with or without a hearing. As a result, oral arguments have become the exception rather
than the norm (Kommers and Miller 2012). The hearings themselves allow the court to
bring litigants, experts, legal scholars, and public officials to the court. The court hears
arguments and evidence from both sides of a case, with the process typically taking a full
day or even longer in exceptional circumstances.19 The media is not permitted to tape or
broadcast the proceedings, although the court does allow recording of opening remarks.
Despite this limitation on media access, hearings typically generate considerable media
coverage, including reports on the evening news and in the major print news outlets.20
After the court holds a hearing, or after the distribution of the rapporteur’s report
19

Questioning is typically dominated by the judge rapporteur during hearings, although

all justices have the opportunity to ask questions.
20
Below I provide an empirical analysis of these claims.
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to the senate if no hearing is held, the court goes into conference to reach a decision.
Here again the process is dominated by the judge rapporteur. Unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court, where opinion assignment is at the discretion of the chief justice or the senior
member of the majority, the judge rapporteur writes the opinion for the FCC even when
the rapporteur is in the minority.21 The court requires a majority vote to rule a law
unconstitutional; a tie results in upholding the law.22 The court typically writes with
one voice, even though dissents have been allowed since 1970. An institutional norm
of unanimity has limited the number of dissents, with only 146 having been published
since 1971 (Kommers and Miller 2012). With more than 90 percent of reported cases are
decided unanimously, the court generally presents a united front. When this is not the
case, the court only reveals the vote split between the majority and minority; justices
names are not identified as being in the minority or majority.
Broadly speaking, the FCC can either strike down a law as unconstitutional or uphold
the law as being consistent with the constitution. If the court upholds, the challenged law
remains in effect and the case ends. If the court strikes down a challenged law, it can do so
in two ways. First, the court can declare a law null and void (nichtig). Such a ruling goes
into force immediately, meaning the law is no longer in effect upon the issuance of the
court’s decision. The second option available to the court is declare a law incompatible
with the constitution (unvereinbar ). Declaring a law incompatible with the constitution
allows the statute in question to remain in effect for a limited period time, at the end
of which the legislature is required to have replaced it with a constitutionally acceptable
statute. The court has wide discretion in defining the terms of this time frame. In some
instances, the court has given a specific date on which the law will no longer be in effect.
In other cases, the court has given the legislature an open-ended timeframe with which
21

This does not mean that the rapporteur’s preference is adopted in the opinion. Rather,

the rapporteur must write the majority opinion in a manner that passes with the majority’s approval. This does leave some room for the rapporteur to influence the opinion,
especially if the rapporteur is a particularly effective writer.
22
A quorum for a senate is six judges.
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to work.23 Whether the court declares a law null and void or incompatible, the statute
is officially unconstitutional and the legislature prohibited from passing the overturned
legislation again.
This discussion of the court’s organization and process describes a court with the basic
features of the court in the model presented in chapter 2. Specifically, the model assumes a
court that can both strike down legislation that violates the constitution and hold hearings
at its discretion. As we see in the case of the German FCC, these two key abilities are
present. I now turn to an examination of the FCC’s relationship with the public and the
effect of hearings on media coverage of the court in order to ascertain whether the FCC
is an appropriate case for the model in light of the model’s other assumptions.

The Compatibility of the FCC with the Theoretical
Model
In the previous chapter I presented a theoretical model of public oral hearings as an
institutional tool for addressing potential noncompliance. In constructing the model, I
made a set of assumptions from which to work. Such assumptions are a necessary aspect
of developing a deductive theory like the one presented here. Only once these first principles are laid out can we construct a theoretical account and ultimately derive empirical
implications that we can take to data. The nature of this form of research design, however, naturally raises questions regarding the appropriateness of the assumptions made.
These concerns are amplified when applying the theory to data. Are the assumptions
incorporated into the model plausible? Do they make sense in the context of the data?
While at some level the plausibility and appropriateness of the assumptions made in
the course of formally modeling are subjective, it is possible to provide evidence to support
them. For example, the assumption that courts are concerned with policy outcomes is
supported by a substantial literature in judicial politics (e.g. Segal and Spaeth 1993).
23

This would be akin to the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “with all deliberate

speed.”
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Three assumptions in the model, however, merit specific empirical attention in the German
context. The model makes empirical claims regarding the relationship between hearings
and public awareness, public support for a court, and the potential for noncompliance.
Below I provide evidence supporting the compatibility of these three assumptions in the
context of the FCC.

Public Oral Hearings and Public Awareness of FCC Decisions
A central assumption of the theoretical model is that holding a public oral hearing
increases the likelihood of public awareness of judicial decisions. Vanberg (2001, 2005)
argues that hearings increase public awareness of judicial decisions by providing an opportunity for increased media coverage. Similarly, Kommers and Miller (2012) note that
the hearings are typically accompanied by considerable media broadcasts. In both cases,
however, the linkage between hearings and increased media coverage remains untested
empirically. This makes it difficult to rule out alternative explanations for why hearings
correspond to greater media coverage. For example, the relationship between hearings
and coverage could be epiphenomenal because cases granted hearings would have received
greater media attention even in the absence of the hearing. Given the critical nature
of this assumption’s validity for the theoretical model, it is a worthwhile endeavor to
empirically investigate the claim that hearings do in fact correspond to increased media
coverage. In what follows, I construct a measure of media coverage of FCC decisions. I
then carry out an empirical analysis of the relationship between coverage and public oral
hearings. This analysis provides insight into the impact of hearings on media coverage
and addresses the alternative account described above.

Measuring Media Coverage of Hearings at the FCC. I used the Foreign Language
News Search on Lexis Nexis to collect media coverage of all 231 concrete review and
constitutional complaint cases at the FCC from 2000 to 2013. I focus on these cases
because the court has discretion over the use of hearings in these proceedings. I constrain
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the data to these years due to data limitations. News sources are less consistently digitized
prior to 2000, weakening any conclusions we can draw when making comparisons, for
example, of coverage from 2013 to coverage from 1995. In addition to this concern, the
Foreign News Search function does not cover the full range of years in the dataset. For
each case, a search was conducted using the official case number. Each case is assigned
a unique number that identifies the senate that heard the case, the proceeding type, and
the year in which the case was initiated. So, for example, case 1 BvL 28/95 indicates a
concrete review case submitted to the court in 1995 and heard by the first senate. An
article is considered to cover a case if it provides a discussion, explanation, or depiction
of the case. Updates of already counted articles and articles that do not provide any case
facts or information on the decision are excluded. I exclude articles written more than
a month after the issuance of the decision. Media sources included press agencies such
as Agence France-Presse and newspapers such as Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt, and the
Berliner Abendsblatt.
Articles were coded as covering a given case at one of three points in time. Articles
written prior to both the decision and the announcement that a hearing, if one was held,
are coded as Pre-Hearing Coverage. For cases that were not granted a hearing, this
variable is the number of articles covering the case before the court issued its decision.
The second variable, Pre-Decision Coverage, is the number of articles written after the
announcement of a hearing, if one was held, but prior to the court’s decision. This
variable takes the same value as Pre-Hearing Coverage for cases not granted a hearing.
The key distinction here is that the first variable captures the amount of coverage prior to
the court’s determination of whether or not to hold a hearing, while the second variable
measures the coverage leading up to the decision. Finally, Post-Decision Coverage is the
number of articles written once the court issued its decision. Descriptive statistics of the
three measures are provided in Table 3.4.
If hearings increase public awareness of FCC decisions, then the decision in cases
granted a hearing should receive more coverage than those not granted a hearing. One
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Media Coverage Variables
Variable
Pre-Hearing Media Coverage
Pre-Decision Media Coverage
Post-Decision Coverage

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

0.27
0.39
5.00

1.32
1.13
4.56

0
0
0

16
8
29

Note: N = 232

potential concern with this coding scheme is that it may bias the results towards those
cases that are granted an oral hearing. Specifically, the likelihood of a media outlet including the case number in its story may be positively correlated with the court’s likelihood
of holding a hearing. If this is the case, the measures of media coverage will overcount
the coverage of cases granted hearings while underestimating the amount of coverage for
those cases not granted a hearing. Such a bias would explain a positive correlation between
hearings and coverage; the relationship would be the result of cases’ latent characteristics
rather than the media’s response to hearings.
To check for such a bias, I compare the correlation between hearings and coverage at
three points in time: (1) the period before the court announced its decision to hold a
hearing, (2) the period between the hearing announcement and the issuance of the court’s
decision and (3) after the court issues its ruling. If using the case number biases the
measure, we should see a positive correlation between hearings and pre-hearings coverage.
If, however, hearings only correlate with coverage written after the announcement of the
hearing and the issuance of the final ruling, then we can be more confident that the
coding scheme is not biasing the empirical results. That is, media coverage is more likely
brought on by the hearing if all cases garner approximately the same amount of coverage
on average before the court makes a decision regarding the use of a hearing. The results
of this analysis are presented in Figure 3.1.
The results are consistent with the assumption of the model and do not provide evidence of bias. If the measures are biased, we would expect cases granted a hearing to
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Figure 3.1: Media Coverage Before and After the FCC Announces a Hearing
8

p = 0.000
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p = 0.002
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Media Coverage Prior
to Hearing Announcement

Media Coverage After
Hearing Announcement

Media Coverage
After Decision

Note: Black bars are the mean number of articles for cases ultimately granted a hearing, while gray bars
are the mean number of articles for cases not granted a hearing. P-values for difference in means tests are
provided at each point in time; bolded values indicate a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.01
level.

systematically have higher levels of coverage both before and after the court announces it
will hold hearing. This is not the case; the mean number of articles covering cases prior
to any hearing announcement is not statistically different for cases granted a hearing
than those not granted a hearing. There is, however, a statistically significant difference
between the mean number of articles covering cases granted a hearing than those not
granted a hearing. Cases granted a hearing enjoy more coverage than other cases in both
the intermediate period between the announcement of the hearing and the court’s ruling
and in the period following the issuance of the court’s decision.

Empirical Analysis of Hearings’ Impact on Media Coverage.

In order to get

a sense of the relationship between hearings and media coverage of cases at the German
Constitutional Court, I estimate the relationship between hearings and media coverage
both before and after the court’s decision to hold a hearing. Accordingly, I use two
outcome variables. For the first model, I use the variable Pre-Hearing Coverage, while for
the second model I use the variable Post-Decision Coverage.
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The key explanatory variable is whether or not the court decided to hold a hearing.
This variable, Hearing, is coded the same as in the article’s primary analysis. In addition,
I include two control variables. First, I control for the proceeding type. Certain types of
cases may systematically be of more interest to the media and more likely to be granted
a hearing. In the article’s main analysis, I find that the court is more like to grant a
hearing for constitutional complaints than other proceeding types. If such cases are also
more likely to generate media coverage, then failing to account for this in the analysis
could lead to biased results. Therefore, I include the variable Constitutional Complaint,
which takes a value of 1 if a case is a constitutional complaint and 0 otherwise. Second, I
control for the year a decision was issued. Media coverage of court decisions has broadly
increased in the last decade, a trend that is borne out in the data. If the court was more
likely to hold a hearing for cases in the later years of the sample, failing to include a
control for the year could result in biased estimates.
Since both outcome variables are counts, I use negative binomial regressions to estimate the statistical and substantive significance of the relationship between hearings
and media coverage. Negative binomial models have become standard in political science when a count variable is the outcome of interest because they address the problem of
overdispersion found in alternatives such as Poisson models. I expect the variable Hearing
to have no statistically significant relationship in the first model and a positive coefficient
in the second model, which would indicate that cases granted a hearing systematically
receive higher levels of media coverage.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3.5. Model 1 estimates the
relationship between hearings and Pre-Hearing Coverage, while model 2 estimates the relationship between hearings and Post-Decision Coverage. There is no statistical evidence
of greater coverage for cases ultimately granted a hearing. As expected, cases granted
a hearing receive significantly more media coverage of the decision. To determine the
substantive magnitude of these relationships, I follow the example of Martin and Vanberg (2005) and calculate the percentage change in the expected number of articles. This
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quantity, which is calculated as [100(eβ(x+δ) + eβx )]/eβx , estimates how much the outcome
of interest, media coverage, changes between a case not granted a hearing to one granted
a hearing. The results make the substantive impact of hearings apparent: media coverage
increases an average of 90% for cases granted a hearing. These results provide strong
empirical evidence supporting the model’s assumption that public oral hearings increase
media coverage of the FCC, particularly the court’s decisions.

Table 3.5: Negative Binomial Analysis of Media Coverage of FCC Cases
Variable

Hearing
Constitutional Complaint

Model 1

Percentage Change
in Expected Number
of Pre-Hearing Articles

0.88
(0.61)
-0.43
(0.56)

Model 2

0.64
(0.13)
-0.07
(0.12)

Percentage Change
in Expected Number
of Post-Decision Articles
90%

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates; numbers in parentheses arestandard errors. N = 231
Both models include a control variable for year. Only percentage changes statistically significant
at the p < 0.05 level are presented.

Public Support for the FCC
A second key assumption of the theoretical model regards diffuse public support for the
court. Recall that in Vanberg’s account of judicial review, a court can effectively constrain
a government when two conditions obtain: the public supports the legitimacy of the court
(diffuse public support) and the public is aware of the court’s decisions. Since the focus
of this project is on a court’s ability to influence the latter, I have explicitly assumed in
the model that the court enjoys a high level of diffuse public support such that voters
will punish government officials for noncompliance when they observe the government’s
behavior. Of course, this assumption does not hold for every constitutional court. Courts
like the Russian Constitutional Court (Trochev 2008) or the European Court of Justice
(Caldeira and Gibson 1995) have struggled to successfully promote public faith in the
judiciary. If this were the case in Germany, then, we would be concerned about the
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applicability of the model to the FCC.
Considerable scholarly evidence supports the assumption that the FCC enjoys a high
level of diffuse public support. Vanberg (2005) comments that levels of diffuse public
support are both “high and stable over time” (pg. 99). Public opinion research on support
and trust in political institutions supports this conclusion. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide
insight into trends of citizens’ attitudes towards key political institutions both historically
and, critically, during the time period under study here. As is evident from these tables,
the German public holds the FCC in high regard and has done so for decades. The court’s
strong position in the German political system was well summarized by a member of the
Bundestag in response to a question about the importance of public opinion for the FCC:
The court...enjoys tremendous trust among the general public. In a confrontation, the broad public would stand behind the court (Vanberg 2005: 121)
In short, there is strong evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, that the FCC enjoys
a high level of public support and is considered by the public to be a legitimate institution
in the German political system.
Table 3.6: Trust in German Political Institutions, 1982-1993
Institution

1982

1986

1990

1993

FCC
Bundestag
Federal Government
Judiciary
Police
Churches
Trade Unions
Political Parties
Newspapers

82%
61%
59%
74%
67%
53%
39%
57%

85%
74%
66%
76%
78%
64%
42%
45%
51%

84%
65%
61%
69%
83%
62%
44%
37%
36%

73%
44%
43%
62%
76%
52%
44%
23%
42%

Source: Vanberg (2005)
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Table 3.7: Trust in German Public Institutions, 2011
Institution

2011

Police
FCC
Educational System
Military
Municipal Authorities
Public Broadcasting
Trade Unions
Churches
Press
Political Parties

89%
80%
78%
70%
67%
61%
55%
43%
37%
16%

Source: TNS Emnid (2011)

The Risk of Noncompliance in German Constitutional Politics
An underlying claim in the theory is that the government can credibly threaten noncompliance. My argument is that the basis for a court’s use of hearings is predicated
upon the real possibility that the government will ignore or otherwise evade a judicial
decision that strikes down one of the government’s policies. It is not sufficient that there
is an abstract possibility that the government can engage in noncompliance; the critical
question is whether or not a government seriously considers noncompliance an option and
has the means to do so. In the context of Germany and the FCC, then, the relevant question is whether the court has reason to be concerned about federal or state governments
engaging in noncompliance.
The support of the German public has not fully insulated the court from the possibility
of noncompliance. As Vanberg (2005) notes, the possibility of noncompliance is quite real
for the FCC. Noncompliance generally takes one of three forms. First, on rare occasion
government actors can publicly defy an FCC decision. Second, a government can fail to
pass the legislation necessary for the implementation of the court’s decision. Third, the
government can pass legislation creating a policy that, on its face, conforms to the court’s
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decision but, when implemented, is substantively identical to the policy struck down by
the ourt. Below I address each of these modes of noncompliance and provide an example
of their use in response to an FCC decision.
The first form of noncompliance, outright defiance, is the most seldomly employed by
German elected officials. As we saw in the previous section, the FCC enjoys a high level
of public support that makes challenging the legitimacy of the court a particularly risky
political strategy.24 There have, however, been examples of government officials defying
FCC decisions. One of the most prominent such cases involved Bavarian law requiring
the display of a crucifix in public elementary school classrooms. The constitutionality of
the law was challenged at the FCC, where the court struck the statute down as violating
the constitutional right to religious freedom. The response from the Bavarian government
was to publicly denounce the court’s decision and declare the government’s intent to defy
the court’s demand that the crucifixes be removed from Bavarian classrooms.
The conclusion of the Crucifix case speaks, however, to the limited extent of such responses to FCC decisions. The Bavarian government, rather than unabashedly refuse to
implement the court’s decision, ultimately passed new legislation to implement the court’s
decision. The government did so, however, by writing legislation that had no substantive
effect on policy. This second strategy available to governments for engaging in noncompliance allows officials to claim they are complying with FCC decisions without paying the
policy costs of faithfully doing so. In the Crucific case, the Bavarian government passed
legislation that made the placement of a crucifix in Bavarian classrooms the “default”
setting. The crucifix may only be removed if a student or parent raises an objection,
and even then the revised legislation left considerable discretion to local school officials
to find a “compromise solution” or “individual solution” (Vanberg 2005: 3). The effect
of the government’s new law was clear: the status quo prior to the court’s decision was
24

An excellent quote from Vanberg (2005: 121) of a member of the Bundestag relays

this point quite nicely: “A serious confrontation [with the FCC] would just create a public
discussion in which one could easily get a bloody nose.”
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maintained, even though the government had passed legislation superficially complying
with the court’s ruling. This strategy has been used by the federal government as well
in response to adverse FCC decisions, as it allows the government to avoid outright confrontation with the court without incurring the full costs of ending the unconstitutional
policy.25
The third general strategy available for government officials to engage in noncompliance is to simply not pass the legislation necessary to implement the court’s decision. An
example of this tactic in Germany is the Federal government’s response to a 1980 ruling
on civil servant pensions.26 The case involved several civil servants challenging the constitutionality of the civil servant pension system, specifically the tax status of their pension
benefits. The FCC ruled in favor of the civil servants, stating that the pension system
violated the constitution’s equal protection clause. The government, faced with a decision
that would have direct budgetary costs, effectively delayed the passage of legislation that
would bring the policy into conformity with the constitution. The government created a
committee to develop a revised policy and, in the meantime, cited the complex nature
of the policy as justification for delay. After some twelve years had passed without new
legislation, civil servants filed a new constitutional complaint at the court. The court
cited the delay as not unreasonable and dismissed the claim. The government had been
able to avoid complying with the court’s decision by effectively delaying the legislative
process until the court lacked the will or political capital to push the issue.
To be sure, these examples should not be taken to suggest that noncompliance of FCC
is anything but a rare occurrence. The rarity of these events, in fact, is entirely consistent with the theoretical model. If German governments and the FCC are forward looking
25

The Federal government adopted this strategy when faced with an adverse ruling in

1992 regarding political party finance laws. The government did so by passing a revised
law that made the changes requested by the court but added a new clause that in effect
replaced the unconstitutional features of the original statute. See Vanberg (2005) for an
in-depth discussion of these cases.
26
An excellent account of the case can also be found in Vanberg (2005).
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players, then we would expect them to avoid noncompliance much of the time. The court,
for instance, should be less likely to strike down legislation when it does anticipate being
able to compel government officials to comply. From the perspective of elected officials,
they have an incentive to avoid conflict with the court when voters are likely to observe
noncompliance. The result is, as the equilibria from the game suggest, a relationship
between judicial and legislative institutions based often on deference to the other branch.
It is important to point out this dynamic, as it highlights the influence potential noncompliance can have on judicial behavior even in the absence of many observed cases of
noncompliance.

Conclusion
This chapter has presented the case study I use for testing the empirical hypotheses
derived from the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2. The German Federal Constitutional Court provides a uniquely excellent case for testing the theory because of its
history, institutional structure, and role in the German political system. The FCC has
developed into one of the most successful and influential German political institutions and
constitutional courts in the world. For the purposes of testing the theoretical model, the
FCC is an especially useful case because it at once corresponds well to the assumptions
and structure of the theoretical model. The court faces, as we saw in the early cases on
the EDC and General treaties, potential noncompliance from government officials. The
ability of governments to successfully ignore FCC decisions, however, is limited by the
high level of public support enjoyed by the court. Perhaps most critically for the theory
proposed in Chapter 2, this chapter has shown that public oral hearings increase media
coverage of FCC decisions. With the appropriateness of the German case established,
I turn to the next chapter, in which I conduct a systematic empirical analysis of the
empirical hypotheses derived from the theoretical model.
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Chapter 4
An Empirical Analysis of Public
Oral Hearings at the FCC
In Chapter 2, I presented a theoretical model that explains how a court can use
its discretion over public oral hearings to facilitate compliance with its decisions from
an otherwise resistant government. The principal argument forwarded in that chapter
focuses on the ability of hearings to increase public awareness of judicial decisions and
thereby create an electoral incentive for elected officials to comply with a court’s ruling.
The model yielded a series of empirically-testable implications of such an argument. In
the preceding chapter, I considered the applicability of the model to one of the most
prominent constitutional courts, the German Constitutional Court (FCC). I now turn to
specifying a series of empirical hypotheses from the model’s implications and testing those
hypotheses using data from the FCC.
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Hypotheses
The theoretical model’s central claim is that a court’s use of public oral hearings
corresponds to the credibility and severity of a government’s threat of noncompliance.1
When the court is faced with the possibility of noncompliance, hearings can bolster the
court’s ability to obtain compliance by increasing public awareness of the court’s ruling. If,
however, the potential for noncompliance is minimal or nonexistent, for example in cases
involving statutes the government prefers the court strike down (Whittington 2005), then
there is no incentive for a court to use hearings as a response to noncompliance. In other
words, courts hold hearings for the purpose of confronting potential noncompliance. As
such, courts should be more likely to use the proceeding when this threat exists. This
observation, which motivated the first observation in chapter 2, leads to the first empirical
hypothesis, the Noncompliance Risk Hypothesis.
Noncompliance Risk Hypothesis (H1): The German Constitutional Court
is more likely to hold a hearing when the government poses a credible threat of
noncompliance.
When faced with a credible threat of noncompliance, courts then consider whether a
hearing would be sufficiently effective at increasing public awareness to offset the cost of
holding the proceeding. This observation (Observation 3 in Chapter 2) from the model
highlights the limitations of hearings as a tool for addressing potential noncompliance.
One potentially significant limiting factor is the complexity of the policy under review.
Cases involving complex or otherwise arcane policies place a greater burden on citizens’
ability to comprehend what precisely is at stake in a given case. This in turn makes it
more difficult for the public to understand the content of a judicial decision and, impor1

Of course, there are other uses of hearings not addressed by my theoretical argument.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, these alternative explanations do not account for the key
results of the model. As we will see in this chapter, the evidence supporting my argument
is robust to the inclusion these alternatives in the empirical analysis.
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tantly, what precisely constitutes compliance with such a decision. Moreover, complex
policies may be less likely to receive substantial media coverage due to the incentives for
media outlets to tailor their coverage to issues and topics of likely interest to the public.
Cases involving complex issues do not lend themselves to the short reports typical in
television media or the limited page space in print media. In contrast, media outlets can
more straightforwardly convey the import and implications of cases addressing relatively
noncomplex issues. As the ability of hearings to increase public awareness relies on the
media covering the proceeding and the public consuming and understanding that coverage, one would expect the court to more aggressively use its discretion over hearings in
cases addressing less complex policy areas.
Complexity Hypothesis (H2): When faced with the risk of noncompliance,
the German Constitutional Court is more likely to hold public oral hearings in
cases involving less complex policies.
A second factor that influences the effectiveness of hearings at increasing public awareness is the type and source of the case before the court. Citizens should be more likely to
relate to the issue at stake in a case if they can relate to the circumstances of the dispute.
That is, citizens should better understand the questions in a case when they can relate to
the case itself. Accordingly, cases brought directly to the court by individuals should on
average better capture the public’s attention than cases sent to the court by other political institutions requesting technical legal clarifications. Recall from the previous chapter
that constitutional complaints allow citizens to make claims of unconstitutional actions
directly to the court. Although most constitutional complaints are directed against the
decisions of other courts, this procedure provides citizens the opportunity to directly challenge the legality of legislation. As a result, the constitutional complaint has become the
primary method for the general public to challenge the constitutionality of government
policies and legislation. This direct connection between ordinary citizens and the court
stands in stark contrast to the other primary proceeding types like concrete and abstract
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review cases, which rely on another branch of the German political or judicial system
to refer constitutional questions, often of a highly technical nature, to the court. As a
consequence, I would expect hearings to be less effective in these other proceedings than
in constitutional complaints.
Proceeding Type Hypothesis (H3): When faced with the risk of noncompliance, the German Constitutional Court is more likely to hold public oral
hearings in constitutional complaints.
In addition to predictions regarding when a court should hold a hearing, the model had
implications for the consequences of hearings for case disposition. The fifth observation
from Chapter 2 noted that courts should be more likely to rule against the government
and strike down the challenged legislation in cases granted a hearing. After all, if courts
use hearings to overcome noncompliance then they can only fulfill that purpose when
noncompliance is at issue, i.e. when the court has struck down a policy against the
government’s wishes. To hold a hearing and then uphold the challenged statute leaves
the court with the undesired policy intact and bearing the cost of the hearing. One would
expect empirically, then, for the German court to coordinate its use of hearings with case
disposition, with cases granted a hearing being more likely to result in the court striking
down the challenged statute. This leads to the fourth hypothesis.
Strategic Case Disposition Hypothesis (H4): When faced with the risk
of noncompliance, the German Constitutional Court is more likely to rule
against a government action in cases granted a public oral hearing.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is worth noting that the above four hypotheses are not the entirety of the empirically testable implications produced by the
model. As we saw in Chapter 2, the model generates predictions regarding the relationship between the use of hearings and the cost of holding a hearing. While ideally
the analysis would incorporate these predictions into the analysis, the research design I
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use here - focusing on the German Constitutional Court - makes this unfeasible. The
costs associated with hearings, such as the opportunity costs and time constraints facing
courts, are difficult at best to quantify. And those cost aspects that are measurable, such
as budgetary constraints, vary cross-nationally rather than within a single court. Beyond
these measurement challenges, these predictions, while interesting, are not as central as
the above hypotheses to the purpose of the theoretical argument made here. Recall that
one primary goal of the formal model was to distinguish my theoretical argument from
alternative explanations and extant theoretical accounts for hearings. Focusing on the
effectiveness of hearings at increasing public awareness and the consequences of hearings
for case disposition most efficiently accomplishes this task. I return to the role of cost
and potential further empirical work in the final chapter.

Data and Measures
I use data collected on published FCC decisions reviewing federal and state laws made
between 1995 and 2014, which I then supplement with Vanberg’s (2005) dataset of such
cases from 1983 to 1995. The dataset consists of 613 cases for which the court had
discretion over holding a hearing, including constitutional complaints, concrete review,
public law disputes, election disputes involving the constitutionality of an electoral law,
constitutional disputes between the national and states governments, and constitutional
disputes within a state. It excludes cases in which the court does not have discretion
over hearings, such as abstract review cases and disputes between federal institutions.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the two primary proceeding types, concrete review
and constitutional complaints, over the time period covered in the data set.
The outcome variable for the first and second hypotheses is the court’s decision to hold
a hearing. The variable Hearing is coded 1 if the court held a hearing and 0 otherwise.
The outcome variable for the third hypothesis, Strike, is the decision of the court. The
variable is coded 1 if the court rules the statute unconstitutional and 0 if it upholds the
statute.
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Note: Solid line denotes number of concrete review decisions present in the dataset in a given year.
Dashed line represents the number of constitutional complaint cases in the dataset in a given year.
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For the first hypothesis, which predicts the likelihood of a hearing to be greater for
cases involving potential noncompliance, I measure the risk of noncompliance by examining whether or not the government whose statute is being challenged filed an amicus brief
in defense of the statute. Filing a brief requires a government to invest resources, which
can indicate the level of importance politicians place on the law. Furthermore, filing a
brief requires a government to take a public stance and risk its reputation on the issue.
While such briefs are rarely direct threats of noncompliance, they signal to the court the
government’s investment in the law and potential willingness to engage in noncompliance.
That is, the government’s decision to file a brief defending the constitutional of a statute
indicates that the policy under review is of nontrivial amount of importance to the government. Conversely, failure to file a brief on the part of the government highlights the
government’s disinterest in the case’s outcome and suggests that the policy under review
is of little to no importance to the government. This variable, No Government Brief, is
coded 0 when the challenged government files a brief defending the constitutionality of
the statute under review and 1 otherwise.2
For the second hypothesis, which predicts the likelihood of a hearing to increase with
the complexity of the issue under review, I focus on the policy addressed in each case.
To measure complexity, I use Vanberg’s (2005) dichotomous coding scheme to construct
the variable Case Complexity. Cases involving taxation, budgets, economic regulation,
social insurance, civil servant compensation, and party finance are coded as “complex”
with a value of 0, while those involving institutional disputes, family law, judicial process,
individual rights, asylum rights, and military conscription are coded as “simple” with a
value of 1. The logic behind this coding scheme is that “complex” policy topics often
involve technical issues and have far reaching, complicated implications for public policy.
A case involving the federal tax structure for civil servants would be an example of a
2

This variable does not distinguish between the Federal and state governments. Thus,

if a state law is challenged, the variable is coded as 1 only if the state government files a
brief defending the law; the Federal government’s position is not taken into account.
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“complex” case, as it involves a highly technical area, the tax code, and has broader
implications for government budgets. This contrasts to the “simple” cases that tend to
address policies more limited in scope and easily recognizable by citizens. For example,
a “simple” policy might involve the regulation of abortion because the court is asked to
identify the specific instances in which the procedure is legal or prohibited. Note that here
the notion of complexity is not one based on the legal complexity of the issue before the
court, but rather one focused on the difficulty a case poses for the public’s understanding
of the issue at stake and the court’s decision.
The key explanatory measure for the third hypothesis is proceeding type. Constitutional complaints allow citizens to make claims of unconstitutional actions directly to the
court. Although most constitutional complaints are directed against the decisions of other
courts, this procedure critically provides citizens the opportunity to directly challenge the
legality of legislation. Constitutional complaints are more easily relatable for the public,
as the cases involve instances of individual harm rather than issues of constitutional jurisprudence raised by lower courts. As a result, news coverage of a citizen’s complaint
against the government should be more effective at increasing public awareness. Thus,
I expect the FCC to be more likely to hold a hearing for constitutional complaints than
other proceedings. The variable Constitutional Complaint is coded 1 for constitutional
complaints and 0 for all other proceedings.3
Since the fourth hypothesis predicts the court to be more likely to rule against the
government in cases granted a hearing, the independent variable for this hypothesis is
whether or not the court held a public oral hearing. This variable, Hearing, is the same
as the outcome variable for the first and second hypotheses.
3

The dataset excludes constitutional complaints that do not directly challenge the

constitutionality of legislation, as such cases do not involve the inter-institutional dynamic
of interest here.
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Table 4.1: Fisher’s Exact Test Results
Relevant
Hypothesis

First
Variable

Second
Variable

Government Brief
Filed?

Odds Ratio

H1
H2
H2
H3
H3
H4
H4

Hearing
Hearing
Hearing
Hearing
Hearing
Strike
Strike

No Government Brief
Case Complexity
Case Complexity
Const. Complaint
Const. Complaint
Hearing
Hearing

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

0.30∗
2.13∗
5.82
2.61∗
3.21
2.29∗
3.86

∗ = Significant at 0.05 level.
Total of 613 Cases. Government brief filed in 486 cases.

Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model identified the conditions under which the decision to hold a
hearing coincides with the risk of noncompliance, the expected effectiveness of hearings at
increasing public awareness, and case disposition. Fisher’s exact test provides a straightforward method for determining the relationship between two dichotomous variables such
as those used here. Based on the first hypothesis, I expect an odds ratios of less than one
for the relationship between Hearing and No Government Brief. For the second and third
hypotheses, I expect the odds ratio between Hearing and Case Complexity and Constitutional Compliant, respectively, to be greater than one when No Government Brief equals
zero. Similarly, for the fourth hypothesis I expect an odds ratio greater than one for Hearing and Strike when No Government Brief equals zero. The results of this preliminary
analysis, presented in Table 4.1, conform to the theoretical model’s predictions.4
Although this preliminary analysis supports the theoretical account, the conclusions
we can draw from the results are limited in two critical ways. First, it is difficult to
discern the substantive significance of the relationships from these results. Second, these
results do not take potential confounding factors into account. To address these issues I
estimate logistic regressions, as this approach provides estimates of both the statistical and
4

Results are robust to variety of alternative measures of association for contingency

tables, such as standard χ2 tests.
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substantive significance of the hypothesized relationships while controlling for potential
confounders.
The Noncompliance Risk Hypothesis (H1) predicts a negative relationship between
No Government Brief and Hearing. For the Complexity Hypothesis (H2), Proceeding
Type Hypothesis (H3), and the Strategic Case Disposition Hypothesis (H4), I follow Kam
and Franzese’s (2007) recommendation to estimate a model including an interaction term
between the independent variables and the conditioning variable No Government Brief.5
The coefficients of the interaction’s constituent terms are estimates of the independent
variables when there is a risk of noncompliance (No Government Brief = 0 ). For the
Complexity Hypothesis I estimate a model interacting the measures of effectiveness (Case
Complexity and No Government Brief, with the expectation that the variable Case Complexity will be positive and statistically significant. I further expect the interaction term
between the two variables to not reach statistical significance. I conduct a similar analysis for the third hypothesis, the Proceeding Type Hypothesis. I interact Constitutional
Complaint) with No Government Brief with an expectation that the coefficient for Constitutional Complaint will be positive statistically significant while that of the interaction
should not be statistically significant. For the Strategic Case Disposition Hypothesis (H4),
I estimate a model interacting Hearing with No Government Brief.6 The coefficient of
Hearing should be positive and statistically significant, while the interaction term between
Hearing and No Government Brief should not be statistically significant.
I include a series of control variables to address potential omitted variable bias. The
court’s decision to hold a hearing may be a function of existing salience rather than the
5

See Kam and Franzese (2007), pgs. 103-111, for benefits of this approach over al-

ternatives such as subsetting the data. Also see (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005) for
a discussion when interaction models are appropriate and their relative advantages and
disadvantages to other empirical modeling strategies.
6
As the model predicts the decision to hold a hearing and case disposition to effectively
be joint choices, the decision to specify Strike as the outcome variable is based on the
temporal ordering of the judicial process.
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risk of noncompliance. As salience may correlate with the government’s decision to file
a brief, failing to control for existing public awareness could lead to biased results. To
measure existing salience, I create the variable Total Briefs using the number of amicus
briefs filed for a case, as greater interest group participation can be indicative of a case’s
salience (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Vanberg 2005).7 As an additional measure of prehearing awareness, I account for whether the challenged statute was passed by the Federal
government or a state government. Federal laws are likely to have a broader societal
impact than subnational laws, which may lead the public to be more aware of a case if it
involves a national rather than subnational law.8 Federal Law takes a value of 1 for cases
involving a Federal statute and 0 for state and local statutes.
I further control for two potential alternative goals judges may pursue through the use
of hearings. Scholars have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court uses oral arguments as
an information-gathering tool to improve the quality of decisions (e.g Johnson 2001). To
control for this possibility in the context of the FCC, I include the variable Court Brief,
which captures whether or not a lower court filed a brief. Lower courts regularly file
briefs for cases, providing the FCC with more reliable information than interest groups.
Second, the FCC may use hearings to legitimate decision by reassuring litigants of the
proceeding’s fairness. If the court is concerned about highlighting the legitimacy of the
process, I would expect it to hold hearings more frequently when faced with a plaintiff
with third party support. Therefore, I include the variable Complainant Support, which
is coded 1 if a brief was filed supporting the plaintiff’s position and 0 otherwise.
Additionally, I control for the institutional structure of the FCC. Recall from the previous chapter that the court conducts the majority of its business, including oral hearings,
7

Figures presenting the distribution of the Total Briefs variable is included in the

appendix.
8
Including this variable also addresses the possibility that the court’s potential costs
are greater when facing the Federal government than when facing a state government. As
such, we might expect the court to be more likely to grant a hearing for cases involving
Federal laws than state laws.
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in one of two senates consisting of eight judges (Kommers and Miller 2012). There are
two key defining characteristics of these senates. First, each judge is assigned to one and
only one senate, meaning that the two senates have entirely separate memberships. The
resulting personnel differences can, in turn, have consequences for the court’s behavior,
including potentially the decision to hold public oral hearings. Moreover, as the story
of the treaties cases in the previous chapter made apparent, government officials are not
oblivious to the court’s composition. This knowledge could alter the government’s strategy regarding the defense of challenged statutes accordingly, just as it might for strategic
litigants similarly concerned with the makeup of the Senate likely to hear a case. The
second characteristic is that each senate is assigned jurisdiction over specific issue areas.
It is possible that some issue areas are more likely to compel the court into holding a
hearing, which would lead to one senate holding hearings more frequently than the other.
A senate’s jurisdiction may further corresponds to the either the complexity of cases or
the government’s likelihood of filing a brief defending the constitutionality of the challenged statute. If either of these accounts is accurate, then failing to include this control
could result in biased coefficients. The variable Second Senate addresses these concerns,
with cases adjudicated by the Second Senate assigned a value of 1 and those adjudicated
by the First Senate coded as 0.
Similarly, I control for potential confounding factors in testing the fourth hypothesis.
First, I control for the legal merits of each case. I follow the example of Vanberg (2005)
and examine the opinion of lower courts to control for the legal merits. The lower courts
of the German judiciary are staffed with judges who have the necessary legal expertise
and familiarity with the FCC’s jurisprudence to provide the court with a clear portrayal
of a case’s legal merits. Furthermore, while the information provided by interest groups is
likely biased, the FCC can have greater confidence in the objectivity of the legal reasoning
presented in lower court briefs. The variable Lower Court Unconstitutional Brief is coded
1 if any lower court filed a brief supporting the plaintiff and 0 otherwise. In addition, I
include a variable considering only briefs filed by high courts, as they may provide higher
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quality information than lower courts. This variable, High Court Unconstitutionality
Brief, is coded 1 if a high court in the German federal or state judiciaries files a brief in
support of overturning the statute. A third control for legal merits, Amicus Brief Balance,
is calculated by subtracting the number of pro-plaintiff briefs from the number of progovernment briefs. Thus, a negative number indicates more support for the plaintiff than
the government, while more support for the government is indicated by a positive value.9
I additionally include the variable Second Senate to account for the possibility hearings vary systematically across the two Senates in a manner that correlates with case
disposition. Case Complexity is also included, as (Vanberg 2005) finds it is a significant
predictor of FCC decisions. Finally, I control for the governing party. To account for
possible partisan bias on the court, the variable CDU captures the partisan identity of
the defendant government. This variable is intended to ensure that my results are not
driven by a predisposition of the court to rule for or against a specific political party. This
variable takes a value of 1 when the head of the defendant government is a member of
the Christian Democratic Union (or Christian Social Union in Bavaria) and 0 otherwise.
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for each of these variables.

Results
Table 4.3 displays the results of the logistic regressions for the Noncompliance Risk
(H1), Complexity Hypothesis (H2), and Proceeding Type Hypothesis (H3). Model 1
analyzes the Noncompliance Risk Hypothesis. The results support the theoretical model;
the FCC is more likely to hold a hearing when the government files a brief defending
the constitutionality of its statute. Importantly, this relationship remains statistically
significant after controlling for potential confounding factors.10 Moreover, the substantive
9

A figure presenting the distribution of the Amicus Briefs Balance variable is included

in the appendix.
10
The results for both H1 and H2 are robust to the use of an alternative measure
of public awareness using media coverage collected from Lexis Nexis. Data limitations,
however, constrain this robustness analysis to cases from 2000 to 2013.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Public Oral Hearing
Strike
No Government Brief
Case Complexity
Constitutional Complaint
Court Brief
Total Briefs
Federal Law
Complainant Support
Amicus Brief Balance
Second Senate
Lower Court Unconstitutionality Brief
High Court Unconstitutionality Brief
CDU

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

0.18
0.39
0.21
0.42
0.44
0.55
3.25
0.79
0.39
0.92
0.39
0.50
0.17
0.73

0.38
0.49
0.41
0.49
0.50
0.50
3.38
0.41
0.49
2.33
0.49
0.50
0.37
0.45

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-10
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
23
1
1
17
1
1
1
1

Note: N = 613

significance of noncompliance rivals that of saliency.11 Figure 4.2 presents the substantive
significance of the relationship graphically. The figure provides the predicted probability
of the FCC holding a hearing based on the presence or absence of a government brief.
The predicted probability of the FCC holding a hearing when the government files a brief
is 17%, while the probability of a hearing when the government does not file a brief is
6%.12
Models 2 and 3 analyze the the Complexity Hypothesis (H2), and Proceeding Type
Hypothesis (H3), with the former model using Case Complexity as the key explanatory
variable while the latter model uses Constitutional Complaint. These hypothesis both
focus on the model’s prediction that when faced with a risk of noncompliance, the FCC is
more likely to hold a hearing when doing so will have the largest effect on public awareness.
11

This is based on Model 1. The inclusion of a government brief increases the probability

of a hearing from 6% to 17%, while increasing the number of amicus briefs from the mean
(3.25) by one standard deviation (3.38) raises the probability from 14% to 25%.
12
Presented differences in predicted probability are all statistically significant at the
p < 0.05 level.
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Figure 4.2: Government Briefs and the Decision to Hold a Public Oral Hearing

Note: The black point is the predicted probability of a hearing when the government files a brief. The
gray point is the predicted probability of a hearing when the government does not file a brief. Lines
represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates based on Model 1.
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Table 4.3: Logit Analysis of H1-H3
Variable
No Government Brief

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
−1.15
-1.84
-1.13
(0.40)
(1.03)
(0.64)
Case Complexity
0.92
(0.25)
Constitutional Complaint
0.87
(0.25)
No Gov’t Brief * Case Complexity
0.51
(1.14)
No Gov’t Brief * Const. Complaint
-0.05
(0.82)
Second Senate
0.48
0.42
0.53
(0.25)
(0.26)
(0.26)
Total Briefs
0.21
0.19
0.19
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
Court Brief
0.12
0.13
0.25
(0.23)
(0.24)
(0.24)
Federal Law
0.81
1.02
0.79
(0.32)
(0.33)
(0.32)
Complainant Support
0.36
0.48
0.45
(0.29)
(0.29)
(0.29)
Constant
−3.31
−3.85
−3.80
(0.40)
(0.45)
(0.44)

N

613

613

613

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates; numbers in parentheses are
standard errors.

The empirical results support this prediction. Based on the results of model 2, the FCC is
more likely to hold a hearing for cases involving “simple” issue areas, but only when there
is a risk of noncompliance. This relationship, presented in Figure 4.3, is substantively
significant. In cases including a brief filed by the government, the probability of a hearing
increases from 12% for “complex” cases to 25% for “simple” cases. When the government
does not file a brief, case complexity does not have a statistically significant relationship
with the court’s decision to hold a hearing.
Model 3 yields a similar relationship between proceeding type and hearings. The FCC
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Figure 4.3: Case Complexity and the Decision to Hold a Public Oral Hearing

Government Brief Filed

No Government Brief Filed

Note: Black points are predicted probabilities for “simple” cases. Gray points are predicted probabilities
for “complex” cases. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates based on the interaction term
Case Complexity ∗ No Government Brief in Model 2.
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Figure 4.4: Proceeding Type and the Decision to Hold a Public Oral Hearing

Government Brief Filed

No Government Brief Filed

Note: Black points are predicted probabilities for constitutional complaints. Gray points are predicted
probabilities for all other proceeding types. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates based
on the interaction term Constitutional Complaint ∗ No Government Brief in Model 3.
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is more likely to hold a hearing for constitutional complaints than other proceeding types,
such as concrete review cases. The probability of a hearing for a constitutional complaint
is 24% but only 11% for other proceeding types (see Figure 4.4). This relationship holds,
however, only when the government files a brief. Otherwise, the proceeding type does not
have a statistically significant relationship with the court’s decision to hold a hearing.

Table 4.4: Logit Analysis of the Strategic Case Disposition Hypothesis (H4)
Variable
Hearing

Model 4 Model 5
0.93
0.92
(0.25)
(0.25)
No Government Brief
-0.15
-0.10
(0.23)
(0.23)
No Gov’t Brief * Hearing
0.78
0.67
(0.87)
(0.87)
Lower Court Unconst.
0.10
Brief
(0.18)
High Court Unconst.
0.68
Brief
(0.24)
Second Senate
-0.46
-0.49
(0.18)
(0.18)
Amicus Brief Balance
−0.15
−0.13
(0.04)
(0.04)
Federal Law
−0.75
−0.76
(0.23)
(0.23)
Case Complexity
−0.01
0.06
(0.19)
(0.19)
CDU
-0.19
-0.19
(0.20)
(0.20)
Constant
0.41
0.31
(0.27)
(0.26)
N

612

612

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates; numbers in
parentheses arestandard errors.
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Table 4.4 presents the analysis of the Case Disposition Hypothesis (H4).13 This hypothesis states that, given a sufficient risk of noncompliance, the likelihood of an unconstitutionality ruling should be greater for cases granted a hearing. The results of models 4
and 5 provide support for this hypothesis. German federal and state governments tend to
lose cases more often when the court holds a public oral hearing. This tendency, however,
only holds in those cases for which the government filed a brief. When there is a low risk
of noncompliance, there is no statistically significant relationship between hearings and
the court’s willingness to rule against the government.
To ascertain the substantive significance of the relationship between hearings and
case disposition, Figure 4.5 provides predicted probabilities of the court ruling against
the government according to whether or not a hearing was held and whether or not the
government filed a brief defending the statute’s constitutionality. In cases including a brief
filed by the government, the probability of the court ruling against the government after
holding a public oral hearing is 58%. In contrast, when the court does not hold a hearing
in cases including a brief from the government, the probability of an unconstitutionality
ruling is 35%.14 This relationship between hearings and case disposition fails to reach
statistical significance, however, in cases that do not include a brief from the government
defending the statute’s constitutionality.

Conclusion
The central insight from the theoretical model in Chapter 2 was that a court can
use public oral hearings to address potential government noncompliance. The empirical
implications that followed from this argument identified a series of hypotheses regarding
relationships between the use of hearings, the political conditions surrounding a case,
13

The results are robust to analysis using only cases including a brief from the govern-

ment. See appendix for full results.
14
Probabilities are based on model 4. Using model 5, which controls for the legal merits
using High Court Unconstitutional Brief, does not effect the statistical or substantive
interpretation.
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Figure 4.5: Public Oral Hearings and Case Disposition

Government Brief Filed

No Government Brief Filed

Note: Black points are predicted probabilities for cases granted a public oral hearing. Gray points
are predicted probabilities for cases not granted a hearing. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Estimates based on the interaction term Hearing ∗ No Government Brief in Model 4.
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and case characteristics. In this chapter, I tested these implications. Using a dataset of
over 600 constitutional review cases brought to the German Constitutional Court between
1983 and 2013, I found evidence consistent with the model’s predictions. Further analysis
accounting for potential confounding factors and alternative accounts similarly yielded
empirical support for each of my hypotheses.
The analysis presented in this chapter has yielded unambiguous support for my theoretical account of public oral hearings. Simultaneously, however, it raises a fundamental
question about the generalizability of my theory to judicial procedures more broadly. If it
is the case, as the evidence about suggests, that courts such as the German Constitutional
Court use hearings to address potential noncompliance, then we might expect other facets
of the judicial process to be similarly used. I take this question up in the next chapter by
extending the theory to consider another institutional tool potentially available to courts,
the timing of decisions.
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Chapter 5
Extending the Theory: Elections and
the Timing of Decisions
In the previous chapters, I developed a theoretical model that explains how a court
can facilitate compliance from government officials by strategically using discretion over
one of the most prominent judicial procedures, public oral hearings. Focusing on the consequences of public oral hearings for public attention to the judiciary, the model demonstrated how courts can overcome the fundamental challenge of noncompliance. In so
doing, the model generated a series of predictions regarding when a court will use hearings and, moreover, how the use of hearings corresponds to the exercise and ultimate
efficacy of constitutional review.
Although the model and empirical analyses in the previous chapters focused on public
oral hearings, the central logic behind the theoretical model - the ability and incentive
for courts to leverage their discretion over key features of the judicial process to confront
potential threats of noncompliance - is not limited to hearings. Courts may possess a
variety of means to use procedural features to affect public awareness of their decisions.
In this chapter, I test this additional implication by extending the empirical analysis to
one such institutional tool, the timing of judicial decisions. Specifically, I contend that the
ability of a court to strategically time its decisions provides an opportunity to strike down

95

legislation when voters are especially attentive to political issues, election campaigns and
the period immediately preceding an election.
The remainder of the chapter considers this empirical extension. I first motivate the
chapter by discussing the role of timing in politics. The following section develops the
theoretical argument and empirical hypotheses. I then discuss the data, measures, and
empirical approach employed to test these hypotheses. The fourth section presents the
results. In the fifth section I extend the analysis to consider whether the court modifies
its decisions based on timing or, instead, the court delays its decisions to issue rulings
in the advantageous context of election campaigns. I then conclude with a discussion of
the implications of these findings for constitutional review and the quality of democratic
governance, specifically in regard to the relationship of these findings with the empirical
results presented in Chapter 4.

The (Judicial) Politics of Timing
Scholars have long recognized the central role of timing in the calculus of political
decision making. Party leaders in parliamentary systems act strategically when timing
national elections (Lupia and Strøm 1995). Legislators strategically time their positiontaking on prominent issues (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 1997; Caldeira and Zorn 2004).
Presidents use the timing of speeches and trips in order to improve their chance of reelection (Brace and Hinckley 1993). Political conditions similarly can influence when United
States Supreme Court justices (Hagle 1993) and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges (Spriggs
and Wahlbeck 1995) choose to retire from the bench.
Key to these arguments is the relationship between the timing of decisions and political
actors’ pursuit of specific goals. Specifically, the timing of the action is meant to maximize
the likelihood of the desired outcome, such as reelection. That is, political actors may base
the timing of major decisions in part on their political impact, as the conditions affecting a
decision’s political consequences may vary across time. The logic here is straightforward:
make decisions under as advantageous of conditions as possible and attempt to delay or
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avoid decisions under less conducive conditions.
Of course, what conditions political actors focus on and what constitutes advantageous
timing for issuing a decision versus a disadvantageous one is dependent on the actors’
goals and political environment. In modern liberal democracies, the ability of the public
to observe and evaluate an official’s decision or action figures prominently as one such
condition. When voters are aware of an elected official’s action, they can effectively
reward or punish that official at the ballot box. Accordingly, officials have an incentive to
issue decisions that will be popular with voters when the likelihood of public awareness
is highest. Conversely, officials have reason to minimize attention for unpopular actions.
Most constitutional courts enjoy discretion regarding when to issue decisions. But
while the above logic of strategic timing is straightforward in the case of reelection-focused
public officials, it is not as immediately clear how a court composed of unelected judges
would benefit from strategically timings its decisions. Since constitutional court judges
are not elected, they do not face the electoral pressures that can motivate the timing
of elected officials’ decisions.1 Moreover, the legitimacy of the courts on which judges
serve is derived in part from the presence and preservation of the appearance that the
judiciary does not engage in politicking or other separation between the judiciary and the
public (Staton 2010; Gibson, Caldeira and Baird 1998). With these points in mind, any
explanation for why a court might strategically time its decisions must first identify the
court’s goal.
The theory presented in the previous chapters provides such an explanation by focusing
on the correspondence between the timing of a court decision, the likelihood of public
attention for the decision, and the court’s goal of obtaining compliance with its decision
from government officials. Specifically, discretion over when a decision is issued provides
courts an opportunity to manipulate public awareness in a manner that can aid in the
pursuit of compliance. Courts can time their decisions to roughly coincide with events
1

Bolivia is an exception to this electoral connection in the context of constitutional

courts; see Driscoll and Nelson (2014).
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likely to raise public attention to political issues. Indeed, if courts are concerned with
obtaining compliance with their decisions and consider the attention of a supportive public
to be a means to that end, then courts have an incentive to consider their discretion over
the timing of decisions as a resource for affecting public awareness.
If it is the case that courts time their decisions with noncompliance in mind, then
they likely seek to issue their decisions when citizens are most likely to become aware
of the ruling. In modern liberal democracies, elections can serve as this basis. Election
campaigns typically increase press and public attention to all political matters, including
constitutional review. Consequently, rulings issued in that period may be more likely
to garner greater public awareness than those issued far from the spotlight of election
campaigns.2 Moreover, the proximity of the decision to an election allows rulings to
figure more prominently in voters’ calculus than they otherwise might if the decision were
issued two or three years before the election. A strategic court concerned with garnering
sufficient public awareness of its decisions to compel government officials to comply with
its decisions should, then, take advantage of the electoral cycle by ruling against the
government in the period immediately preceding an election. This expectation leads to
the first hypothesis.
Timing Hypothesis (H1): A court is more likely to rule against the government in the period immediately preceding an election.
One of the key implications of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 is that
a court will use its discretion over institutional tools to increase public awareness only
when faced with a credible threat of noncompliance. When the government does not value
the policy under review, whether because the policy is of little importance or because the
government prefers the law struck down, noncompliance is not at issue and the court need
not strategically time its decision. Accordingly, a court that values compliance with its
rulings should be more likely to strike down statutes as unconstitutional in the period
2

Later in this chapter I provide evidence to this effect in the context of the FCC.
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leading up to an election only when the defendant government’s investment in the policy
signals the potential for noncompliance. That is, a court need not be strategic in this
manner when noncompliance is not a threat, and as a result one would not expect in
those cases to find evidence of the strategic relationship proposed in the first hypothesis.
Noncompliance Risk Condition Hypothesis (H2): The relationship defined in Hypothesis 1 is limited to cases involving a threat of noncompliance.
A challenge facing a court attempting to strategically time its decisions is uncertainty
over the length of the electoral cycle. Constitutional courts often operate in political
systems where electoral cycles are not always fixed. Successful motions of no confidence
in national parliaments, for example, can result in the holding of early elections. Similarly,
in some parliamentary democracies the prime minister can choose to call an election before
the end of the current term (see Schleiter and Tavits 2016; Goplerud and Schleiter 2016).
Table 5.1 shows the widespread nature of such features in European democracies.
As a result of these powers, predicting when the next election will take place is not
straightforward for a court attempting to strategically time its decisions. Such a court
cannot be assured that an attempt to time a decision to coincide with the next election
will in fact do so, as the court may miss its opportunity as a result of an unexpected early
election. Thus, courts may be less successful at strategically timing their decisions when a
government terminates its term in office with an early election. If this is the case, then one
might expect the relationship between a court’s likelihood of striking down legislation as
unconstitutional and issuing the decision in the period immediately preceding an election
to be limited only to cases decided in electoral terms that are not ended in an early
election. Conversely, the court cannot effectively time its decisions and as a result we
should not observe the relationship between timing and case disposition when there is an
early election.
Early Election Hypothesis (H3): The relationship defined in Hypothesis
1 is limited to cases decided during to a standard election period.
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Table 5.1: Dissolution Powers in Europe
Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

PM Dissolution Power

Government Dissolution Power

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Schleiter and Tavits (2016). Based on powers as of 2011.
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Returning the the German Constitutional Court
Before turning to the empirical tests of these hypotheses, I consider their applicability
in the case of the German Constitutional Court. Specifically, I address three questions
critical to determining whether or not the FCC is an appropriate setting. First, I show
variation in the timing of the court’s decisions, with particular attention paid to how this
variation corresponds to the German electoral cycle. Second, I look for evidence consistent
with the claim that decisions issued in the period preceding an election garner attention.
Third, I review the instances of early federal elections in Germany to show that it was
unlikely that the court would have foreseen their use and thus been unable to successfully
time its decisions.

The Timing of Federal Elections and Campaigns in Germany.

The German

constitution lays out guidelines for the timing of federal elections, including Bundestag
elections. The first section of Article 39 stipulates that “the Bundestag shall be elected for
four years. Its term shall end when a new Bundestag convenes. New elections shall be held
no sooner than forty-six months and no later than forty-eight months after the electoral
term begins.” A result of this requirement is a largely stable and consistent electoral
calendar. In fact, every Bundestag election since 1998 has been held in September. If the
Bundestag is dissolved, then the constitution requires a new election to be held within
sixty days.
The length of Bundestag election campaigns is regulated neither by the constitution
nor federal law. Rather, state and local laws govern certain aspects of campaigning. For
example, the use of billboards is often limited to a few weeks immediately preceding the
election. Similarly, advertising on radio and television is limited by state laws to a four
week period before the election. Otherwise, the timing of formal campaigns is left to
convention, with the norm being that parties begin campaigning in earnest five or six
weeks prior to the election (Birnbaum 2013; Khazan 2013).
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The Media and German Elections.

While formal campaigning may not begin until

a few months before election day, media interest in Bundestag elections typically begins
much sooner and crescendoes as the election nears. Since the timing of the next election is
constrained by the constitution (barring an early election), media outlets can begin reporting on the dynamics of an upcoming election well in advance of the parties’ campaigning.
And as the election nears, the media coverage grows in its intensity. Peak coverage comes
in the months immediately preceding the election known as the “hot phase” of the campaign (Schoenbach 1987; Schoenbach and Lauf 2001; Bachl and Brettschneider 2011).
During this period, voters are inundated with campaign-related coverage as “television
channels can hardly avoid political information” (Schoenbach 1987: 383).
To see how media coverage grows in the months preceding an election, I collected data
on newspaper coverage of Bundestag elections between 2000 and 2013. This timespan
covers four national elections: the 2002, 2005, 2009, and 2013 Bundestag elections. Using
the Lexis-Nexis Foreign Language News Search function, I counted the number of newspaper articles focused on Bundestag elections each month. Articles were counted if their
title included the word Bundestagswahl (Bundestag Election). The average number of
headlines per month was 42, with a median number of articles of 7.
The results are presented in Figure 5.1. A few observations stand out from the figure.
First, the media unsurprisingly covers the elections most vigorously in the month including
election day. Indeed, the coverage in these months far surpasses the amount of coverage
in any other month, a finding that conforms with the narrative in the German politics
literature regarding a “hot phase” of the campaign. Second, the figure highlights the
media buildup as an election approaches. While coverage is greatest during the month of
the election, this peak is the culmination of several months of increasing media coverage.
With the exception of the 2005 early election3 , media attention for the upcoming election
3

Since an election was not anticipated by the media, there was no buildup of coverage

six months out from the election. I discuss the circumstances surround this election in
greater detail later in the chapter.
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began in earnest six to nine months before election day. That is, upcoming elections were
coming into the public eye well before the politicians began their formal campaigning.
The data also suggest that media coverage of elections has increased over time. I
am hesitant, however, to draw such a conclusion because the data rely on newspapers
having digitized their archives. Simply put, the greater amount of coverage in September
2009 than September 2005 may be the result of more newspapers being included in the
Lexis-Nexis catalogue of online newspaper records in 2009 than there were in 2005. Such
a dynamic, however, would not account for the relative trend of coverage increasing in
the months leading up to election day.
Recall, however, that my argument here is that media coverage of government actions,
not just elections, increases as an election nears. While election coverage naturally entails
discussion of politics and the issues facing voters, it may not fully encompass the degree of
interest in the actions of the government itself. To address this, I collect data on headline
coverage of the German federal government. The data counts the number of headlines
per month including the word Bundesregierung, or federal government. In Figure 5.2, I
plot the media’s coverage of the government alongside the election coverage shown above
in Figure 5.1. While attention to the government is not quite as systematically related to
election day as that of elections, a trend nonetheless is evident from the figure. Coverage
of the government creeps upward in the months immediately preceding an election, with
the spike occurring typically in the month or two following election day. This is likely the
result of coalition negotiations that occur after each election and, consequently, typically
delay the installation of a new government for a month or two. Without accounting of
this lag, the partial correlation between the two variables is both positive and statistically
significant after controlling for the spike in coverage of the government when the financial
crisis and subsequent recession hit in the fourth quarter of 2008.4 If, however, a one
month lag in coverage is taken into account, the relationship becomes even stronger with
4

Partial correlation estimate is 0.13 with a p-value of 0.09. The months controlled for

are October through December of 2008.
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Figure 5.2: Media Coverage of the Federal Government and Bundestag Elections, 20002013
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a correlation estimate of 0.17 and p-value of 0.03. In short, there appears to be evidence
of elections’ influence on the coverage of politics in Germany, both in the context of the
elections themselves and the behavior of the governments seeking votes.

The Timing of FCC Decisions.

The German Constitutional Court has considerable

discretion over the timing of its decisions. There is no specified timeline by which the
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court must make its decisions. That is, while the U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
typically issues its decisions on cases within a year of receiving the case, the German
Constitutional Court may take years to dispose. Figure 5.3 highlights this discretion
by showing the variation in the number of years the German court took to decide cases
involving Federal laws from 1983 to 2012. While the plurality of cases are decided within
a year of being filed, the median amount of time between application and decision is three
years. The variation shown in the figure is particularly striking, with the court having
taken as long as twelve years to provide a ruling in some cases and regularly taking five
years in others.
There is similarly variation in the timing of FCC decisions with respect to the German
electoral cycle. Figure 5.4 shows the frequency of FCC decisions by the number of years
between the decision and the most recent national election. Two specific observations
from the figure warrant particular attention. First, the court issued decisions throughout
the electoral cycle. Interestingly, the frequency of decisions decreases as the number
of years since the last election increases. Second, the court issued the most decisions
after the first and second years following an election. The number of decisions then
tapers as the electoral cycle moves forward, with the fewest decisions issued after four
years have passed since the last election. This observation makes sense, as the German
constitution requires that a national election be held at least roughly every four years.
More generally, taken together these figures illustrate the FCC’s use of discretion over
the timing of decisions and, moreover, highlight potential trends in the court’s use of this
discretion. My argument here is that this variation is, at least partially, due to strategic
considerations regarding noncompliance.

Media Coverage and the Timing of FCC Decisions.

A second concern regards

whether decisions issued near elections do in fact garner more media, and thereby public,
attention. Although on its face an uncomplicated claim, answering this question empirically is not entirely straightforward because of the strategic nature of the timing of

106

60
40
20
0

Number of Cases

80

100

Figure 5.3: Time Between Application and Decision of Cases at the FCC
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Figure 5.4: Timing of FCC Decisions in the Electoral Cycle
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counts the number of cases decided less than a full year after a national election.
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Table 5.2: Timing and Media Coverage of FCC Decisions
Model 1
Next Election within Six Months
0.19
(0.24)
Strike
0.44∗
(0.13)
Constant
1.40∗
(0.10)
N
176
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

decisions. The most obvious empirical test is to examine whether cases decided in the
period immediately preceding an election garner more media coverage than other cases.
Table 5.2 presents the results of such an analysis using data on media coverage of cases
involving Federal laws between 2000 and 2013. The outcome of interest here is the number of articles covering a decision and the explanatory variable of interest is whether a
decision was issued in the six-month period immediately preceding a federal election. I
also control for whether or not the court struck down the challenged law as unconstitutional. I do so to account for possible omitted variable bias. Case disposition may be
correlated with both the timing of the decision, a relationship predicted by hypothesis 1,
and the amount of media coverage given to a case. While decisions striking down legislation as unconstitutional garnered greater media coverage than those upholding challenged
statutes, this empirical approach provides no statistical evidence of such a relationship
between coverage and the timing of decisions immediately preceding an election.
This result is not, however, dispositive regarding the potential for increased media
coverage of rulings issued in this period. If my strategic timing argument is correct, then
the court may be selectively choosing which decisions to issue in the pre-election period
and which to issue earlier in the electoral cycle. Critically, one criterion upon which the
court may be making this selection could be the expected amount of coverage a decision
will receive if it is not issued in the higher-coverage time period preceding the national
election. Timing the issuance of decisions for cases that are unlikely to otherwise garner
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the coverage necessary to engender compliance maximizes the court’s benefit of using its
discretion. This is because such a strategy allows the court to strike down legislation
that it would likely uphold without the additional media attention. In contrast, the
marginal impact of timing decisions is more limited for decisions that are likely to generate
media coverage. This approach by the court would conform with the predictions of the
theoretical model in Chapter 2. Timing decisions in this manner results in the “Judicial
Emboldening” and “Limited Judicial Emboldening” equilibria. Moreover, such a selection
process would suggest that the court is using its discretion over timing when it is likely to
be most effective at promoting public awareness and ultimately compliance. Empirically,
then, the reason we find no statistically significant relationship between coverage and
timing is not because timing does not affect coverage, but rather because strategically
timing a decision brings coverage of those cases up to the level of more salient cases.
Two empirical hypotheses follow from this discussion that shed light on the question
of the relationship between timing and media coverage. First, if the court is using the
immediate pre-election period to increase media coverage of decisions that would otherwise
not garner significant attention, then cases decided in that period should, on average,
exhibit characteristics that suggest the media will not provide much coverage of the court’s
decision. In other words, there should be a correlation between cases decided in the period
leading up to an election and the amount of coverage the court might expect its decision
to receive if the decision is issued further away from the next election. Second, this
relationship should be conditioned by the risk of noncompliance in a case. Only when
there is a credible possibility that the government will fail to comply with the case does
the court have an incentive to behave in the strategic manner described here. When
this isn’t the case and the government does not value the statute under review, then we
should not observe the court linking the timing of its decision to the likelihood of media
coverage. To summarize, I expect cases decided in the period immediately preceding an
election to, on average, be less salient than other cases, but only when the court faces the
possibility of noncompliance with a decision to strike the challenged legislation down as
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unconstitutional.
To test these expectations, I once again use data on FCC decisions involving federal
legislation from 2000 to 2013. The outcome of interest here is whether or not a case was
decided in the six months immediately preceding the next national election. To measure
interest in a case before the court issues its decision, I rely on previous studies (e.g.
Vanberg 2005; Caldeira and Wright 1990; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997) and use the total
number of amicus briefs filed in a case (Total Briefs). Importantly, interested parties
(i.e. interest groups, governments, lower courts) must decide to file such briefs uncertain
about when the court will issue its decision. That is, the measure is exogenous to the
outcome of interest, the timing of Court’s decision. As in the empirical analysis in the
previous chapter, I use the variable No Government Brief as a measure of the risk of
noncompliance. As the relationship between the number of briefs and the timing of the
court’s decisions should be conditioned by No Government Brief, I once again follow the
advice of Kam and Franzese (2007) and interact the variables No Government Brief and
Total Briefs. The coefficient of most interest, then, is Total Briefs, as that coefficient
estimates the relationship between the number of briefs filed in a case and when the court
issues its decision.
The results, presented in Table 5.3, support the empirical expectations derived from
my strategic account of timing. Specifically, the likelihood of the court issuing a decision
in the six months prior to a federal election decreases as the number of amicus briefs
increases. That is, the more inherently salient a case is, the less likely the court is to
release that decision in the immediate buildup to an election. Moreover, this negative
relationship is limited to cases where noncompliance is at issue. When the government
does not file a brief defending the constitutionality of the challenged statute, the court’s
timing does not appear to be based significantly on a case’s salience. Figure 5.5 plots the
predicted probabilities based on these results to demonstrate the substantive significance
of this relationship. When the government files a brief defending the constitutionality
of the challenged statute and the case includes four amicus briefs, the probability of the
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court issuing its decisions within six months of the next election is 7%.5 This probability
rises to 33% when no third party amicus briefs are filed in a case. When the court is
not confronted with the potential for noncompliance, the number of amicus briefs has no
statistically significant relationship with the timing of the court’s decision. These results,
while not definitive, provide empirical support to the claim that the court strategically
times its decisions based, at least in part, on the risk of noncompliance and the need for
media coverage of decisions in order to overcome that risk.
Table 5.3: Case Salience and the Timing of FCC Decisions
Model 1
No Gov’t Brief
−1.95
(1.08)
Total Briefs
−0.49∗
(0.20)
No Gov’t Brief * Total Briefs
0.50∗
(0.26)
Constant
−0.68
(0.65)
N
176
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

Early Elections in Germany.

The third empirical hypothesis contends that courts

cannot time their decisions as effectively when the electoral cycle is unexpectedly shortened by early elections. This predicted relationship assumes that courts are unable to
accurately predict early elections, a claim that implicitly requires the decision to hold an
early election to be exogenous to the behavior of courts. That is, it is critical for the
theory that the decision of government officials to hold an early election is not the result
of judicial action. If this were the case, a court could strategically time its decisions more
effectively since it would be informed of the likelihood of an early election. While this is of
less concern with the early election of 1990 that was called after the reunification of East
5

This is the median number of briefs in this data set.
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Figure 5.5: Predicted Probability of Pre-Election Decision

Probability of Court Issuing Decision Less
Than Six Months Prior to National Election
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Note: Black lines indicate cases for which zero third party briefs were filed. Gray lines indicate cases for
which four amicus briefs were filed.
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and West Germany, it is worth discussing the highly politicized circumstances behind the
contentious use of early elections in 1983 and 2005.
In the case of Germany, early elections are generally the result of failed votes of
confidence. Specified by Article 68 of the Basic Law, this procedure allows the chancellor
to bring forth a motion to the parliament that, if successful, allows for the governing
coalition to continue in power.6 If, however, a majority of parliament does not vote in
support of the government, then the chancellor can either attempt to govern as a minority
government or ask the Federal President to dissolve the Bundestag and hold an election.7
Since the founding of the Federal Republic after World War Two, this procedure has
been used five times, three of which resulted in the dissolution of the Bundestag and the
holding of early elections (Reutter 2006). Two of these early elections, those of 1983 and
2005, are included in my dataset.
Interestingly, in both cases the chancellor motioned for a vote of confidence with the
explicit goal of the vote failing and thereby dissolving the Bundestag and bringing about
an election. In December 1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl requested a vote of confidence
6

The text of Article 68: “If a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence

is not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the Federal President
may, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, dissolve the Bundestag within twentyone days.”
7
There is a second related parliamentary procedure, and the only one initiated by the
parliament for removing the chancellor, known as the “constructive vote of no confidence.”
Specified by Article 67 of the Basic Law, this procedure allows the lower house of the
German parliament, the Bundestag, to remove the chancellor from office only if a majority
of its members simultaneously elect a successor. It was through this procedure that
Helmut Kohl replaced Helmut Schmidt as chancellor in 1982. The Social Democrats
(SPD) and liberals (FDP) had been the ruling coalition since 1969, but in 1982 the
FDP decided to leave that coalition and instead join a coalition with the conservative
CDU/CSU. Since a majority of the Bundestag now preferred an alternative chancellor
to the sitting chancellor, a constructive vote of no confidence was successful at removing
Schmidt and replacing him with the leader of the CDU/CSU, Kohl. For more, see Winkler
(2007).
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from the Bundestag and instructed his parliamentary majority to abstain from the vote
and thus ensure that the motion failed. Kohl had only become chancellor in October of
that year as the result of the only successful constructive vote of no confidence in the
history of the Bundestag.8 The issue for Kohl, then, was not that he lacked the support
of a majority of the chamber’s members, but that he wanted an election to legitimize
the new governing coalition and allow him to govern with a fresh electoral mandate.9
The problem, however, was that the Bundestag cannot dissolve itself and hold a new
election; that power is reserved for the Federal President. The president at the time, Karl
Carstens, was concerned that the motion for a vote of confidence was constitutionally
suspect since there was no question that the government had the support of a majority of
the Bundestag; the government had successfully passed a budget the day before the vote
of no confidence was scheduled to take place. Nonetheless, President Carstens accepted
Kohl’s proposal to dissolve the Bundestag and hold new elections in March 1983.10 Four
Bundestag delegates then challenged the President’s decision by bringing a case to the .
The court concluded that the action did not violate constitutional norms, allowing the
election to take place. The result of the election was a resounding victory for Kohl and
the CDU, with the party winning 48.8% of the vote and Kohl retaining the chancellorship,
a post he occupied until 1998.
The other instance of a vote of confidence resulting in an early election occurred in 2005
8

The only other attempted constructive vote of no confidence occurred in 1972, when

CDU leader Rainer Barzel came two votes short of replacing SPD chancellor Willy Brandt.
9
Kohl stated that the coalition needed “the decision of the people as a basis for the
necessary, long-term and broadly conceived policy of renewal” (Winkler 2007).
10
Carstens justified this decision on the basis of three points. First, both the governing
and opposition parties favored an early election. Second, there was no parliamentary
majority that stood to benefit from an election at the expense of a minority. Third,
leaders of within the government indicated that their support for the government was
contingent on new elections, thus calling into direct question the ability of the governing
coalition to maintain a parliamentary majority without new elections. See Winkler (2007)
for a detailed account.
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during the chancellorship of the SPD leader Gerhard Schröder.11 After electoral defeat
in a series of state elections culminating with a critical defeat in Nordrhein-Westfalen,
the governing parties, the SPD and Greens, did not control any state governments. As a
result, opposition parties controlled 43 of 69 seats in the Bundesrat, the upper house of
the German parliament consisting of delegates appointed by state governments. Schröder
claimed that the opposition’s control of the upper house left his government unable to
effectively legislate, a situation that could only be resolved by new elections (Reutter
2006). In July 2005, Schröder put forth the motion for a vote of confidence with the
instructions that members of the coalition parties abstain and thus ensure the motion’s
failure. The Federal President, at the time Horst Köhler, assented to Schröder’s request for
the dissolution of the Bundestag and the holding of early elections. After an unsuccessful
challenge of the constitutionality of the use of the vote of confidence motion at the FCC,
national elections took place in September. The results were a setback for Schröder’s
SPD party, but not a total defeat. The SPD entered into a “Grand Coalition” with the
CDU, with Schröder stepping down from the chancellorship and Angela Merkel of the
CDU taking over as chancellor.
To summarize, the three early elections included in my data set were not the direct
result of FCC actions. In the case of the 1990 election, few politicians, much less the FCC,
had seen reunification coming as swiftly as it did (Winkler 2007). As for the elections
following confidence votes in the Bundestag, in both instances it was the desire of the
chancellor that new elections be called because of shifts in the partisan makeup of key veto
players in the German political system. The resulting elections, which the constitution
required be held within 60 days of the Bundestag’s dissolution, left the court little time
to attempt to strategically time its decisions without appearing to behave politically. As
such, I expect the court’s ability to strategically time its decisions to have been hampered
in the electoral cycles ended by these elections.
11

For a more extensive treatment, see Reutter (2006).
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Empirical Analysis
To test my hypotheses, I consider all rulings involving the Federal government in
my data set. I restrict the analysis to cases of national law due to data limitations
regarding cases addressing questions of state law. The mechanism proposed here argues
that impending elections increase media coverage. This trait of elections, however, is
generally less prominent in state elections than national elections. Moreover, attention to
elections likely varies across states; elections in some states, such as the highly populated
Nordrhein-Westfalen and Niedersachsen, are likely to garner significantly more attention
than others, such as the less populated Saarland or Mecklenburg-Vorpommern states. To
appropriately model this requires estimating state-level relationships between timing and
case disposition, a task that requires more observations per state than the data provide.12
By limiting the analysis to disputes over the constitutionality of national laws, I can avoid
these issues and ensure I employ the appropriate empirical model.
Since Hypothesis 1 predicts a relationship between timing and case disposition, the
outcome variable of interest is whether the FCC struck down or upheld the challenged
statute. Recall that this variable, Strike, is coded 1 if the FCC strikes down a law as
unconstitutional and 0 if the court upholds the law. I take an expansive view of what it
means for the court to strike down a law by assigning cases a value of 1 when the court
at least partially invalidates the law. I also code a case as 1 when the court declares a
law incompatible with the Basic Law, which requires the legislature to revise the law but
in the meantime allows for its continued implementation for a limited period of time.
The key explanatory variable for the analysis is whether or not the FCC issued its
decision on a case in the period immediately preceding a national election. The variable,
Near Election Decision, codes cases as being close to the next election if the court issued
the decision within six months of election day. I chose six months as the cutoff for two
12

An interesting task for future research would be to consider state-level cases when

sufficient data is available. Or, alternatively, to examine cases at state constitutional
courts and then compare results across states.
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reasons. First, it accounts for the FCC’s desire to avoid appearing overtly political (Vanberg 2005: 125). Decisions issued days before an election may appear too conspicuously
strategic in the eyes of both politicians and, more importantly, the public. To avoid this
pitfall, the court can take advantage of the media buildup to an election, like that shown
in Figure 3.3 and described by scholars of German politics (Schoenbach 1987; Schoenbach
and Lauf 2001; Bachl and Brettschneider 2011), without directly inserting itself into the
politicized environment of the relatively short period of formal campaigning. This is not
to say that the court never makes decisions during this period, but rather that the mechanism described here can be at work before the official start of campaigns and, moreover,
there may be an incentive for the FCC to balance its image as a neutral institution with
strategic need related to obtaining compliance. Second, this measure accounts for the
uncertainty over the exact date of national elections. The constitution dictates that an
election must be held between 45 and 47 months after the start of a legislative session.
As a result, there is some variability in the precise date of national elections. Using six
months as the cutoff allows for the possibility that the FCC’s ability to strategically time
its decisions is related to this constitutional feature of German elections.
For the noncompliance risk condition hypothesis (H2), which states that the relationship between the timing of FCC decisions and case disposition is conditional on the
potential for noncompliance, I use the variable No Government Brief. Recall that this
variable is coded 1 if the government does not file a brief defending the constitutionality
of the challenged statute and 0 if it does file such a brief. Since the analysis is limited
to cases involving national laws, this variable is based solely on whether the federal government filed such a brief. To measure the key concept of the early election hypothesis
(H3), which predicts the relationship between timing of decisions and case disposition to
be conditioned by the timing of national elections, I consider whether or not a case was
decided during a term of the Bundestag ended by an early election. That is, if the FCC
decided a case during the electoral cycles ended by the early elections of 1983, 1990, or
2005, then the variable Early Election takes a value of 1. If the FCC issued its decision
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Table 5.4: Fisher’s Exact Test Results
Relevant
Hypothesis
H1
H2
H2
H3
H3
H3
H3

First
Variable

Second
Variable

Government Brief
Filed?

Early
Election?

Odds Ratio

p-value

Strike
Strike
Strike
Strike
Strike
Strike
Strike

Near Election Decision
Near Election Decision
Near Election Decision
Near Election Decision
Near Election Decision
Near Election Decision
Near Election Decision

Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No

1.49
1.80
0.83
2.4
0.35
1.52
2.31

0.25
0.13
1
0.57
0.43
0.56
0.12

during any other electoral cycle, then this variable takes a value of 0.
Since the predicted relationship is between two dichotomous variables, I again conduct
a preliminary empirical analysis using Fisher’s Exact Test. For each test, I examine the
relationship between Strike and Early Election Decision. For the second hypothesis, I
divide the data according to whether or not the government filed a brief defending the
constitutionality of the challenged statute. Similarly, for the third hypotheses I divide the
data between the presence of such a brief and whether or not the case was decided before
an early election. The results of the tests are presented in Table 5.4.
The results of this preliminary analysis do not provide conclusive evidence supporting
my hypotheses. None of the odds rations resulting from the Fisher’s Exact tests reach
standard levels of statistical significance. Despite these inconclusive findings, the results
are suggestive of a conditional relationship between case disposition and timing. The
bottom row of Table 5.4 shows this relationship when only considering cases including a
brief filed by the government and decided during a standard electoral period. Recall that
the third hypothesis predicts the relationship between Strike and Near Election Decision
to be present specifically under these conditions. As the table shows, this relationship is
strongest when looking at cases that meet those two criteria. This finding suggests that a
more thorough empirical analysis using the entire dataset and key control variables may
better reveal any strategic timing of FCC decisions.
As Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict a relationship between case disposition and timing that
is conditioned by the risk of noncompliance and nature of the electoral term, respectively,
I employ a logistic model with a triple interaction term (Kam and Franzese 2007). The
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constituent terms of this interaction are the three variables Near Election Decision, No
Government Brief, and Early Election. Since these three variables are all dichotomous,
the coefficients for each of the constituent terms correspond to the relationship between
the outcome variable and the individual explanatory variables when they take a value of 1
and the other two components of the interaction equal 0. Recall that the key explanatory
variable is the timing of the FCC’s decision, the variable Near Election Decision, which
I expect to have a positive correlation with case disposition when the government files
a brief (No Government Brief = 0) and the decision is not issued in an electoral cycle
ended by an early election (Early Election = 0). Therefore, the coefficient of interest here
is Near Election Decision, as it will indicate the relationship between case disposition and
timing when the two conditioning variables equal 0.
I include a series of control variables in the analysis to deal with potential omitted
variable bias and account for factors previous research identifies as influencing judicial
decision making in general and at the FCC in particular. First, I control for the legal
merits of the case using the variables Lower Court Unconstitutionality Brief and Amicus
Briefs Balance. Including these variables accounts for potential bias resulting from a
correlation between legal merits and both case disposition and the timing of the court’s
decisions. While I discuss the potential for correlation between legal merits and case
disposition in Chapter 4, it is worth briefly considering how the legal merits might correlate
with the timing of FCC decisions. If it is the case that the FCC is not strategic about the
timing of its decisions, then strategic litigants could be influencing the timing of decisions
and a case’s outcome. Strategic litigants might have an incentive to time their applications
to the court in order to maximize the likelihood of the FCC issuing its decision near an
election. In such a story, politically motivated litigants might try to time cases with
particularly strong legal arguments to come out near the election in order to embarrass or
otherwise electorally harm the government. A critical implication of this account is that
litigants, not the court, are acting strategically, which suggests that failing to account for
this possibility could lead to an incorrect interpretation of the empirical analysis.
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Second, I control for procedural aspects and the issue area of each case that might both
influence case disposition and timing. The variable Second Senate is included in order to
ensure that characteristics unique to one of the Senates is not driving the results. The
variable Hearing addresses the possibility that the focus of the court is on the strategic
use of hearings discussed in the previous chapter and, as a result, any relationship between
timing and case disposition is an artifact of the court’s use of this procedure. I include the
variable Case Complexity, as litigants may strategically select cases that will be readily
understood by voters during an election campaign and time their applications to increase
the likelihood of the FCC issuing its decision in the lead up to an election.

Results
Table 5.5 presents the results of the logistic regression designed to test my three hypotheses. The results are consistent with the expectations of each hypothesis. The FCC is
more likely to strike down a statute as unconstitutional in decisions issued within the six
month period immediately preceding a national election. This relationship, however, is
only statistically significant for cases involving potential noncompliance that the FCC decided in an electoral cycle that did not end with an early election. When the government
did not file a brief defending the constitutionality of the challenged statute, the timing of
the FCC’s decision does not have a statistically significant relationship with case disposition. Similarly, this relationship is not statistically significant for cases decided during
electoral terms that are shortened by early elections.
Since the coefficients of the logistic regression do not lend themselves to straightforward interpretation, I turn to the predicted probabilities presented in Figure 5.6 for a
substantive interpretation of the empirical results. The left panel of the figure provides
the predicted probability of the FCC striking down legislation as unconstitutional when
the court issues its decision in regular electoral cycles. In these instances, the figure
then distinguishes between cases involving potential noncompliance and the timing of the
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Table 5.5: Case Disposition and the Timing of FCC Decisions
Model 1
Near Election Decision
No Government Brief
Early Election
Lower Court Unconstitutionality Brief
Amicus Brief Balance
Hearing
Second Senate
Case Complexity
Near Election Decision × No Gov’t Brief
Near Election Decision × Early Election
No Gov’t Brief × Early Election
Near Election Decision × No Gov’t Brief × Early Election
Constant
N

1.08∗
(0.53)
−0.22
(0.30)
−0.14
(0.27)
0.13
(0.20)
−0.17∗
(0.05)
0.90∗
(0.24)
−0.28
(0.20)
−0.01
(0.21)
−2.13
(1.24)
−0.75
(0.78)
0.01
(0.56)
2.85
(1.76)
−0.53∗
(0.22)
498

Standard errors in parentheses.
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

FCC’s decision. The results are striking: when the government files a brief defending the
constitutionality of the challenged statute, the probability of the FCC striking down legislation is 64% for cases decided in the six months immediately preceding the next election.
In contrast, the probability of such a ruling when faced with the risk of noncompliance
decreases to 36% when the FCC decides cases at any other point in the electoral cycle.13
13

The difference between these two predicted probabilities is statistically significant at

p < 0.1 level.
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Figure 5.6: Analysis of Timing of FCC Decisions
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Note: Black points indicate predicted probability of the FCC striking down legislation as unconstitutional
when the case is decided in the six months prior to the next national election. Gray points indicate the
probability of such a ruling for cases decided more than six months prior to the next national election.
Lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

The results in the right panel of the figure, which provides predicted probabilities of
case disposition for cases decided during electoral cycles ended with an early election, are
noteworthy as well. In these cases, the relationship between the timing of the FCC’s decision and case disposition fails to reach statistical significance. Moreover, this is the case
irrespective of the government’s decision to file a brief defending the constitutionality of
the challenged statute. In short, the linkage between the FCC’s strategic timing of decisions and the political conditions of constitutional review cases is considerably hampered
by the use of early elections.

Extending the Analysis: Convenient Timing or Strategic Delay?
While the above analysis provides empirical evidence for a strategic component to the
timing of FCC decisions, it leaves one central question unanswered: is the timing of FCC
decisions the result of strategic action by the court in choice of timing, or is it instead
the result of exogenous forces that the FCC reacts to by being strategic in its choice
of disposition. Put another way, there are two potential mechanisms for how a court
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such as the FCC can take strategic advantage of timing its decisions. Discerning which
mechanism is at work here will provide a fuller picture of strategic judicial behavior and
the extent to which the timing of decisions serves as an institutional tool for courts to
overcome potential noncompliance.
First, a court could proactively time its decisions by selectively delaying or expediting
its decisions based on when doing so is most advantageous. In this account, the court
prefers to strike down the challenged legislation and seeks to find the most opportune time
to do so. Specifically, the court receives challenges of statutes it wishes to strike down and
so, in order to maximize the likelihood of compliance, it can withhold those decisions until
an impending election creates greater public and media attention to political events like
constitutional review. This “proactive” account of judicial behavior focuses on how courts
can use the complicated and time-intensive nature of decision making as an institutional
tool for addressing potential noncompliance.
A second account is that a court changes the content rather than the timing of its
rulings. By this account, the strategic component of the relationship between timing and
decision making is the latter. This would be the case, for example, when a court has
minimal discretion over the timing of its decisions. In such an instance, the court is not
strategic about when it issues its decision, but instead strategically adjusts the decision
to meet the political conditions. This “reactive” court account depicts judiciaries as
constrained by their environment and by their inability or unwillingness to change that
environment through the timing of their decisions.
Distinguishing between these two accounts empirically requires moving beyond the
preceding analysis, since an implication of both accounts is that a court should be more
likely to strike down legislation near an election. To do so, I focus on the implications of the
two accounts for observable aspects of decisions. In particular, the empirical implications
of the “proactive” and “reactive” mechanisms for judicial behavior diverge depending on
the length of time between when a court receives a case and when it issues a decision as
well as the characteristics of cases decided in the period preceding a national election.
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Only the first account, that is the “proactive” court mechanism, generates predictions
about the strategic use of delay by courts faced with potential noncompliance. In this
account, courts respond to the risk of noncompliance by selecting when they will issue
their decisions. If this is the case, then the political conditions of a case should correspond
to the amount of time a court takes to issue its decision. Moreover, the time taken to make
a decision should further relate to the conditions facing the court when it receives the
case. That is, this account directs our attention to examine the influence of two factors:
the timing of litigation, specifically as it pertains to the likelihood of public attention to
the case, and the potential for noncompliance attached to that case.
When the court receives a case in the electoral cycle directly influences whether and
for how long the court has an incentive to delay its decision. As Figure 5.7 shows, the
FCC receives cases throughout the electoral cycle. Cases the court receives early in an
electoral cycle are less likely to require significant delay because the court can reasonably
expect to issue its decision before the next election. This may not, however, be true for
cases received later in the electoral cycle. The FCC is rarely able to reach its decisions in a
short period of time, making it more difficult to time decisions in the “sweetspot” prior to
an election when the court receives the case later in the electoral cycle. Moreover, a court
can justify delaying its decision relatively easily by citing the complex and demanding
nature of judicial decision making. By delaying these decisions, the court can effectively
wait out the current electoral cycle by delaying and then issue its decision at a more
opportune time in the next electoral cycle. Empirically, then, the FCC should take longer
to make decisions in cases received later in an electoral cycle. Moreover, this relationship
should be limited to cases where noncompliance is at issue; when this is not the case,
there is no incentive for the court to strategically delay its decision in response to the
political environment. My fourth hypothesis follows from this discussion.
Time to Decision Hypothesis (H4): The closer to an election the FCC
receives a case, the longer the FCC takes to issue its decision in that case.
This relationship only holds in cases for which noncompliance is at issue.
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A second implication of the strategic timing account regards the relationship between
the delay of decisions and the specific timing of those decisions. If it is the case that a court
such as the FCC is delaying some decisions to maximize the likelihood of public attention,
then we should observe a relationship between delayed decisions and the electoral cycle
and, critically, the threat of noncompliance. This logic corresponds directly to the second
empirical implication of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2, in that we should
observe a strategic court using its institutional tools, in this case the timing of decisions,
when doing so is most beneficial. As such, I expect the delay of decisions to correlate with
the timing of those decisions under two conditions. First, I expect such a relationship
when the FCC strikes down legislation as unconstitutional. When the court upholds,
noncompliance is not at issue and, as a result, there is no incentive for strategic timing.
Second, I expect this relationship when the government defends the constitutionality of
the challenged statute. Similar to the court’s disposition, when the government does
not defend the statute, noncompliance is not at issue and we should not observe the
timing of decisions vary systematically with the length of time the court takes to issue
its decision. When, however, these two conditions hold and the court strikes down the
challenged legislation against the explicit preferences of the government, I expect longer
delays in the issuance of the court’s decision to correlate positively with the likelihood
that the decision is issued in the period immediately preceding an election. I present this
expectation below as my fifth hypothesis.
Strategic Delay Hypothesis (H5): The longer the FCC takes to issue
a decision, the more likely it is to issue that decision in the period immediately preceding an election. This relationship only holds in cases for which
noncompliance is at issue.
Note that these implications contrast directly with that of the “reactive” court account,
according to which courts respond rather than affect the timing of cases. In this account,
courts change their decisions based on the timing of a decision rather than, as predicted
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in hypotheses 4 and 5, changing the timing of the decision to fit the court’s preferences. If
this alternative “reactive” account is correct, then we should not observe evidence of the
court delaying its decisions or, more generally, a correspondence between political nature
of a case and the length of time the court takes to dispose of a case. In the context of the
hypotheses presented here, such an account would predict a null result, making the tests
below provide a way to empirically adjudicate between this account and the “proactive”
court account. To test the fourth and fifth hypotheses, I again use data on all FCC cases
involving federal law in my dataset.

Testing the Time to Decision Hypothesis (H4)
The key outcome variable for the fourth hypothesis is the number of years between
when the FCC received a case and when the FCC issued its decision. Since FCC decisions
do not list the specific date a case was filed, I rely on the year indicator included in every
case number, which provides the year in which the FCC received each case. This variable,
Decision Years, is the number of years between this application year and the year in which
the FCC issues its decision.14 Since this variable is a count measure, I estimate a negative
binomial regression.15
There are two primary explanatory variables for the fourth hypothesis. The first is
14

Cases decided in the same year they are received by the FCC take a value of 0, cases

decided in the year following the application to the court take a value of 1, and so on.
15
An alternative specification is to use a survival model since the outcome is effectively
the likelihood of a case ”surviving”, that is not being decided by the FCC, in a given
year as explained by the timing of the case’s application. I include in the appendix an
estimation of the model using a Cox Proportional Hazard model, as another common
approach in political science (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Box-Steffensmeier and
Zorn 2001). The results of this Cox Proportional Hazard model are statistically and
substantively similar to those of the negative binomial model used here. The results of
this robustness check are provided in the appendix. I use the negative binomial here for
its more straightforward interpretation and presentation of predicted probabilities and
interaction effects.
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Table 5.6: Time to Decision Hypothesis Preliminary Analysis
First Variable
Election to Filing Time
Election to Filing Time

Second Variable

Government Brief?

Correlation

p-value

Decision Years
Decision Years

Yes
No

0.10
0.06

0.04
0.52

when a case reaches the FCC with respect to the national electoral calendar. This variable,
Election to Filing Time, is the number of years between the case’s arrival at the FCC and
the preceding national election. Note that, as with the variable Decision Years, the year
of a case’s arrival at the FCC is determined by the case number, which does not provide
a specific date. Thus, a case that arrived at the FCC in an election year is coded 0.
The second explanatory variable is No Government Brief, as the hypothesis predicts the
relationship between Election to Filing Time and Decision Years to be conditioned by
the threat of noncompliance.
A simple correlation test, presented in Table 5.6, supports the hypothesis’s expectation. A positive relationship exists between the two variables, suggesting that the nearer
to an election the FCC receives a case, the longer the court takes to issue its decision.
Critically, this relationship only is found in cases including a brief from the government
defending the constitutionality of the challenged statute. To test the robustness of this
preliminary result, I extend the analysis. Because of this conditional relationship, I interact Election to Filing Time with No Government Brief, with the expectation that
the coefficient for Election to Filing Time will be positive. I further include a series of
control variables to address potential omitted variable bias. The variable Case Complexity addresses the possibility that it takes the FCC longer to decide more complex cases.
Moreover, it may take litigants more time after an election to bring forward a case involving complex statutes, either because it took the government longer to pass the statute in
question or because the complex nature of the legislation limited the number of litigants
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capable of bringing a plausible suit to the court. The variable Lower Court Unconstitutionality Brief controls for the legal merits of each case, as the quality of legal arguments
could influence the time needed to decide a case as well as the timing of litigation. Failing
to include these characteristics of each case could lead to biased results and ultimately
hamper the ability of the empirical models to distinguish between the two competing
accounts of judicial behavior.
In addition to these case-focused controls, I include a control variable to address the
possible impact of election results on the relationship between Decision Years and Election
to Filing Time. If an election results in a change in the partisan control of government,
litigants may have an incentive to challenge the previous government’s policies shortly
after the election. Without the enacting government in power to defend against these
challenges, the threat of noncompliance may be less immediate. As a result, the FCC can
strike down legislation challenged in such suits more quickly. To account for this potential
dynamic, I include the variable Government Change. This variable takes a value of 1 if
the election immediately preceding an application to the FCC results in a partisan change
of government and 0 if the incumbent party retains control of government.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.7. The coefficient of interest
here, Election to Filing Time, is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that
when the federal government files a brief defending the constitutionality of a challenged
statute, the FCC takes longer to decide the case the later in the electoral cycle the court
receives it. That is, the more time that passes between a case’s arrival at the FCC and
the preceding national election, the longer the FCC takes to issue its decision in the case.
This relationship, however, only holds in cases where noncompliance is at issue. When
the government does not file a brief in defense of the law under review, the number of
years taken by the FCC to decide a case is unrelated to when the FCC received the case.
Importantly, this conditional relationship holds after the inclusion of key control variables
such as the legal merits of each case and the results of the previous election.
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Table 5.7: Time To Decision Hypothesis Analysis
Model 1
Election to Filing Time
0.06∗
(0.03)
No Government Brief
−0.17
(0.13)
Case Complexity
−0.39∗
(0.07)
Constitutional Complaint
0.34∗
(0.09)
Lower Court Unconstitutionality Brief
0.20∗
(0.09)
Government Change
−0.18∗
(0.06)
Election to Filing Time × No Government Brief
−0.10
(0.07)
Constant
1.16∗
(0.10)
N

497

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

Figure 5.8 provides a graphical representation of these relationships for a substantive
interpretation of the results. The most interesting result is presented in the left panel of
the figure. Cases filed in the same year as a national election take the FCC on average
3.24 years to decide when the government files a brief defending the constitutionality of
the challenged statute. This contrasts to the 3.89 years the FCC takes to issue a decision
in cases received the maximum number of years after the last national election (3 years).
That is, the FCC takes 237 days longer to decide cases that reach the court at the end of
the electoral cycle than those that reach the FCC in the same year as an election. Given
that cases in the dataset took the FCC an average of 3.44 years to decide, this difference is
far from trivial. Indeed, it can be the difference between issuing a decision in a media-rich
electoral environment and issuing the same decision in the middle of the electoral cycle.
In short, this evidence is consistent with the “proactive” account in that the FCC delays
decisions to some degree based on timing.
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Figure 5.8: Predicted Number of Years Between Application and FCC Decision
0.0

Number of Years Between Application and FCC Decision

Government Brief Filed

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

No Government Brief Filed

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0
0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Number of Years Between Application and Election
Note: Based on model 1 from Table 5.7. Shaded bands indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Testing the Strategic Delay Hypothesis (H5)
The outcome variable for my analysis of the fifth hypothesis is the dichotomous variable
Near Election Decision. There are three key explanatory variables for this hypothesis.
The first is Decision Years, as the hypothesis predicts the likelihood of the FCC issuing
decisions in the period immediately preceding the next election to be higher for cases
that took the court longer to decide. The second and third variables of interest address
the conditional nature of this relationship. I include No Government Brief because the
relationship between Decision Years and Near Election Decision should be limited to cases
involving potential noncompliance. The final explanatory variable is Strike. Strategically
timing its decisions only benefits if the court strikes down the challenged statute. As
these last two variables are conditioning variables, I interact them with Decision Years
to create a triple interaction term. Since the hypothesis predicts the relationship between
Decision Years and Near Election Decision to occur when No Government Brief equals 0
and Strike equals 1, the coefficient estimate that represents this conditional relationship
is the interaction term Decision Years × Strike. I expect this coefficient to be positive
and statistically significant.
The results, presented in Table 5.8, support the expectation of the Strategic Delay
Hypothesis (H5). Specifically, the likelihood of the FCC issuing a decision in the period
immediately preceding an election increases with the length of the court’s delay in issuing
the decision. That is, the longer it takes the FCC to issue its decision, the more likely
it is that the FCC issues that decision within six months of the next national election.
This relationship only reaches a traditional level of statistical reliability, however, when
the government files a brief defending the constitutionality of the challenged statute and
the FCC decides to strike the statute down as unconstitutional. When this conflict is
not present, there is no statistical evidence of the FCC strategically delaying decisions in
order to issue them at a more advantageous point. This result is further evidence of the
strong conditioning influence of potential noncompliance on judicial behavior.
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Table 5.8: Results of Logistic Regression for Strategic Delay Hypothesis (H5)
Model 1
Decision Years
−0.12
(0.12)
No Government Brief
−0.13
(0.72)
Strike
−0.86
(0.76)
Decision Years × No Government Brief
0.19
(0.21)
Decision Years × Strike
0.35∗
(0.17)
No Government Brief × Strike
0.39
(1.41)
Decision Years × No Government Brief × Strike
−0.31
(0.32)
Constant
−2.23∗
(0.46)
N

505

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

Figure 5.9 provides predicted probabilities of the FCC issuing a decision in the six
month period immediately preceding the next election based on the three explanatory
variables. Each panel in the figure corresponds to a specific combination of the two
conditioning variables Strike and No Government Brief, while the variable on the x-axis
is Decision Years. The upper left panel presents the result of particular interest here, as
it provides the predicted probability of a near-election decision striking down a statute
despite a brief from the government defending the law. The results are striking. The
probability of the FCC issuing its decision in the period immediately preceding the next
election is 4% in cases decided in less than one year. This probability doubles to 8% for
cases decided in three years, which is the median number of years the FCC took to decide
cases in the data set. At five years, which is third quartile in the data set, the probability
of the FCC issuing its decision in the period immediately preceding an election increases
to 12%. The decisions involving the longest delays by the FCC reveal a considerably

134

greater probability of the FCC strategically timing their issuance; when the FCC takes 8
years to issue a decision, it does so in that pre-election period with 23% probability, while
this probability increases to 42% for cases taking the FCC 12 years to decide. In short,
it appears that when the FCC delays issuing decisions, it does so at least in part to allow
itself an opportunity to time the issuance of the decision for the end of the electoral cycle.
Figure 5.9: Predicted Probabilities for Strategic Delay Hypothesis (H5)
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Note: Based on model 1 from Table 5.8. Shaded bands indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Conclusion
This chapter provides an empirical extension of the theoretical argument presented in
Chapter 2 by considering how the ability of a court to select the timing of its decision can
serve as an institutional tool for affecting public awareness of judicial decisions. Timing
matters in politics, in particular with respect to the ability of citizens to observe the
behavior of their elected officials. I argue that courts can strategically time their decisions
to coincide with period of heightened public interest in politics, specifically the months
leading up to a national election. Building on the insights of the formal model in Chapter
2, I develop a series of discriminating hypotheses regarding the relationship between case
disposition, the threat of noncompliance, and the dynamics of electoral politics in many
of the world’s modern liberal democracies.
I return to the context of the German Constitutional Court to test these hypotheses.
As shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, the timing of the court’s decisions varies considerably.
Using data on the German Constitutional Court to test the empirical implications of this
argument, I find several systematic trends in the timing of the court’s decisions. When
the court is faced with potential noncompliance and electoral politics do not prevent
the court from anticipating the timing of the next election, the FCC is more likely to
issue rulings against the government in the period immediately preceding an election.
When either of these conditions do not hold, however, this relationship does not hold.
Further analysis of the court’s decision provides evidence that the court is strategic in its
choice of timing rather than choice of disposition. That is, my results suggest that the
court selectively delays issuing rulings until the period immediately preceding an election
instead of selectively changing its disposition of a case in response to the timing of the
decision.
These results help to paint a fuller picture of the strategic interactions that occur
between courts and elected officials. It highlights the potential variation in procedural
discretion available to courts and, moreover, the strategic potential of such features of the
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judicial process. In the next and final chapter, I consider how the results shown in this
chapter might interact with those of the preceding chapter. By taking a step back, I can
evaluate the broader implications of the empirical results in their entirety for the quality
of democratic governance.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this project, I proposed and tested a theory of strategic judicial procedures focused
on understanding how key aspects of the judicial process, specifically public oral hearings
and the timing of judicial rulings, influence judicial authority and ultimately the quality
of democratic governance in modern liberal democracies. To conclude, I consider how
my theoretical and empirical results fit into the broader context of judicial politics and
the study of courts. To this end, the chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I
summarize my argument and findings. In the second section, I consider the implications
of my argument for understanding cases at the German Court by examining a recent
FCC ruling as an illustrative example. The third section describes the implications of
the results presented here for several streams of scholarship. Then, in the fourth section,
I examine potential avenues for future research. Finally, I conclude by returning to the
motivating question of the role of judicial procedures in modern liberal democracies.

Summary of Argument and Findings
My theory of strategic judicial procedures is predicated on the first principle that
courts cannot be assured of government compliance with judicial decisions. With neither
the power of the purse nor the sword, courts must instead rely on elected officials for the
implementation of decisions. Critically, this reliance poses a threat to judicial authority
when those officials tasked with implementing the decision prefer not to do so. To over138

come this challenge, courts may be able to rely on public support for the legitimacy of the
judiciary to compel government compliance (Vanberg 2001, 2005). If voters view judicial
decisions as a legitimate and necessary component of democratic governance, then they
may punish elected officials for failing to implement a ruling. The focal point of the theory
and this project is how courts can use their control over the judicial process to ensure
citizens are aware of judicial decisions such that governments are incentivized to faithfully
carry out judicial orders.
To answer this question, I focused my theoretical account on one of the most prominent
judicial procedures, public oral hearings. By providing for media access to an otherwise
typically closed judicial process, public oral hearings have the capacity to increase public
attention to constitutional review cases. In addition, the relative rarity of hearings in
many constitutional courts contributes to the increased media attention hearings garner.
Hearings are typically not required in most cases. Rather, constitutional courts in modern
liberal democracies typically have considerable discretion over the use of hearings. This
discretion allows such a court to decide whether or not to hold a hearing before issuing its
ruling on the constitutionality of a challenged statute. I contend that these two decisions
in the judicial process are linked by a court’s interest in overcoming potential threats of
noncompliance. That is, I argue that courts can use hearings to strategically increase
public awareness of cases to create electoral pressure that incentivizes elected officials to
comply.
To develop my argument, I constructed a formal model of an interaction between
a court with discretion over the use of a public oral hearing and a government with
policy interests opposed to those of the court. The model allows the court to chose
between issuing its decision with or without a public hearing. When the court opts to
incur the cost of holding a hearing, the procedure increases the likelihood that the public
will be aware of the court’s final decision. The government, having observed the court’s
actions, then determines whether to comply with the court’s decision or, instead, engage
in noncompliance.
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The model generates a series of empirically testable predictions providing insight into
both a court’s use of hearings and the procedure’s impact on case disposition. The
model predicted the court to be more likely to hold a hearing for cases that involve a
potential noncompliance risk. This observation stated that when the government is likely
to comply with the court’s decision regardless of a hearing, then the court does not need
the procedure. Only when faced with potential noncompliance does the court have reason
to use its procedural discretion. The model then highlighted the conditions constraining a
court’s use of hearings when faced with potential government noncompliance. A court is
most likely to use a hearing in a case when the proceeding is most likely to generate public
awareness. The model further identified a linkage between the use of hearings and case
disposition. In the theory, courts use hearings to address noncompliance and therefore
should follow up a hearing by striking down the challenged legislation as unconstitutional.
To test these predictions, I collected and coded data on cases at the German Constitutional Court (FCC) from 1995 to 2013 and then added Vanberg’s data on cases from
1983 to 1995 to the dataset. The first hypothesis, the Noncompliance Risk hypothesis,
followed from the first observation of the theoretical model. Consistent with theoretical
expectations, the FCC is more likely to hold a hearing when noncompliance is at issue,
which I measure by examining whether the government filed an amicus brief defending
the constitutionality of the statute. I then tested the Case Complexity and Proceeding
Type hypotheses, which followed from the observation that hearings are more likely to
be effective at increasing public awareness in some cases than others. As anticipated, the
FCC was more likely to hold a hearing in noncomplex and constitutional complaint cases,
as these characteristics lend themselves to increased media coverage and make a case more
easily relatable to the public. Finally, consistent with the Case Disposition hypothesis
based on the final observation from the model, the court was more likely to strike down a
statute after holding a hearing. Critically, this relationship only held when noncompliance
was at issue; otherwise the data yielded no statistically significant relationship between
hearings and case disposition.
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To examine the generalizability of the theory to aspects of the judicial process beyond
hearings, I extended the empirical analysis to the timing of judicial decisions. Again
using data on German Constitutional Court decisions from 1983 to 2013, I test a series of
hypotheses regarding the strategic timing of judicial decisions. The primary hypothesis,
the Timing hypothesis, predicts the court to rule against the government with a higher
frequency in the months immediately preceding a national election due to the increased
media coverage of political news that occurs in the build up to an election. Two further
hypotheses, the Noncompliance Risk Condition and Early Election hypotheses, predict
the relationship between timing and case disposition to be limited to cases for which
noncompliance is at issue and for cases decided near the conclusion of a standard electoral
term. The results of this analysis produced evidence of strategic timing on the part of the
German Court. Decisions issued within the six-month period were more likely to strike
down legislation, but only when a threat of government noncompliance existed and the
upcoming election was not an early election.
Together, the theoretical and empirical results provide strong, nuanced support for a
strategic account of judicial procedures. Notably, the empirical support for the model’s
predictions hold up to the inclusion of alternative accounts in the analysis, such as informational and procedural legitimacy arguments. It suggests that a fuller understanding of
judicial behavior, particularly in the politicized realm of constitutional review, requires
considering the strategic potential of the judicial process itself and the strategies available
for courts to use procedures to address potential noncompliance.

Understanding FCC Rulings: An Illustrative Example
In addition to providing evidence of the strategic potential of judicial procedures, my
argument and accompanying empirical results have the potential to inform our understanding of individual cases adjudicated by the German court. Although the focus of the
empirical aspects of the project has been on the use of large-N statistical analyses, the
theory should nonetheless be a useful guide to interpreting the behavior of constitutional
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courts in specific instances. An illustrative example of the theory’s application to a recent
major case demonstrates this contribution of the project. To this end, I return to the
example discussed in the introduction of the project to consider how my argument might
help inform our understanding of how the FCC handled the case.
In 2010, a chemistry professor at the Philipp University of Marburg in the state of
Hesse brought suit against the state of Hesse regarding his salary.1 In the early 2000’s,
state and federal legislators reformed the pay scale for university professors with the goal of
introducing increased competition. Federal rules introduced in 2005 allowed for professors’
salaries to be set low and then provide for performance-based bonuses. The professor
challenged the constitutionality of state law specifying the pay of professors, claiming
that his low salary was not commensurate with the degree of training and expertise
necessary to obtain employment in his post. The administrative court adjudicating his
claim referred the case to the constitutional court seeking clarification on the statute’s
conformity with the constitution.
Initial interest in the case was predominantly limited to higher education interest
groups, who supported the litigant’s claim, and the government of Hesse, which defended
the constitutionality of the challenged statute. In addition, the Federal government took
an interest in the case since it involved the state level implementation of its reform legislation passed in 2005. In addition to these directly involved parties, five interest groups
filed amicus briefs with the court. Beyond the demonstrated interest of these parties,
however, attention for the case was sparse. In fact, the case received no initial media
attention based on the Lexis Nexis data on media coverage of cases used in Chapter 3.
On October 11, 2011, the court held a public oral hearing for the case. The plaintiff
and the Hessian government presented their arguments, as did the Federal government.
The court further heard expert testimony from a representative of the Federal Statistical
Office (Statistischen Bundesamt) In addition, representatives from the several interest
groups that had filed briefs participated in the hearing. Notably, the hearings garnered
1

The case number is 2 BvL 4/10.
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coverage from some major German news outlets. This included the Süddeutsche Zeitung,
Germany’s highest circulating daily newspaper according to the German Advertising Federation.
In a decision issued on February 12, 2012, the court ruled 6 to 1 in favor of the
plaintiff.2 The court declared the law contradictory to the “maintenance principle”, which
is a constitutional mandate for the state to take care of civil servants’ welfare. In the
opinion, the justices stated that basic salaries are “not enough to ensure a professor an
appropriate living in accordance with his rank, the responsibilities his office entails and
the significance of civil service with tenure for the public at large.” The ruling ordered
the Hessian government to pass new legislation raising pay for university professors by no
later than the end of that year (January 1, 2013).
The court’s decision created a media frenzy. The major media outlets dedicated considerable coverage to the ruling. Der Spiegel, Germany’s most widely circulated weekly
news magazine, carried court articles on the case, including an English language article.
The most widely circulated weekly newspaper, Die Zeit, similarly included coverage of
the decision. In addition to the widespread reporting of the decision, the editorial pages
of German newspapers were filled with commentary on the case. Editorials appeared in,
among others, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, the Süddeutsche Zeitung,
Handelsblatt, the Financial Times Deutschland, and Die Tageszeitung. Beyond the traditional news media, higher education interest groups and unions issued press releases and
statements on the decision.
The government responded to the court’s decision by passing revised legislation as
ordered. As the court’s ruling gave the government until January 1, 2013 to comply, the
change was not made immediately. Nonetheless, on October 1, 2012, a revised pay scale
took effect. With the passage of the new law, the state government had complied with
the FCC’s ruling.
2

A rarity in FCC decisions, one justice wrote a dissent in the case. Decisions are

typically issued unanimously.
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This case is an excellent example of a constitutional court successfully constraining
a government against its will. The argument in this study highlights how the German
court was able to use procedures as tools for accomplishing this end. At the outset, it
was not clear whether or not public awareness would be sufficient to compel the Hessian
government to comply if the court struck the law down. Although there was attention
from interest groups, the media appeared largely uninterested. Moreover, the federal
government had sided with the state government, meaning that the court could not rely
on the national government to pressure Hesse to comply. This case posed what might be
considered a moderate threat of noncompliance - the government in the case had a vested
interest in the continued implementation of the challenged statute and the likelihood of
public awareness in the case was small but not trivial.
The court’s use of a public oral hearing changed things dramatically. In the context of
my theory, it made sense for the court to hold a hearing in this case. The issue at stake,
low pay for university professors, was relatively straightforward and could be effectively
covered by the media and easily understood by the public. Moreover, the potential for
noncompliance, while present, was not so overwhelming as to make a hearing a waste of
the court’s resources. If confronted with an alert electorate, the government was unlikely
to make a defiant stand on the issue. In short, the case was ideally suited for the use
a procedure that could raise its public profile. The hearing did just that, leaving the
government in the position of accepting the court’s decision and passing new legislation.
The timing of the court’s decision similarly conforms with my theory’s expectations.
The FCC received the case in 2010, only one year after a state election had been held.
With elections typically held in the January or February of every fourth year, one could
have reasonable anticipated the next election to take place in the early months of 2013.
While the court’s decision was issued in February 2012, recall that it specified that the
government had until January 1, 2013 to comply. As a result, a failure to comply with
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the court’s decision by this date would likely coincide with the next electoral campaign.3
While it is difficult to discern with any precision the link between the timing of the court’s
decision and the electoral calendar in this singular instance, the argument and empirical
evidence in Chapter 5 suggest a nuanced account for the court’s choice of timing.

Implications for Extant Research
This project has implications for the study of the German Federal Constitutional
Court. The conventional wisdom has been that a case’s saliency is the primary determinant for whether or not the court holds a hearing (Vanberg 2001: 355, 2005: 103;
Kommers and Miller 2012: 27). While my analysis shows empirical support for the previously untested claim of salience’s effect, it also provides compelling evidence for the
project’s novel claim that the threat of noncompliance motivates the FCC’s use of hearings. Moreover, the results reveal the substantively significant influence of noncompliance,
most notably in comparison to the influence of salience. Together with Vanberg’s empirical evidence, these results provide further evidence of how noncompliance influences the
FCC’s behavior.
The results of this study are also interesting when considered in light of recent evidence of the ideological basis of decision making by European constitutional courts (e.g.
Hanretty 2012; Hönnige 2011). This line of research has demonstrated that courts strike
government actions more often when the court consists of judges with conflicting ideological preferences to that of the government (Hönnige 2009). Such ideological considerations
cannot account for the results presented here. By typical measures of ideology, the FCC
had no variation in ideological divergence from the government during the period of this
study (Hönnige 2009). As a result, the patterns of FCC decision making, and their sys3

Only several months after the court’s decision did the state government institute a

complete shift in the state’s electoral calendar by synchronizing the date of state elections
with the federal elections in September 2013. Although a rather extreme measure, the
possibility of such drastic changes to the electoral calendar pose a challenge the strategic
timing of decisions similar to that posed by early elections.
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tematic connection to procedural choice, complement these past studies and provide a
richer depiction of adjudication in these courts. This study also suggests that previous
evidence of ideological voting on constitutional courts likely understates the actual prevalence of ideological considerations in judges’ sincere preferences over rulings. Based on
the model and findings presented here, noncompliance concerns should cause judges, at
least some of the time, to vote strategically and uphold government actions that they
ideologically oppose. This finding directs the attention of future research on Europe’s
constitutional courts toward incorporating the procedures and processes that shape the
judicial process, such as the constitutional complaint, into theories of judicial behavior
and empirical studies of ideological voting on constitutional courts.
The study additionally offers insights into the role and influence of public oral hearings
on judicial review. The most developed empirical literature addresses the U.S. Supreme
Court’s oral arguments and the impact of the content of hearings. In these works, hearings
affect judicial review by serving as an information-gathering tool for judges (Johnson
2001) and an opportunity for the Federal government to convert the Solicitor General’s
superior resources and expertise into a higher likelihood of winning (Johnson, Wahlbeck
and Spriggs II 2006). While addressing important questions, this line of research is limited
to considering behavior after the court has decided to hold oral arguments. In contrast,
this article poses the question of why courts opt to hold hearings when they do. A more
complete appreciation of hearings might consider how the answers to these two distinct
questions complement or contradict each other.
The results further highlight the influence of institutional rules on the quality of liberal
democratic governance. Liberal democratic governance requires elected officials to adhere
to constitutional obligations and constitutional courts to hold officials accountable when
they breach those obligations. To effectively do so, constitutional courts must be willing
to rule against the wishes of the government and then maximize the chance such rulings
will be accompanied by electoral or other pressures on the government to comply. The
theoretical account presented here suggests that courts use procedures such as public oral
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hearings to bring such pressures upon officials by increasing public attention to cases of
unconstitutional behavior. The discretion available to courts allows them to use hearings
when they are both most needed to confront threats of noncompliance and when they
will be most effective at garnering public attention. Ultimately, as evidenced by the
empirical results from the German Constitutional Court, hearings provide courts with a
route through which they can more readily exercise their authority and hold government
officials accountable for breaches of constitutional obligations.
Finally, my findings have implications for the study of compliance. Scholars of the
politics of judicial review are increasingly considering how threats of noncompliance constrain constitutional courts (e.g. Vanberg 2001, 2005; Staton 2006, 2010; Carrubba and
Zorn 2010; Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 2008; Carrubba and Gabel 2015). The work
presented here provides further theoretical and empirical support for this literature’s key
conclusion that noncompliance shapes judicial behavior and substantiates the conclusion
of previous studies (Staton 2006, 2010) that courts use the institutional tools at their
disposal to address potential noncompliance. This contribution, however, goes beyond
reinforcing existing conclusions in the literature. This project extends the literature’s
understanding of compliance’s influence on judicial behavior in a novel manner by showing the influence of political conditions on judicial behavior before any ruling has been
issued. In so doing, the argument and accompanying evidence shown in the preceding
chapters promote a more complete and thorough account of courts’ strategic responses to
the fundamental challenge noncompliance poses for judicial authority. As I discuss in the
next section, future work building on this project would further this progression towards
a general understanding of noncompliance’s impact on judicial politics.

Future Research
Future research might address a number of theoretical and empirical questions raised
by the argument presented here. The theoretical model, although simple in its construction, yielded a number of empirical implications and insights into the relationship
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between courts and elected governments. While I tested the implications most central
to the question of judicial procedures’ influence on judicial authority, there remain additional implications of the model yet to be empirically tested. The results of the model
point to the constraining effect the cost of hearings has on the court’s ability to use the
procedure to overcome potential noncompliance. On the one hand, some cases, such as
those addressing highly complex policies, may require a court to bring in experts and
other qualified parties to provide testimony. For some courts, such costs may be negligible thanks to substantial budgets, docket control (thus limiting the number of potential
hearings), or an ability to efficiently distribute cases within the court (thus spreading
the opportunity cost among the judges). For others, however, hearings may constitute a
drain on time and financial resources that makes the procedure’s use considerably more
onerous. On the other hand, other disputes may leave the court requiring little more
information than the briefs submitted by interested parties and the litigants’ statements.
Further empirical analysis of the strategic potential of judicial procedures might look to
examine if there is empirical support for the model’s predictions linking variation in the
cost of holding a public hearing to the procedure’s use by constitutional courts.
The potential for such future work points to implications of the theory’s generalizability. While the focus here has been on Germany and its Federal Constitutional Court, the
argument applies to many constitutional courts from a variety of backgrounds. As we
saw in Chapter 2, a wide range of courts enjoy discretion over the public oral hearings.
And similarly many courts have discretion over when they dispose of a case. The theory
proposed here has the potential to provide a new perspective and understanding of how
these courts operate, much like this project did in the case of the German Constitutional
Court. Moreover, variation across countries on key aspects of the model suggests a potential for cross-national analyses that can leverage additional insights from the model, such
as the role of hearings’ cost. This point regarding comparative analysis is particularly
poignant, as it highlights how the model’s results have implications for behavior across
courts in addition to the implications tested here on the actions of a single court.
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One of the lessons from the analysis of the timing of FCC decisions was the potential
extent of strategic behavior beyond hearings. The project extends Staton’s conclusions
regarding media relations by demonstrating that the list of institutional tools includes
key features of the judicial process. A key implication of this conclusion is that similar
strategic judicial behavior may extend to a multitude of facets of the judicial process;
courts have a list of potential tools that goes far beyond public oral hearings and press
releases. For example, many courts, including the FCC, can reduce the ambiguity of
rulings by specifying the date upon which the government must implement new legislation.
The theoretical account presented here suggests that the relationship between public
awareness and noncompliance may be one possible explanation for why and when courts
use such features.4 Insofar that such tools can be manipulated to effectively influence
public awareness, this article directs the attention of future research to the influence of
threats of noncompliance on the judicial process.
The implications of the project, and by extension the potential for future work, may
not be limited to the context of domestic constitutional courts. International courts, much
like their domestic counterparts, face a fundamental challenge of ensuring the faithful implementation of their decisions (Staton and Moore 2011; Carrubba and Gabel 2015). Indeed, much of the international law is often characterized as anarchic, i.e. a system lacking
an enforcement mechanism (e.g. Waltz 1979). In short, the first principles that motivate
my argument here are largely applicable to international courts that enforce international
legal regimes, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ). While the solutions to noncompliance threats available to international courts differ from those available to domestic
courts, judicial procedures at international courts may nonetheless have strategic potential. Indeed, it is entirely possible that international courts use procedures to affect public
attention much like evidence presented here shows domestic courts do. Understanding the
role of procedures in international courts can provide some insights into the behavior of
4

The political potential of this feature in the German context has not been lost on

scholars of the FCC (Kommers and Miller 2012, Vanberg 2005).
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this growing set of courts and, additionally, yield theoretical and empirical leverage to
the ongoing debate regarding the differences and similarities between international and
domestic courts.
In addition to such empirical extensions, avenues for future research include extensions
of the theoretical model. The empirical and theoretical analyses in this project focused
on the strategic use of individual procedures. It is unlikely, however, that courts make
procedural decisions without consideration for past and future procedural choices. Indeed,
the model and analysis presented here demonstrate the interconnectedness between such
choices (i.e. hearings and case disposition). Courts, then, may have a broader strategy
with regard to procedures, one in which the variety of institutional tools available to
courts serve as a form of menu from which the court can choose. This would suggest
more extensively strategic judicial behavior that links procedural decisions throughout
the process. For example, the use of hearings may be tied to the timing of when a case
reaches a court. A more complete theory of the judicial process, one that accounts for the
various steps involved and procedural options available to courts, would help to improve
our overall understanding of judicial behavior in the broader sense and the influence of
political threats like noncompliance in a more specific sense.
A second theoretical extension would be to relax the assumption that the court enjoys
a high level of diffuse support. Recall that the court in the model is assumed to have
a high level of public support that creates the electoral incentive for elected officials to
comply with the court. But what of courts that do not enjoy such support? Courts like
the Russian Constitutional Court (Trochev 2008) cannot rely on voters to punish elected
officials when they observe noncompliance. In such cases, does a court use hearings,
the timing of decisions, or similar procedural tools to affect public awareness? A useful
extension of the argument here would be to examine the implications of increasing public
awareness in those contexts where courts lack public support or are even actively disliked
by the public.
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Final Thoughts: Judicial Procedures and Democratic
Governance
This project began by noting the increasingly central role of constitutional courts and
judicial review in modern liberal democracies. Both established and new democracies
are adopting some form of constitutional review as the institution becomes a hallmark
of democratic governance. But the mere presence of a court does not ensure it can
effectively exercise its authority and constrain the other branches of government. The
central conclusion following from the analysis presented here is that procedures can help
courts hold officials accountable for breaching their constitutional obligations. What,
then, does this mean for the influence of institutional procedures on the quality of liberal
democratic governance?
The argument and evidence suggest that the clear answer to this question is that procedures like public oral hearings can serve to improve the quality of governance. Modern
liberal democracies rely broadly on the threat of electoral punishment to ensure elected
officials act in accordance with both the policy objectives of voters and constitutional
obligations. For voters to effectively hold politicians accountable in this manner, however, citizens must be aware of their elected officials’ behavior. Procedures like hearings
serve to establish and reinforce this critical link in the democratic process by improving
the public’s access to information about the actions of their elected representatives. An
informed public can empower a court, which in turn can promote the rule of law and
protect that public from illegal state actions.
The extent to which public oral hearings or the timing of judicial rulings can accomplish this, however, is limited in a critical way. As the model predicted and the empirical
analysis demonstrated, judicial procedures are by no means a comprehensive solution to
the noncompliance problem facing courts. Hearings, for example, are most effective when
the media is likely to cover the proceeding and the public is likely to understand that
coverage. But such cases are ex ante more likely to garner public attention even without
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a hearing - the court’s use of the procedure activates the public’s awareness to a case.
Where hearings lose their effectiveness is in the cases that are most likely to result in
government noncompliance. Courts are weakest when the threat of electoral punishment
for noncompliance lacks credibility because the public is highly unlikely to become aware
of the government’s actions. When the public’s inattentiveness is entrenched, holding
a hearing is unlikely to generate much public interest. This leaves the court unable to
effectively exercise its authority and further still unable to rely on procedural tools to
rectify the situation. When the court is at its weakest and most needs an effective tool
for addressing potential noncompliance, these procedural options fall short.
This leaves something of a mixed message regarding the desirability of discretionary
procedures. Policymakers see the structure of procedures as a critical component of
designing and maintaining effective judiciaries. In a 2004 report on hearings at the Russian Constitutional Court, the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy
through Law, known as the Venice Commission, endorsed revising the Russian Constitutional Court Act to allow the court broader discretion over the use of hearings. Citing
the value of the procedure for ensuring judicial legitimacy and authority, the commission
recommended granting the court more control over the judicial process. The argument
and evidence here only offers tentative support for such a recommendation. Without the
necessary public support, it is unclear the extent to which hearings can engender the sort
of electoral threat that can help a judiciary effectively exercise constitutional review.
Despite their limitations, discretionary procedures may in some respects better serve
the goal of promoting judicial authority than other options typically available to courts.
Compare, for example, public oral hearings with the focus of Staton’s work, press releases
and other media relations. Both can serve the similar purpose of bringing judicial rulings
into the public eye. But whereas media relations offices are not part of the judicial process
itself, hearings are. This distinction is not trivial, as it may make a court’s discretion over
hearings more durable to potential political maneuvering. Court curbing, that is actions
taken by politicians to limit the authority or capacity of the judiciary, can be a threat
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to courts, including otherwise established judiciaries like the U.S. Supreme Court (Clark
2009, 2011). In such instances, politicians may find it difficult to justify hampering
a court’s ability to use normatively desirable procedures like public oral hearings. In
contrast, cutting a court’s budget to render a press office ineffective may be considerably
more politically plausible. In this sense, providing a court with discretion over hearings
may be a particularly durable method for enhancing judicial authority.
In sum, this study suggests that interactions between courts and governments involve
complex dynamics than span throughout the judicial process. Judicial procedures like
public oral hearings can serve as effective institutional tools for courts confronted with
potential noncompliance, but only when they effectively communicate issues to the public
and voters are dedicated to the institutional integrity of a court. Ultimately, though, the
results presented here are positive for the efficacy of constitutional review. With judicial
procedures in a court’s toolbox, the least dangerous branch has at least a few more ways
to assert its authority.
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Appendix: Formal Model Proof
Proofs for Model Equilibria. The solution concept for the game is subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) and I limit the analysis to pure strategies. I first prove the three
thresholds used to structure the model’s equilibria.
Consider the final stage of the game. At this node the government decides whether
to evade (E = 1) or comply (E = 0) with the court’s veto. Note that since I assume the
government complies trivially any time the court upholds, I will not consider government
strategies after the court issues a ruling upholding the challenged action. As the government observes the court’s decision regarding a hearing for the case, there are two possible
environments in which the government can find itself. First, consider when the court has
chosen not to hold a hearing (H = 0). In this case, the government’s utility functions are:
EUG (E = 1|H = 0, V = 1) = α(1 − π) − β(π)
EUG (E = 0|H = 0, V = 1) = 0
This yields the following threshold:

Evade (E=1) iff: π <

α
α+β

Now consider when the court has chosen to hold a hearing (H = 1). In this case, the
government’s utility functions are:
EUG (E = 1|H = 1, V = 1) = α(1 − φ) − β(φ)
EUG (E = 0|H = 1, V = 1) = 0
This yields the following threshold:

Evade (E=1) iff: φ <

α
α+β

Definition 1.1: Define the “Government Compliance Threshold” as:
α
TGComp ≡ α+β
Now consider the court’s decision stage. At this point in the game, the court must
decide to either uphold (V = 0) or veto (V = 1) the challenged government action. Since
the court must base its decision off its previous move (whether or not to hold a hearing)
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and in anticipation of the government’s choice (whether or not to evade a veto), there are
four possible cases.
Case 1: H = 1 and φ < TGComp
EUC (V = 0|H = 1; E = 1) = −κ
EUC (V = 1|H = 1; E = 1) = A(φ) − I(1 − φ) − κ
This yields the following threshold:

Veto (V=1) iff: φ >

I
A+I

Case 2: H = 1 and φ > TGComp
EUC (V = 0|H = 1; E = 0) = −κ
EUC (V = 1|H = 1; E = 0) = A − κ
This yields the following threshold:

Veto (V=1) iff: A > 0
Case 3: H = 0 and φ < TGComp
EUC (V = 0|H = 0; E = 1) = 0
EUC (V = 1|H = 0; E = 1) = A(π) − I(1 − π) − κ
This yields the following threshold:

Veto (V=1) iff: π >

I
A+I

Case 4: H = 0 and φ > TGComp
EUC (V = 0|H = 0; E = 0) = 0
EUC (V = 1|H = 0; E = 0) = A
This yields the following threshold:
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Veto (V=1) iff: A > 0
Definition 1.2: Define the “Judicial Veto Threshold” as:
I
TCV eto ≡ A+I
Finally, consider the first move of the game, the court’s decision regarding the holding
of a public oral hearing. The threshold that must be met in order for the court to hold a
hearing is the following:
Definition 1.3: Define the “Judicial Public Hearing Threshold” as:
K
TCHearing ≡ A+I
When this condition is met, there are six unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria to the game. I will present each one in turn.
Confrontational Hearings.
In this equilibrium, the court and government are at
conflict regardless of the court’s decision to hold a hearing. However, holding a hearing
has the possibility to sufficiently improve the likelihood of public mobilization such that
doing so offsets the accompanying cost.
Equilibrium A: Confrontational Hearing.
For π < φ < TGComp , φ > π > TCV eto ,
and φ − π > TCHearing the following strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
Government: SG = {Evade, ..., Evade}
Court: SC = {Hearing, V eto}
Proof:

If π < φ <

α
α+β

and φ > π >

I
,
A+I

then

EUC (H = 0) = A(π) − (I)(1 − π)
EUC (H = 1) = A(φ) − (I)(1 − φ) − κ
Hold a hearing iff:
A(φ) − (I)(1 − φ) − κ > A(π) − (I)(1 − π)
φ(A + I) − κ > π(A + I)
K
φ−π >
A+I
Mobilizing Hearing.
In this equilibrium, the government’s behavior is altered by
the holding of a hearing. Specifically, the hearing effects the government’s utility function
such that the government complies with a judicial veto when it would not do so otherwise.
Equilibrium B: For φ > TGComp > π, φ > TCV eto , and 1 − π > TCHearing , the following
strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
Government: SG = {Comply, Evade, Comply, Evade}
Court: SC = {H = 1, V = 1}
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Proof:

If φ >

α
α+β

> π and φ >

I
,
A+I

then

EUC (H = 0) = A(π) − (I)(1 − π)
EUC (H = 1) = A − κ
Hold a hearing iff:
A − κ > Aπ + Iπ − I
(A + I)(1 − π) > κ
κ
1−π >
A+I
Judicial Emboldening Hearing. In this equilibrium, hearings shift a case from one
in which the court upholds in order to avoid government evasion to one in which the court
vetoes and the government acquiesces.
Equilibrium C: For φ > TGComp > π, π < TCV eto < φ, and
strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
Government: SG = {Comply, Evade, Comply, Evade}
Court: SC = {Hearing, V eto}
Proof:

If φ >

α
α+β

and φ >

I
A+I

A
A+I

> TCHearing , the following

> π, then

EUC (H = 0) = 0
EUC (H = 1) = A − κ
Hold a hearing iff5 :
0 > A−κ
A
K
>
A+I
A+I
Limited Judicial Emboldening Hearing.
In this equilibrium, a hearing increases
the likelihood of public mobilization a sufficient level to incentivize the court to veto. It
does not, however, increase it enough to influence the government’s strategy. As a result,
a hearing in this equilibrium takes a case from a nonconfrontational setting to one in
which the court is willing to challenge the government.
Equilibrium D: For φ < TGComp , π < TCV eto , and
profile constitutes a SPE:
Government: SG = {Evade, ..., Evade}
5

κφ
K+I

> TCHearing , the following strategy

The final step in the proof is added to make the threshold for this equilibrium con-

sistent with those of Equilibria C, D, and E.
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Court: SC = {Hearing, V eto}
Proof:

If φ <

α
α+β

and π <

I
,
A+I

then

EUC (H = 0) = 0
EUC (H = 1) = Aφ − (1 − φ)(I) − κ
Hold a hearing iff:
Aφ − (1 − φ)(I) − κ > 0
κφ
κ
>
κ+I
A+I
Inconsequential Hearings. There are two equilibria in which hearings have no effect
on the players’ strategies due to their beliefs. As a result, in these equilibria the court
never holds a hearing in these equilibria.
Equilibria E: Fully Deferential Government.
following strategy profile constitutes a SPE:
Government: SG = {Comply, ..., Comply}
Court: SC = {No Hearing, V eto}
Proof:

For φ > π >

α
α+β

and φ > π >

I
,
A+I

If π > TGComp and π > TCV eto , the

then

EUC (H = 0) = A
EUC (H = 1) = A − κ
Hold a hearing iff: A − κ > A
Hold a hearing iff: κ < 0
Since κ > 0, the court never holds a hearing.
Equilibria F: Fully Deferential Court. For φ < TCV eto , the following strategy profile
constitutes a SPE:
Government: SG = {Evade, ..., Evade}
Court: SC = {No Hearing, V eto}
Proof:

If π < φ <

I
,
A+I

then

EUC (H = 0) = 0
EUC (H = 1) = −κ
Hold a hearing iff: κ < 0
Since κ > 0, the court never holds a hearing.
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics of
FCC Dataset
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Figure A1: Histogram of Total Briefs Variable
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A2: Histogram of Total Briefs Variable
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Note: Boxplot widths are proportional to the square root of the sample sizes.
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Appendix: Alternative Analysis of
Time to Decision Hypothesis (H4)
Table A1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model Analysis of H4
Model 1
Near Election Decision
−0.09†
(0.05)
No Government Brief
0.20
(0.18)
Case Complexity
0.61∗∗∗
(0.10)
Constitutional Complaint
−0.53∗∗∗
(0.14)
Lower Court Unconstitutionality Brief
−0.25†
(0.13)
Government Change
0.28∗∗
(0.09)
Near Election Decision ×No Government Brief
0.17
(0.10)
N

497

Standard errors in parentheses
†
significant at p < .10; ∗ p < .05;

∗∗

p < .01;
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∗∗∗

p < .001

